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Although the banking literature offers a very rich assessment of financial risks, this thesis at-
tempts to extend the empirical literature by narrowing the important gaps in various aspects. 
Guided by the fundamental-based view (Calomiris, 2007) and supported by the theory of fi-
nancial intermediation introduced by Allen and Santomero (1997), this thesis presents three 
distinctive empirical models to analyse the determinants of financial risks among banks in the 
United States over the past few decades. In first essay (chapter 2), I examine the factors and 
the extent to which they affect the probability of bank failure across different size categories. 
Results suggest that factors affecting bank failure vary across respective size categories, and 
the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) of mutually significant covariates also exhibit signifi-
cant variability across different size classes. In second essay (chapter 3), I explore the system-
atic trend in bank risk and its sources. I find that the risk level for each new cohort of banks are 
higher than its predecessors. In addition, I find that the risk differences (cohort risk phenome-
non) are broadly persistent because each new cohort of banks adopts riskier business strategies 
than its predecessor. In third essay (chapter 4), I investigate the impact of tail risk on financial 
distress among publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs). My results show that tail risk 
is significantly and positively linked to the financial distress, implying that BHCs with a higher 
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1. THESIS OVERVIEW   
1.1 Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis indicates that the knowledge gained about bank financial risks 
is still not sufficient to avoid such crisis in the future. In addition, the banking literature has a 
lack of coverage in several aspects related to financial risks. The purpose of this thesis is to 
enhance our understanding by deeply investigating the determinants of financial risks in the 
U.S. banking industry, and to address the important gaps in the banking literature by focusing 
on certain areas remain unresolved. The thesis presents three empirical models to study a 
number of financial risks among banks in the United States over the past few decades.  
In first essay (chapter 2), I extend the banking literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Cole and Gunther, 1995; Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 
2013; Kolari et al., 2002; Spahr, 1989) by providing a comprehensive analysis of failures across 
various bank size categories over the longest period of time (from 1985 until 2016) in the 
literature that covers data-points before, during, and after financial crises. I employ separate 
early-warning models for small, medium, and large banks, and report any differences in 
comparison to all bank failure prediction models, irrespective of bank size. Empirical results 
show that the accounting-based factors affecting bank failure and the magnitudes of mutually 
significant factors (AMEs) vary across bank size classes. The results clearly underline the 
importance of the heterogeneity in bank size when examining the financial risks and 
constructing appropriate policies and regulations. 
My second essay (chapter 3) contributes to the existing literature of bank risk (e.g., Boyd 
and Prescott, 1986; Bryant, 1980; Calem and Rob, 1999; Delis and Staikouras, 2011; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
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Liu and Ngo, 2014; Qi, 1994) by extending the body of research focuses on a systematic 
increase in idiosyncratic risk among publicly listed firms. (e.g., Ang et al., 2006; Brown and 
Kapadia, 2007; Campbell et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2004; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009; Pástor 
and Pietro, 2003). Specifically, I study the systematic trend of financial risks (measured by 
liquidity risk and credit risk) among unlisted banks in the U.S. market and examine the potential 
explanations for this trend. In general, I find a clear evidence of an increase in bank financial 
risks over the sample period, 1980-2017.  This positive trend explained by the increase of the 
risk levels for each successive cohort of new banks (cohort risk phenomenon). In addition, I 
find that the risk differences for these cohorts are broadly persistent due to the adoption of 
riskier business strategies based on higher brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-
balance sheet items, and non-interest income.  
The third essay (chapter 4) expands the scope of the existing literature, which shows a 
strong connection between the information content of market indicators and individual bank 
risk (e.g., Coffinet et al., 2010; Curry et al., 2007; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Flannery, 1998; 
Gropp et al., 2006), by incorporating tail risk measures namely, value-at-risk (VaR) and 
expected shortfall (ES), to substantially enhance the understanding of bank financial distress. 
Guided by the Extreme Value Theory (EVT), I empirically investigate the impact of extreme 
negative daily equity returns (tail risk) on financial distress among publicly traded bank holding 
companies (BHCs) in the United States. My results show that VaR and ES are significantly 
and positively related to the banks financial distress. Implying that BHCs with more frequent 
extreme negative daily equity returns induce higher tail risks, thereby increasing their 
likelihood of experiencing financial distress. The results also show that tail risk measures 
enhance the explanatory power of traditional models explaining banks distress risk based on 
accounting information. These results indicate that market discipline is generally beneficial in 
managing and regulating banks. 
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Overall, the main implications of this thesis are to provide deeper insights into the 
understanding of bank financial risks and strongly support recent regulatory requirements (e.g., 
the Basel III framework and the Dodd–Frank Act) to enhance the stability of banking industry, 
thereby avoiding the adverse effects on whole economy. In addition, this thesis should interest 
all parties including bank managers, supervisors, policy makers, and researchers who attempt 
to examine the financial risks. 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
1.2.1 Theoretical Perspective on The Role of Banks 
The theoretical literature on the role of banks typically related to the traditional existential 
theories and the financial intermediation theories. The first strand focuses on the existence and 
main operations of banks and the second strand discusses the conditions and reasons behind 
the existence of banks (Swank, 1996). The core traditional theories in the literature are 
transaction costs (Benston et al., 1976), asymmetric information and signalling (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977), and delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984). They assume banks as financial 
intermediaries exist due to the market imperfections that prevent the direct relationship 
between savers and investors and justify the transaction costs to monitor investors on behalf of 
savers and the engagement in asset transformation activities. In contrast, Allen and Santomero 
(1997) view financial intermediaries, especially banks, as facilitators of risk transfer and deal 
with complex financial instruments and markets. In other words, they consider the risk 
management as the key role of financial institutions (e.g. banks). They argue that traditional 
financial intermediation theories are increasingly less relevant to current financial systems due 
to the rapid changes such as technologies and financial innovations that have reduced the 
transactions costs and have increased the availability of information. Moreover, the neutral of 
banks is dealing in financial assets, which considers a financial risk business, and this means 
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they expose, involve, and manage all types of risks including financial risks (e.g. credit risk, 
market risk, and liquidity risk) and non-financial risks (e.g. operational risks). These risks have 
increased in parallel with the rapid growth in banks during the past 30 years. In addition, the 
fixed premium deposit insurance that offered by the FDIC has increased the banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour without limit (deposit insurance theory) (Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992). 
1.2.2 Theoretical Framework 
This thesis is supported by two theoretical views. First, the panic-based view that introduced 
by Bryant (1980), which advocates banks are inherently vulnerable and subject to contagion 
(Calomiris, 2007). According to this view, banks run attributed to the beliefs of depositors to 
withdraw their funds because others will run, and depositors withdraw the money due to 
ambiguous or inaccurate information (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In such circumstance, 
many banks may fail due to high withdrawal pressure and spread to the rest including the 
solvent and healthy banks. Second, the fundamental-based view that considers banks are 
inherently stable and not subject to panic. According to this view, depositors withdraw their 
funds due to adverse fundamental changes in the economic conditions of banks (e.g. large 
losses) that lead to the failure of only weak and fragile banks (Calomiris, 2007). 
This thesis tends most likely to the fundamental-based view because I believe the 
financial status of bank generally governs current depositors’ decision of withdrawal, investors, 
and expected depositors. Consequently, I investigate the main factors that determine the 
financial condition of banks to assist interested parties to make the correct decisions. 
1.3 Thesis Organisation 
The rest of the thesis is organised into four chapters. 
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 Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of the differences in US bank failures 
engendered by size heterogeneity. In Section 2.2, I provide a review of literature on the deter-
minants of bank failures and develop testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents discussion on 
the dataset, sample, and covariates. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I outline empirical methods and 
discuss my results. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present additional analysis and robustness test. Section 
2.8 concludes this chapter. 
 Chapter 3 focuses on the systematic trend in bank financial risk and its potential expla-
nations. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the relevant literature and develops the empirical 
hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents a discussion on the dataset, sample, and covariates. Section 
3.4 presents the results of the hypotheses tests. Section 3.5 addresses robustness issues, and 
Section 3.6 offers concluding remarks. 
 Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the impact of tail risk measures on the bank financial 
distress. Section 4.2 discusses data and financial covariates; Section 4.3 presents my empirical 
methods and main results; Section 4.4 presents additional results on robustness checks; and 
Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
Chapter 5 summarises and concludes this thesis, identifies the limitations and suggests 
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2. A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF BANK FAILURE  
2.1 Introduction 
Does size matter in predicting banks failure? The answer to this question would be helpful to 
policymakers and bank regulators seeking to improve their understanding of bank failures 
across different size categories, and thereby promoting stability of the financial system. This 
issue was seriously exaggerated following the failure of large and complex banks in 2008 (the 
recent financial crisis) which resulted in extremely high costs to national economies forced to 
bail them out in order to restore confidence in the financial markets (Pais and Stork, 2013). 
Over the last three decades, several banks have been criticised for becoming oversized and 
thereby carrying the associated higher systemic risk. In response, several restrictions have been 
enacted by federal governments to downsize or split up these banks to reduce the public finance 
risk. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act of  2010 is a US federal law intended to limit banks’ 
involvement in some risky activities and to ban mergers that result in a financial institution 
with total liabilities surpassing 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial 
firms (to prevent the emergence of “too big to fail” banks (Bertay et al., 2013)). Proponents of 
the act also argue that the constraints, particularly size limitation, shall prevent future crises 
and protect consumers from abusive financial services practices. However, many argue that 
these actions would impair the efficiency of capital allocation for some banks and add costs to 
the economy (Aiyar et al., 2014). Others also argue that such restrictive regulations may lead 
to the failure of many small banks deemed “too important to fail”, which may cause the 
recurrence of financial crises (De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012; Wilmarth, 2011). This debate 
reveals the need for further investigation into the heterogeneity of bank failures across different 
size classes, to recognise the similarities and differences before taking appropriate measures. 
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The empirical literature on individual bank failures is extensive and offers a rich 
assessment of several aspects. However, the factors and the extent to which they affect the 
probability of bank failures across size classes remain overlooked. More specifically, most 
previous studies (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Cole and Gunther, 1995; Cole and White, 2012; 
DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Kolari et al., 2002; Spahr, 1989) do not split banks into different 
size categories (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), nor do they examine separately the reasons for 
the failures and their effects on each size. A prospective exception is Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) who examine the impact of capital on bank performance (survival and market share) 
and how this effect differs among bank size classes (small, medium, and large) and across 
banking crises, market crises, and normal times. However, unlike my study, they focus only on 
one of the six CAMELS components that may misclassify distressed banks. This shortage of 
studies perhaps surprising because the literature shows that bank size is as an essential 
economical foundation as the capital (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), and plays a crucial role in 
many dimensions such as performance (e.g., Bertay et al., 2013), financial stability (e.g., 
Bhagat et al., 2015), scope (e.g., De Jonghe et al., 2015), lending (e.g., De Haas et al., 2010), 
funding strategies (e.g., Loutskina, 2011), and systemic risk (e.g., Laeven et al., 2016). 
Notwithstanding the evidence of bank size heterogeneity effects on various aspects, 
particularly financial stability, the literature lacks a thorough analysis of determinants and 
predictability of bank failures across bank size categories. Hence, this study is to improve the 
literature by developing separate failure prediction models for different bank size categories 
(small, medium, and large), and report any differences in comparison to an all-inclusive 
(containing all banks irrespective of their size) failure prediction model. I also compare the 
consistency (statistical significance and average marginal effects) of respective covariates in 
explaining bank failures across size categories. To capture the effects of variables linked to 
bank size, I use criteria based on banks’ total assets in a given year t to classify small, medium, 
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and large banks. Specifically, in any given year t, I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 
25 percentile of total assets as small banks, the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest 
medium banks. 
Another contribution of this paper is that, unlike the majority of previous studies that 
focus only on either the saving and loans crisis of the late 1980s (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1995; 
DeYoung, 2003) or the recent subprime crisis (e.g., Cole and White, 2012; Deyoung and Torna, 
2013; Berger et al., 2016), I analyse virtually all commercial banks in the United States over 
the longest period of time (from 1985 until 2016) in the literature that covers data-points before, 
during, and after banking crises. Moreover, the literature of bank failures draws heavily on 
accounting-based variables such as capital, earnings, and liquidity ratios (e.g., Cole and 
Gunther, 1995; Kolari et al., 2002; Cole and White, 2012; Berger et al., 2016). However, 
previous studies have not provided a comprehensive analysis of the relative importance of a 
full set of predictors. Thus, I employ univariate regression analysis, suggested by Hosmer et 
al. (2013), as a variable selection technique to investigate the relative importance of almost all 
accounting-based variables used in previous bank failure literature. Specifically, the broad 
categories of CAMELS, where the letters refer to Capital adequacy (e.g., total equity to total 
assets ratio), Asset quality (e.g., non-performing loans to total assets ratio), Management 
quality (e.g., cost to income ratio), Earnings (e.g., net interest margin), Liquidity (e.g., cash and 
due to total assets ratio), and Sensitivity to market risk (e.g., trading income to total operating 
income ratio); and other categories such as funding, business model, and growth, are analysed. 
I investigate a total of 61 accounting variables. I focus only on accounting variables for two 
reasons. First, some argue that bank-specific variables are more essential than market and 
macroeconomic variables in predicting bank failures (e.g., Cole and Wu, 2009). Second, the 
vast majority of my sample is of unlisted banks. This concentration on  accounting variables is 
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also supported theoretically by the fundamental-based view that attributes bank failure to 
negative information about fundamentals (e.g. large losses) (Allen and Gale, 1998). 
To narrow down the list of covariates for further multivariate empirical analysis, I 
follow Gupta and Chaudhry (2019) strategy, suggested by Hosmer et al. (2013), and eliminate 
variables that (i) are not significant in 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years lagged univariate regression 
estimates, or (ii) are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME)1 of less than 5% 
in all three time periods. I repeat the univariate regression analysis for small, medium, and large 
banks respectively. The final lists of variables for all, small, medium, and large banks contain 
19, 19, 20, and 21 variables respectively. This is a major departure from approaches that exist 
in the empirical literature, which often select variables that are advocated by popular studies, 
or that suit their empirical design. 
The univariate regression analysis shows that the AMEs for most of the accounting-
based predictors used in the literature vary across size categories and for the three lagged 
periods. Generally, the AMEs of respective covariates (1-year lag) for small banks are higher 
compared to estimates obtained for medium and large banks. However, for 2- and 3-years 
lagged estimates, AMEs of large banks are mostly the highest. This suggests that the prediction 
horizon of variables for small banks are stronger on short term, while the variables for large 
banks have a longer horizon forecast. Moreover, the variable with the highest AME among 
small and medium banks is net charge off to total assets (NCOTA), while the ratio of total 
equity to total assets has the highest AME for large banks. 
                                                          
1 Marginal Effects are useful to non-linear regression analysis for examining the effect of changes in a given 
covariate on changes in the outcome variable, holding other covariates constant. These can be calculated as mar-
ginal change (it is the partial derivative for continuous predictors) when a covariate changes by an infinitely small 
quantity, and discrete change (for factor variables) when a covariate changes by a fixed quantity. Average Mar-
ginal Effects (AME) of a given covariate is the average of its marginal effects computed for each observation at 
its observed values. In other words, AME is the change in the outcome (failure = 1, in my case) probabilities due 
to unit change in the value of a given covariate, holding others constant. For more details, see Long and Freese 
(2006).  
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Subsequently, following the multivariate model building strategy applied by Gupta et 
al. (2018) based on the discussion suggested by Hosmer et al. (2013), I rank competing 
variables based on the magnitude of their AMEs, and then introduce each variable at a time, in 
descending order of magnitude.  I perform this to develop multivariate models for all, small, 
medium, and large-sized banks respectively. The rationale for this approach is that a variable 
with a higher value of AME induces higher change in the failure probability, and thus should 
be given priority in the variable selection process (Gupta et al., 2018).   I exclude a variable 
from the multivariate models if, when added: (i) it changes the sign of any previously added 
variable; (ii) it holds the opposite sign to that generated by univariate analysis; (iii) it holds the 
identical sign to univariate analysis, but is insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.10; or (iv) 
it makes a previously introduced variable insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.10. I end 
up with six, seven, six, and five variables (main variables) for building multivariate models for 
all, small, medium, and large banks, respectively. This divergence of main variables across the 
multivariate regression models reinforces that the factors affecting banks’ failure vary across 
different size categories. 
To test the discriminatory power of the main variables in identifying failed and non-
failed banks for all, small, medium, and large banks, I use panel logistic regression analysis for 
1-year, 2-years, and 3-years lagged estimates. This technique can address potential endogeneity 
issues since lagged explanatory variables (e.g., capital) and dependent variables (failure) have 
a low chance of being jointly determined (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Also, it measures any 
temporal variation in the explanatory power of my variables. Test results illustrate that all of 
the main variables are strongly significant when explaining the failure risk of banks across all 
three-time lagged periods. This demonstrates the complementary information content of these 
main variables, and their statistical significance up to the 3-years lagged period establishes their 
intertemporal predictive ability.  
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Empirical results also show that credit risk plays a major role in promoting the risk of 
failure across the bank size classes and the three-time lagged periods, implying that poor asset 
quality - represented by net charge off, past due 90+ days, loan loss reserves, and other real 
estate owned – increases the probability of bank failure. This confirms the findings of earlier 
studies (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Meyer and Pifer, 1970), as well as recent theoretical and 
empirical studies by Iyer and Puri (2012) and Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) respectively. 
Some critical findings of my study are that small banks are most likely to fail if they have high 
deposit ratios, are more cost inefficient, and have a high liquidity risk, while medium and large 
banks with poor capital and low net interest margin are more likely to fail. These results are 
consistent with the existing theoretical and empirical bank failures literature (e.g., Acharya and 
Naqvi, 2012; Angbazo, 1997; Betz et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2017; Kolari et al., 2002). 
These results are robust to the presence of control variables including house price 
inflation, foreign ownership, and dummies for banking crises and regulators. To perform an 
additional robustness test, I follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) by splitting the sample into 
banking crises, market crises, and normal times, and treating them as separate groups. I rerun 
all multivariate regressions separately for all, small, medium, and large banks, and qualitatively 
similar results are obtained. In addition, the AUROC (Area under Receiver Operation 
Characteristics Curve) of all multivariate models developed across respective bank size classes 
for within-sample and out-of-sample show excellent classification performance for different 
forecast horizons. Furthermore, I present persuasive evidence that the magnitude of respective 
coefficients of different significant predictors are not equal across different size categories. 
This is further reaffirmed by my inclusion of interaction between bank-size and bank-charter 
into my regression model for all banks.  
My findings emphasise the importance of considering bank size when designing 
appropriate policies and regulations targeted toward enhancing financial stability and 
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resilience. Future studies should, whenever possible, separate banks by size category to clearly 
understand the heterogeneity in bank failures. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide a review 
of literature on the determinants of bank failures and develop testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 
presents discussion on the dataset, sample, and covariates. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I outline 
empirical methods and discuss my results. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present additional analysis and 
robustness test. Section 2.8 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
This paper is guided by theoretical models and linked to the existing empirical literature in 
primarily two strands of research: first, the determinants and prediction of failure at the bank 
level, and second, the relevance of bank size to financial stability. I review these strands in turn 
before proposing my empirical hypotheses. 
2.2.1 Determinants of Bank Failure Prediction 
In theory, two views explain the sources of bank default. First is the panic-based view 
introduced by Bryant (1980), which posits that banks are inherently vulnerable and subject to 
contagion (Calomiris, 2007). According to this view, bank runs can be attributed to the strong 
likelihood of depositors withdrawing their funds because others will run, or due to ambiguous 
or inaccurate information about the institution’s health (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In such 
circumstances, many banks fail due to high withdrawal pressure and risk spreading the adverse 
effects within the banking system, including solvent banks. Second is the fundamental-based 
view which considers banks to be inherently stable and not vulnerable to panic. According to 
this view, depositors withdraw their funds due to adverse fundamental changes in the economic 
conditions of banks (e.g. large losses), leading to the failure of only weak and fragile banks 
(Calomiris, 2007). 
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The latter view supports my paper, which aims to investigate bank default reasons. I 
believe that the financial status of a bank generally governs current depositors’ withdrawal 
decisions, investors, and expected depositors. Thus, it is essential to focus on the factors that 
determine the financial condition of banks, in order to assist interested parties in making 
informed decisions. 
The empirical literature on the determinants of bank failures typically concentrates on 
the United States (US) banks and thrifts (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Cole and White, 2012; Lane 
et al., 1986; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Schaeck, 2008; Thomson, 1992; Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000). Furthermore, the literature draws heavily on accounting-based indicators and aims to 
construct early warning models generally based on the Uniform Financial Rating System, 
informally known as the CAMELS ratings system, to identify distress institutions prior to their 
failure (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1995; Kolari et al., 2002; Cole and White, 2012). Several 
studies supplement the CAMELS proxies with some information about audit quality (Jin et al., 
2011), or corporate governance (ownership, management, and compensation) (Berger et al., 
2016). All of these studies show that their models are significant and effective in predicting 
bank failures. Also, several statistical (e.g., Discriminant analysis (DA) and Logit/Probit 
regression models) and intelligence (e.g., Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Neural 
Networks) techniques have been used to analyse and predict bank failures. Demyanyk and 
Hasan (2010) provide a comprehensive review of these techniques and related studies; I refer 
interested readers to this study for more details. 
The vast body of research focuses on bank failures that occurred during either the saving 
and loan crisis period of 1987-1992, or the 2008-2010 subprime lending crisis period. Papers 
studying the failed banks during the saving and loan crisis (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1995; 
Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; DeYoung, 2003) show that banks with poor capitalization, 
extreme non-performing loans, low earnings, and less liquidity were associated with a higher 
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probability of failure. Recently, several studies  have analysed the determinants of bank failures 
in the United States during the recent subprime lending crisis (Berger et al., 2016; Cole and 
White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Hong et al., 2014; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014; Ng 
and Roychowdhury, 2014). Cole and White (2012) use the CAMELS indicators together with 
measures of “traditional” banking activities, such as commercial and residential loans, to 
explain the drivers of US commercial bank failures that occurred between 2004 and 2008, and 
to predict 2009 failures. They find that banks with less capital, bad asset quality, lower 
earnings, less liquidity, and with higher loan allocations to construction-and-development 
loans, commercial mortgages, and multi-family mortgages, are more likely to fail. DeYoung 
and Torna (2013) focus on “non-traditional” banking activities with mainly noninterest income 
such as stakeholder activities and Fee-for-Service income to analyse the US bank failures from 
2007 to 2009. They find that stakeholder activities (e.g. investment banking, insurance 
underwriting, proprietary trading, and venture capital) increase the probability of bank failure 
only if the bank was already suffering from financial distress, whereas Fee-for-Service income 
(e.g. insurance sales, loan servicing and securities brokerage) reduce the probability of bank 
failure during the crisis. Hong et al. (2014) examine the links between US commercial bank 
failures and Basel III liquidity risk measures, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR). They report that both LCR and NSFR have limited effects on explaining 
bank failures.  Testing the impact of loan loss reserves on US bank failures, Ng and 
Roychowdhury (2014) employ a Cox proportional-hazard model and report that “add-backs” 
of loan loss reserves is positively related to bank failures. Additionally, Imbierowicz and Rauch 
(2014) investigate the impact of liquidity risk and credit risk on probabilities of default in US 
commercial banks. They document that these two risk sources separately increase the 
likelihood of default, but their joint effect can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. More 
recently, Berger et al. (2016) analyse the roles of corporate governance (ownership, 
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management, and compensation structures) in US commercial bank failures. They find that 
banks with more shareholdings of lower-level managers and non-CEO higher-level managers 
are more likely to fail. However, the shareholdings of CEOs do not increase the risk of failure. 
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the existing literature generally suffers 
from two respective limitations. First, most studies cover a short period of time (the span of 
one banking crisis) and do not pay attention to the periods prior to and following the crisis 
(normal times), or other banking crises. Second, the analysis of bank failures across size classes 
is largely ignored. This suggests that the findings of studies reviewing the saving and loans 
crisis consider small banks results, given the domination of failures among small banks (Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013). In this paper, however, I examine virtually all US commercial bank 
failures over a long period of time covering multiple-crises and normal times, clearly 
distinguishing between small, medium, and large banks to identify factors leading to bank 
failures across different size categories.  
To the best of my knowledge, only one paper provided deep insight into the matter. 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) examine the impact of capital on bank performance (survival and 
market share) across bank size classes (small, medium, and large), and how this effect differs 
across banking crises, market crises, and normal times between 1984 and 2010, in the United 
States. They find that capital improves the performance of medium and large banks only during 
banking crises and helps to improve the performance of small banks during banking crises, 
market crises, and normal times. However, Berger and Bouwman’s paper differs from ours in 
many respects. First, their study is based on only one of the six CAMELS components (capital), 
and ignores the others that may misclassify distressed banks (Cole and White, 2012). Second, 
they use a development sample up to 2010, while I extend my sample to cover the most recent 
observation (i.e. up to 2016). Third, they split the bank size classes into small banks (gross total 
assets, or GTA, up to $1 billion), medium banks (GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $3 
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billion), and large banks (GTA exceeding $3 billion), while I use different and arguably more 
accurate criteria to determine bank size. Specifically, in any given year t, banks corresponding 
to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets are considered to be small banks, the top 25 percentile 
are large banks, and the rest are medium banks. Fourth, they exclude banks that are below $25 
million of total assets instead of including all banks, as I do. 
2.2.2 Relevance of Bank Size to Financial Stability 
Theoretically, several studies focus on the relationship between bank size and bank stability. 
One set of theoretical models disputes that the growth of bank size generally reduces risk. This 
includes models that predict economies of scale and scope in intermediation (e.g. Diamond, 
1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). A main implication of these studies is that larger banks are 
more stable and efficient due to the comparative advantage of enhanced economies of scale in 
information production, monitoring, and transaction costs, that helps to diversify loan-portfolio 
risks (De Nicolo, 2000). Another set of theoretical models argues that growth of bank size 
increases risk. These models are based on deposit insurance (e.g. Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1992) and the “Too-big-to-fail” moral hazard (e.g. Mishkin, 1999). A key conclusion 
of these models is that larger banks are implicitly or explicitly protected by government in the 
form of guarantees or subsidies, and other banks are not. This protection intensifies the risk-
taking behaviour of these banks that could lead to financial fragility (Beck et al., 2006). 
Empirically, few studies (Bhagat et al., 2015; De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012; De 
Nicolo, 2000; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) address the role of bank size on bank stability. 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) focus on US bank holding companies (BHCs) to analyse the 
relationship between bank size and volatility in stock prices as a measure of risk. They conclude 
that large BHCs are better diversified, but they are not less risky than small BHCs. Analysing 
an international sample of banks, including 419 BHCs in the US, De Nicolo (2000) finds a 
positive relationship between bank size and volatility in small to medium-sized BHCs and a 
17 | P a g e  
 
negative relationship in large ones. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) analyse the relationship 
between bank size and risk-taking under the Basel II Capital Accord. They conclude that large 
banks have an advantage over small banks to choose between the Standardized and Internal 
Ratings Based Approach which pushes small banks to take more risk. Moreover, De Haan and 
Poghosyan (2012) report a non-linear relationship between size and earnings volatility. They 
find that bank size is negatively related to earnings volatility, but the relationship becomes 
positive when a bank’s total assets exceed $5 billion. Recently, Bhagat et al. (2015) studied the 
size effect on the risk-taking of US based financial institutions, including commercial banks, 
investment banks and life insurance companies. They document a positive relationship between 
bank size and risk in the pre-crisis period (2002–2006) and the crisis period (2007–2009), but 
not in the post-crisis period (2010–2012). Overall, the existing literature indicates that bank 
size plays a pivotal role in maintaining financial stability. In line with the literature, I expect 
that bank size should have an impact on actual bank failure. Hence, I propose and test the 
following three hypotheses: 
H1: Failure rate of banks varies across small, medium, and large size categories. 
H2: Factors affecting the probability of bank failure vary across small, medium, 
and large size categories. 
H3: The magnitudes of mutually significant factors explaining bank failures 
vary across small, medium, and large size categories. 
2.3 Dataset, Sample and Covariates 
The data used in my empirical analysis come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) database. The FDIC collects financial information such as balance sheets and income 
statements from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) submitted 
by US financial institutions on a quarterly basis. In line with several existing studies I focus 
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only on commercial banks to obtain a homogenous sample. I exclude savings banks due to the 
discrepancy in directions between these banks and the commercial banks (Cole and White, 
2012). To construct financial variables, I use the year end (fourth quarter) data from 1985 to 
2016 for each bank in my sample.  
2.3.1 Defining Bank Failure 
To identify commercial bank failure, I use the Failed Bank list reported by the FDIC, which is 
widely used in the existing literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Liu and Ngo, 2014). The list 
contains characteristics of failed banks, including bank names, locations, acquiring institutions, 
and closing dates. The FDIC generally records a bank as failed if it enters either “assistance 
transactions”, which require restructuring and the charter survives, or “outright failure”, in 
which a bank closes its operations and the charter is terminated. The failure list in my sample 
contains 1,871 banks with 1,694 outright failures and 123 assistance transactions.  
2.3.2 Defining Small, Medium, and Large Banks 
The literature documents the importance of bank size and the advantages generated by size 
heterogeneity (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2009, 2013). However, there is no formal definition 
that identifies bank size classes. Thus, I use criteria based on a bank’s total assets in a given 
year to classify it as small, medium, or large. Specifically, I consider banks corresponding to 
the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, the top 25 percentile as large banks, and 
the rest as medium banks. I perform this exercise on a yearly basis, as my size classification is 
based on the relative assets size of respective banks, which changes from one year to another 
due to various reasons. This gives me a sample of 74,533 bank-year observations for small 
banks, 149,072 bank-year observations for medium banks, and 74,520 bank-year observations 
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for large banks. This subsequently leads to 8,260 small banks, 12,977 medium banks, and 7,210 
large banks in my sample2.   
2.3.3 Sample Description 
Table 1 presents the annual failure rates of banks from 1985 to 2016. To observe any 
differences between size categories, I also report the annual failure rates of small, medium, and 
large banks. The average failure rate of my entire sample is around 0.54%. The average failure 
rate is highest for small banks (0.67%), followed by large banks (0.53%), and lowest for 
medium banks (0.47%). Further, I see in Table 1 that the relationship between failure rate and 
bank size is most likely negative, up until the onset of the subprime lending crisis in 2008. This 
relationship turns out to be positive, specifically between 2008 and 2012. However, after the 
crisis period, it becomes negative.  
The failure rates of small banks experienced a significant rise around the savings and 
loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, followed by large banks, and were lowest for medium banks. 
Yet the failure rates of large banks escalated dramatically during the subprime lending crisis, 
followed by medium banks, and were lowest for small banks (see Figure 1). This 
transformation in the failure rates may be attributed to augmentation in bank size associated 
with high risk-taking by these banks, due to the moral hazard that the government will bail 
them out in troubled times to stabilise the financial system and avoid unfortunate consequences 
to the economy (Pais and Stork, 2013). Overall, this fluctuation of failure rates across different 
size categories supports my first hypothesis that failure rates of banks vary across small, 
medium, and large size categories, and time. 
                                                          
2 The total of the count of banks across respective size categories is higher than the total number of banks in my 
sample due to the dynamic nature of banks’ total assets. A bank may start small, but eventually move to the 
medium or large size categories as its total assets increases, or vice versa. For instance, a bank which is classified 
as small in 1990 may be classified as medium or large in 1995 due to increased asset size and vice-versa. Thus, 
some banks may appear in more than one size categories, but in different time periods. 
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Table1: Failures Rate of US Banks 
 
All Banks  Small Banks  Medium Banks  Large Banks 
Year Failures Total %Failures  Failures Total % Failures  Failures Total % Failures  Failures Total % Failures 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) 
1985 118 14,656 0.8051  54 3,664 1.4738  56 7,328 0.7642  8 3,664 0.2183 
1986 142 14,468 0.9815  61 3,616 1.6869  63 7,235 0.8708  18 3,617 0.4977 
1987 199 14,171 1.4043  107 3,542 3.0209  73 7,086 1.0302  19 3,543 0.5363 
1988 276 13,626 2.0255  86 3,406 2.5250  113 6,813 1.6586  77 3,407 2.2601 
1989 204 13,074 1.5603  80 3,268 2.4480  82 6,538 1.2542  42 3,268 1.2852 
1990 158 12,643 1.2497  70 3,161 2.2145  67 6,321 1.0600  21 3,161 0.6643 
1991 103 12,258 0.8403  34 3,063 1.1100  46 6,132 0.7502  23 3,063 0.7509 
1992 75 11,796 0.6358  26 2,948 0.8820  35 5,898 0.5934  14 2,950 0.4746 
1993 38 11,303 0.3362  13 2,826 0.4600  17 5,651 0.3008  8 2,826 0.2831 
1994 11 10,820 0.1017  3 2,705 0.1109  3 5,410 0.0555  5 2,705 0.1848 
1995 5 10,271 0.0487  1 2,567 0.0390  1 5,137 0.0195  3 2,567 0.1169 
1996 4 9,897 0.0404  1 2,474 0.0404  3 4,949 0.0606  0 2,474 0.0000 
1997 1 9,562 0.0105  1 2,391 0.0418  0 4,781 0.0000  0 2,390 0.0000 
1998 3 9,131 0.0329  1 2,283 0.0438  1 4,566 0.0219  1 2,282 0.0438 
1999 6 8,838 0.0679  3 2,210 0.1357  2 4,419 0.0453  1 2,209 0.0453 
2000 6 8,597 0.0698  2 2,150 0.0930  4 4,298 0.0931  0 2,149 0.0000 
2001 3 8,284 0.0362  3 2,071 0.1449  0 4,142 0.0000  0 2,071 0.0000 
2002 10 8,035 0.1245  4 2,009 0.1991  3 4,018 0.0747  3 2,008 0.1494 
2003 1 7,896 0.0127  1 1,975 0.0506  0 3,948 0.0000  0 1,973 0.0000 
2004 3 7,760 0.0387  1 1,941 0.0515  2 3,879 0.0516  0 1,940 0.0000 
2005 0 7,671 0.0000  0 1,918 0.0000  0 3,836 0.0000  0 1,917 0.0000 
2006 0 7,568 0.0000  0 1,892 0.0000  0 3,784 0.0000  0 1,892 0.0000 
2007 1 7,444 0.0134  0 1,861 0.0000  1 3,722 0.0269  0 1,861 0.0000 
2008 22 7,238 0.3040  4 1,810 0.2210  5 3,619 0.1382  13 1,809 0.7186 
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2009 124 7,018 1.7669  11 1,755 0.6268  57 3,509 1.6244  56 1,754 3.1927 
2010 130 6,765 1.9217  19 1,692 1.1229  55 3,383 1.6258  56 1,690 3.3136 
2011 84 6,443 1.3037  9 1,611 0.5587  51 3,222 1.5829  24 1,610 1.4907 
2012 40 6,235 0.6415  8 1,559 0.5131  26 3,118 0.8339  6 1,558 0.3851 
2013 23 5,999 0.3834  11 1,500 0.7333  9 3,000 0.3000  3 1,499 0.2001 
2014 14 6,532 0.2143  7 1,633 0.4287  5 3,266 0.1531  2 1,633 0.1225 
2015 8 6,199 0.1291  5 1,550 0.3226  2 3,100 0.0645  1 1,549 0.0646 










Notes: The table reports annual details of failed and censored US commercial banks. Column 1 lists years followed by the number of failed banks in that year (column 2), total number 
of banks in the database in that year (column 3), and percentage of failed banks (failed/Total banks × 100) in that year (column 4) for myentire sample of banks. The following columns 
show identical information for small, medium, and large sized banks. In the last row, ‘Average’ is the mean of annual failure rates reported in columns 4, 7, 10 and 13 respectively. 
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2.3.4 Covariates 
In this section, I discuss the rationale behind my choice of dependent variable, followed by 
relevant discussion on the explanatory and control variables employed in this study. 
2.3.4.1 Dependent Variable 
One important focus of this study is the determination of factors that affect bank failure across 
different size classes.  Therefore, the dependent variable is binary (fail/non-fail). As discussed 
in Section 2.3.1 and following Liu and Ngo (2014), I consider all banks in the FDIC failed list 
as failed banks if presented as either “assistance transactions” or “outright failures”. 
2.3.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
To develop my multivariate regression models, i consider a comprehensive list of 61 financial 
(accounting-based) variables as candidate failure predictors, and briefly explain them in Table 
2. These predictive variables are drawn from popular studies on bank failure, including Cole 
and Gunther (1995), Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Kolari et al. (2002), Arena (2008), Cole 
and White (2012), DeYoung and Torna (2013), Betz et al. (2014), and many others. I do not 
consider market-based covariates for two reasons. First, the vast majority of my sample 
comprises unlisted banks. Second, my prediction horizon is 1 to 3 years prior to failure, while 
the signals of these variables tend to have a shorter-run time horizon (Betz et al., 2014). 
Moreover, Cole and Wu (2009) suggest that bank-specific variables are more essential than 
market and macroeconomic variables when predicting bank failures.  
My choice of variables reflects all dimensions in the CAMELS, as well as funding, 
business model, leverage, off-balance sheet, growth, non-traditional activities, and others3.  
                                                          
3 While calculating the financial ratios, I use similar approach to Campbell et al. (2008) and replace zero values 
for all bank-year observations with $1 to further limit the influence of outliers. For robustness check, I repeat the 
analysis without replacing and the results remain unchanged. 
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Capital adequacy: Capital is the most important indicator that is considered in all regulator and 
supervisor frameworks (e.g., Basel) to ensure the safety and soundness of banks and financial 
systems. It is also included as a key variable in virtually all previous studies. The level of capital 
reflects the capacity of banks to meet their financial obligations. Hence, a decline in capital is 
a clear sign of potential financial troubles. To measure the capital adequacy I use the total 
equity to total assets (TETA) ratio, which is largely used in the literature and a highly valuable 
proxy of capital, and the nonperforming assets coverage ratio (NPACR), which is shown by 
Chernykh and Cole (2015) to outperform regulatory capital ratios in predicting US bank 
failures. Higher values of these indicators are expected to reduce the probability of a bank 
failure. Following Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), I do not incorporate the ratio of regulatory 
capital to total risk-weighted assets to avoid any risk assessment, and because the calculation 
of these ratios is based on relatively arbitrary weights. 
Asset quality: poor quality of assets generally increases the probability of bank failure. The 
most preponderant and risky assets of commercial banks are loans. Thus, I focus heavily on 
this asset group and employ a wide variety of potential indicators, specifically loan loss 
reserves, loan loss provisions, net charge off, and all types of non-performing loans. In general, 
these variables are expected to have a positive relationship with bank failure probability. 
Management: Management competence plays a central role in the performance and success of 
a bank. Although the management quality is difficult to measure with financial data, DeYoung 
(1998) documents that cost efficiency reflects management quality. He concludes that higher 
management quality leads to higher efficiency of resource uses, thus I use the cost efficiency 
represented by cost-to-income ratio to gauge the quality of management. Following DeYoung 
and Torna (2013) I also use cost inefficiency, measured by total noninterest expenses to total 
assets. These indicators are expected to be positively associated with bank failures. 
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Earnings:  This category reflects the profitability and performance of banks. The most 
frequently applied measures are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net 
interest margin (NIM). Higher earnings enhance the profitability (ROA, ROE, NIM) and 
capital level (equity/assets) that lead to improved bank performance. Hence, the relationship 
between profitability and the probability of bank failure is expected to be negative. 
Liquidity: An adequate liquidity is essential for banks to meet their current obligations and to 
cope with unexpected withdrawals of depositors without liquidating assets. To gauge this 
category, I employ most of the variables that have been used in the literature, including federal 
funds to total assets, securities to total assets, total loans to total deposits, and others (see Table 
2).  In general, I expect a higher value of these ratios to have a negative relationship with bank 
failure probability.  
Sensitivity to market risk: This category is represented by the share of trading income (TIOI). 
Higher trading income could be associated with a riskier business model and higher probability 
of failing. Liquid, however, rather than loans, is more likely to decrease fire sale losses. Thus, 
it is difficult to predict the direction of the influence in advance. 
In addition to the CAMELS covariates, I also include many other potential explanatory 
variables, specifically to measure funding, business model, leverage, off balance sheet, growth, 
non-traditional activities, and others (see Table 2). 
2.3.4.3 Control Variables 
To establish the robustness of my explanatory variables, I also report my multivariate results, 
supplementing the following control variables (see Table 2): 
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Table 2:  Description of Variables 
No. Category Variable Description CALL Item Codes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Bank Size LTA Natural Logarithm of Total Assets rcfd2170 
Explanatory Variables 
1 Capital (C) TETA Total Equity divided by Total Assets rcfd3210/ rcfd2170 
2 T1CR Tier1 Capital Ratio rcfd7206 
3 NPACR Nonperforming assets coverage ratio = [(Equity + LLR) - Weighted NPA] 
divided by Total Assets 
[(rcfd3210+ rcfd3123) - 
(0.20*rcfd1406+0.50*rcfd1407+ 
1*(rcfd1403+rcfd2150)]/rcfd2170 
4 Asset Quality (A) LLRTA Loan Loss Reserves divided by Total Assets rcfd3123/rcfd2170 
5 PD90TA Loans Past Due 90+ Days divided by Total Assets rcfd1407/rcfd2170 
6 NAATA Nonaccrual Loans divided by Total Assets rcfd1403/rcfd2170 
7 OREOTA Other Real Estate Owned divided by Total Assets rcfd2150/rcfd2170 
8 NPATA Non-Performing Assets (PD38-89 + PD90 + Nonaccrual Loans + Other Real 
Estate Owned) divided by Total Assets 
(rcfd1406+rcfd1407+ 
rcfd1403+rcfd2150)/rcfd2170 
9 LLRNPL Loan Loss Reserves divided by Non-Performing Loans rcfd3123/rcfd2170 
10 LLPTL Loan Loss Provisions divided by Total Loans riad4230/rcfd2122 
11 LLPTA Loan Loss Provisions divided by Total Assets riad4230/rcfd2170 
12 NPLTL Non-Performing loans divided by Total Loans (rcfd1407 + rcfd1403)/rcfd2122 
13 NPLTA Non-Performing loans divided by Total Assets (rcfd1407 + rcfd1403)/rcfd2170 
14 NCOTA Net-Charge Offs divided by Total Assets (riad4635-riad4605)/rcfd2170 
15 RELTA Real Estate Loans divided by Total Assets rcfd1410/rcfd2170 
16 CILTA Commercial & Industrial Loans divided by Total Asset rcfd1766/rcfd2170 
17 CLTA Consumer Loans divided by Total Asset rcfd1975/rcfd2170 
18 CDLTA Construction & Development Loans divided by Total Assets rcon1415/rcfd2170 
19 RERLTA Real Estate Residential (1–4) Family Loans divided by Total Assets rcon1430/rcfd2170 
20 REMLTA Real Estate Residential Multifamily Loans divided by Total Assets rcon1460/rcfd2170 
21 RENFNRL
TA 
Real Estate Nonfarm Non-residential loans divided by total Assets rcon1480/rcfd2170 
22 Management (M) ROA Return on Assets; Net Income divided by Total Assets riad4340/rcfd2170 
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23 NIETA Cost Inefficiency; Noninterest expenses divided by Total Assets riad4093/rcfd2170 
24 CIR Cost to Income Ratio; Operating Expenses divided by Operating Income riad4130/riad4000 
25 ROE Return on Equity; Net Income divided by Total Equity riad4340/rcfd3210 
26 Earnings (E) NIM Net Interest Margin; Net Interest Income divided by Average Earning Assets riad4074/rcfd3402 
27 Liquidity (L) CDTA Cash & Due divided by Total Asset rcfd0010/rcfd2170 
28 TSTA Total Securities divided by Total Assets rcfd8641/rcfd2170 
29 TLTA Total Loans divided by Total Assets rcfd2122/rcfd2170 
30 LATLB Liquid Assets divided by Total Liabilities [rcfd0010 + (rcfd0390 & rcfd1773 + 
rcfd1754)]/rcfd2948 
31 LATA Liquid Assets (Cash & Due from Banks + securities held for investment + 
securities held for sale) divided by Total Assets 
[rcfd0010 + (rcfd0390 & rcfd1773 + 
rcfd1754)]//rcfd2170 
32 FTA (Fed fund purchase - fed fund sold) divided by Total Assets (rcfd2800-rcfd1350)/rcfd2170 
33 TRADTA Trading asset divided by Total Assets rcfd3545/rcfd2170 
34 TIETLB Total Interest Expenses divided by Total Liabilities riad4073/rcfd2948 
35 Sensitivity to market (S) TIOI Trading Income divided by Operating Income riada220/riad4000 
36 Funding TDTA Total Deposits divided by Total Assets rcfd2200/rcfd2170 
37 STDTD Short-Term Deposits (transaction deposits + demand deposits) divided by 
Total Deposits 
(rcon2215 + rcon2210)/rcfd2200 
38 BDTA Brokered Deposits divided by Total Assets rcon2365/rcfd2170 
39 LCDTA Large Certificates of Deposits ($100,000 & more) divided by Total Assets rcon2604/rcfd2170 
40 LCDTLB Large Certificates of Deposits divided by Total Liabilities rcon2604/rcfd2948 
41 MBSTA Mortgage-Backed Securities divided by Total Assets rcfd8639/rcfd2170 
42 Business Model NDFTLB Non-deposit funding divided by Total liabilities rcfd2527/rcfd2948 
43 NIIOI Non-interest income divided by Operating income riad4079/riad4000 
44 Leverage TATE Total Assets divided by Total Equity rcfd2170/rcfd3210 
45 TLBTE Total Liabilities divided by Total Equity rcfd2950/rcfd3210 
46 TLBTA Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets rcfd2948/rcfd2170 
47 TLTD Total Loans divided by Total Deposits rcfd2122/rcfd2200 
48 Growth GTA Growth of Total Assets  
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Notes: This table reports the set of explanatory and control variables that I use in my empirical analysis. The first column is the number of explanatory and control variables, 
while the second column lists the category of explanatory and control variables. The third column lists names of variables. The fourth column provides their respective 
definitions. Financial information is obtained from the Call Report (FDIC) database, covering an analysis period from 1985 to 2016. The last column states the specific codes 
of Call Report data items that I use to calculate explanatory variables.    
49 GTL Growth of Total Loans  
50 Other GWTA Goodwill divided by Total Assets rcfd3163/rcfd2170 
51 LIR Loans Interest Rate; Total Interest Income divided by Total Loans riad4107/rcfd2122 
52 Market Discipline DIR Deposits Interest Rate; Total Interest Expense divided by Total Deposits riad4073/rcfd2200 
53 SPREAD LIR – DIR  
54 Non-Traditional ICFTA Insurance Commissions and Fees divided by Total Assets riadb494/rcfd2170 
55 IRUITA Insurance & Reinsurance Underwriting Income divided by Total Assets riadc386/rcfd2170 
56 VCRTA Venture Capital Revenue divided by Total Assets riadb491/rcfd2170 
57 FCSBTA Fees & Commissions from Securities Brokerage divided by Total Assets riadc886/rcfd2170 
58 NSITA Net Securitization Income divided by Total Assets riadb493/rcfd2170 
59 IBFCTA Investment Banking Fees & Commissions divided by Total Assets riadb490/rcfd2170 
60 NSFTA Net Servicing Fees divided by Total Assets riadb492/rcfd2170 
61 Off Balance Sheet TUCTA Total Unused Commitment divided by Total Assets. rcfd3423/rcfd2170 
Control Variables 
62 Primary regulators FDIC Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is a 
state-chartered and non-member of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
63 FED Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is a 
state-chartered and member of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
64 Foreign ownership FOPCT Dummy variable indicating whether the bank is foreign-owned (25% or 
more). 
 
65 Growth of House Prices 
Index 
GHPI State-level House Price Indices (HPIs) of the seasonally adjusted Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA). 
 
 
66 Banking Crises SL Dummy variable indicating whether the year is on saving and loans crisis that 
occurred between 1987 and 1990. 
 
67 GFC Dummy variable indicating whether the year is on subprime lending crisis 
(Global Financial Crisis) that occurred between 2008 and 2010. 
 
28 | P a g e  
 
Primary regulator: US commercial banks are regulated by one of three federal regulators. 
National banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), state-chartered banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) are regulated by the Federal Reserve, 
and state-chartered banks that are not members of the FRS are regulated by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). To investigate the influence of the regulator on bank failures, I 
include three dummies: OCC, FED, and FDIC. Due to collinearity, I use only two of them 
(FED and FDIC), and treat OCC as the reference category. 
Foreign ownership: Foreign ownership is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if 25% or more of a bank is foreign-owned, and 0 otherwise. Arena (2008) concludes that 
foreign banks in emerging countries can mitigate their probability of failure due to better risk-
based management practices, capitalization, and access to parent funding, however in the 
United States, Berger et al. (2000) find that domestic banks are generally more efficient than 
foreign banks. I therefore expect a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the 
probability of failure. 
Growth of House Prices Index: This economic variable is a broad measure to capture real estate 
prices at state-level. The movements of the real estate prices can impair the stability of banks 
because defaulted mortgage loans are generally covered by real estate as collaterals, and banks 
will not be able to recover all of the value of collaterals in a situation of deteriorating real estate 
prices. To capture the effect of this variable, I obtain the seasonally adjusted House Price 
Indices (HPIs) from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Following Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) I use all transactions index (based on purchases and appraisals) data until 1990 and 
purchase only index (based on purchases) data from 1991onward. 
Banking Crises: To measure the effects of previous banking crises, I create two dummy 
variables. First, the saving and loans crisis that takes the value of 1 for the years from 1987 to 
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1990, and 0 otherwise. Second, the subprime lending crisis takes the value of 1 for the years 
from 2008 to 2010, and 0 otherwise. 
2.4 Econometrics Technique, Selection of Variables, and 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
In this section, I discuss the statistical model and the methodology of selecting the explanatory 
variables for multivariate analysis as well as summary statistics and correlations. 
2.4.1 Panel Logistic Regression 
Numerous statistical methodologies have been used to analyse and predict bank failures. These 
methods range from simple Discriminant Analysis (e.g., Haslem et al., 1992) and Logit/Probit 
regressions (e.g., Berger et al., 2016) to advanced machine learning techniques, such as 
Extreme Gradient Boosting (e.g., Climent et al., 2018). To investigate the factors that affect 
bank failure and establish my empirical validation, I use panel logistic regression with random 
effects. Although hazard models are emerging as a popular choice (e.g., Cole and Wu, 2009; 
Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014), Gupta et al. (2018) argue that the discrete-time hazard model 
with logit link is essentially a panel logistic model that controls for firms’ age. Accordingly, I 
assume that the marginal probability of bank failure over the next time period follows a logistic 
distribution that is estimated as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
1 + exp⁡(−𝛼 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank is failed in time t, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector 
of explanatory variables known at the end of the previous (or any appropriate lagged) period. 
2.4.2 Variable Selection Method 
Although previous studies have introduced numerous variables to enhance the prediction 
accuracy of failure models, the answer to the question of which variables should be selected to 
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predict failures is inconclusive. The choice of variables is often driven by the popularity and/or 
significance of certain indicators across the literature. However, this is associated with the high 
risk of omitting unsuccessful variables in the past, which could be influential when confronted 
with new data. Thus, the selection of variables is useful to identify relevant variables and to 
enhance predictability (Tian et al., 2015). Stepwise selection is a commonly used traditional 
variable selection approach that allows changes in either direction, dropping or adding one 
variable at a time according to some test statistics (Tian et al., 2015). However, it has a potential 
drawback. It ignores stochastic errors in the variable selection process (Fan and Li, 2001).4  
Consequently, I rely on univariate regression analysis, suggested by Hosmer et al. 
(2013), for the selection of variables from a comprehensive list of variables considered in the 
literature (see Table 2). Following Gupta et al., (2018) and Gupta and Chaudhry (2019), I 
perform univariate regression analysis of each of the 61 variables in turn, using the failure 
definition and econometric specification discussed earlier. To gauge the intertemporal 
discriminatory power of respective covariates, I report regression estimates for 1-year (T – 1), 
2-years (T – 2), and 3-years (T – 3) lagged time periods. To narrow down this list for further 
multivariate analysis, I exclude variables that (i) are not significant in all three time periods (to 
ensure that the selected covariates are consistent predictors of banks’ financial soundness over 
a sufficiently long-time interval to allow for developing a reasonable early warning system), or 
(ii) are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three 
time periods. The rationale is that a unit change in the value of significant variables must induce 
sufficient change in the magnitude of the outcome probability to clearly distinguish between 
failed and censored banks (Gupta et al., 2018). 
                                                          
4 Fan and Li (2001) propose methods based on penalty functions to select variables and estimate coefficients 
simultaneously.  
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Most considered variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
significance levels across all lagged time periods (see Table 3). However, only 19 out of 61 
variables have AME values of 5% or more in at least one of the three time periods. This 
suggests that, although these variables are significant predictors, a unit change in their value 
does not transmit significant change in the probability of outcome variable. Table 4 reports the 
final list of explanatory variables that I use for further multivariate regression analysis among 
all banks. An interesting observation in Table 4 is that the variable with the highest AME, net 
charge off to total assets (NCOTA), is largely ignored in the literature. Furthermore, the 
aggregated non-performing loans to total assets (NPLTA) ratio, which is considered to be one 
of the most common default predictors in the literature, has lower AME than one of its 
components (PD90TA) for the 1-year and 2-years lagged periods, but higher AME for the 3-
years lagged period. This indicates that the aggregated non-performing loans to total assets 
(NPLTA) is a superior predictor for bank failure in the longer time horizon (3 years and above).  
I rerun the univariate regression analysis of each variable (total 61 variables) to verify 
its power to explain the failure of small, medium, and large banks respectively. Specifically, I 
verify whether the statistical significance of the variables vary across size categories or not. 
Most of the considered variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% significance 
levels in explaining the failure of small, medium, and large sized banks (see Table 5). 
Subsequently, I repeat the elimination process performed above using different bank size 
classifications (small, medium, and large). I find relatively similar results of univariate 
regression analysis compared with all banks, but different AME and ranking as well as 
additional variables across size categories. The final lists contain 19, 20, and 21 variables for 
small, medium, and large banks respectively.  All of the 19 variables that I report as significant 
and that have AME of 5% or more in one of the three time periods for all banks (see Table 4) 
are the same across size categories, except the ratio of total deposits to total assets (TDTA), 
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which is rejected among large banks. Furthermore, I find additional variables such as net 
interest margin (NIM) that meet the criteria for medium and large banks. Table 6 reports the 
final list of variables that I use for further multivariate regression analysis for small, medium, 
and large banks. 
 A noteworthy observation in Table 6 is that the AMEs of small banks’ variables are 
mostly the highest for the 1-year lagged estimate. However, the ranking is changed for the 
second and third year lagged periods. The variables of large banks have the highest AMEs. 
This implies that the variables of small banks tend to have a strong prediction on a shorter 
horizon, while the variables of large banks tend to have a longer horizon prediction. Overall, 
these findings strongly support my third hypothesis (H3) that the magnitudes (AMEs) of 
mutually significant factors explaining bank failures vary across small, medium, and large size 
categories. 
Table 3: Univariate Regression Analysis for All Banks 
Variable Lag Years 
 
L1 L2 L3 
T1CR    
β -0.041a -0.013b -0.049a 
SE 0.006 0.006 0.007 
AME% -0.02a -0.01b -0.02a 
LCDTA 
   
β 8.54a 11.03a 12.81a 
SE 0.261 0.304 0.383 
AME% 2.26a 2.05a 1.19a 
LCDTLB 
   
β 6.09a 8.79a 10.53a 
SE 0.247 0.268 0.330 
AME% 1.26a 1.44a 0.91a 
CIR 
   
β 4.08a 3.23a 2.09a 
SE 0.076 0.072 0.096 
AME% 1.36a 0.54a 0.07a 
NIM 
   
β -87.80a -48.96a -16.73a 
SE 5.240 4.934 4.874 
AME% -3.94a -2.55a -0.72a 
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LATA 
   
β -7.55a -8.51a -9.54a 
SE 0.259 0.311 0.361 
AME% -1.48a -0.90a -0.83a 
LATLB 
   
β -8.42a -8.68a -9.22a 
SE 0.260 0.306 0.336 
AME% -1.79a -1.02a -0.81a 
TIOI 
   
β 155.9a 96.91b 41.19 
SE 39.55 48.52 58.95 
AME% 63.44a 42.78b 19.82 
TSTA 
   
β -10.07a -10.67a -11.69a 
SE 0.297 0.339 0.442 
AME% -2.76a -1.74a -1.10a 
NDFTLB 
   
β 0.53 0.31 0.32 
SE 1.073 1.041 1.088 
AME% 0.76 0.51 0.48 
ROE 
   
β -5.01a -5.68a -4.67a 
SE 0.058 0.124 0.141 
AME% -2.67a -1.66a -0.17a 
TLTA 
   
β 3.36a 5.02a 6.52a 
SE 0.216 0.253 0.297 
AME% 0.36a 0.51a 0.40a 
CDTA 
   
β 4.49a 3.37a 2.23a 
SE 0.437 0.465 0.539 
AME% 0.35a 0.31a 0.13a 
FTA 
   
β -4.44a -3.36a -2.29a 
SE 0.417 0.501 0.535 
AME% -0.13a -0.02a -0.05a 
NIIOI 
   
β 1.49a 0.07 -1.41a 
SE 0.395 0.426 0.508 
AME% 0.08a 0.01 -0.08a 
TATE 
   
β 0.24a 0.32a 0.21a 
SE 0.003 0.007 0.006 
AME% 0.13a 0.05a 0.01a 
TLBTE 
   
β 0.24a 0.32a 0.21a 
SE 0.003 0.007 0.007 
AME% 0.13a 0.05a 0.01a 
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TLTD 
   
β -0.25 2.01a 3.67a 
SE 0.167 0.167 0.191 
AME% -0.01 0.18a 0.19a 
GTA 
   
β -12.85a -13.42a -3.11a 
SE 0.265 0.339 0.226 
AME% -0.07a -0.02a -0.01a 
GTL 
   
β -9.07a -9.72a -2.84a 
SE 0.254 0.253 0.186 
AME% -1.64a -1.03a -0.11a 
GWTA 
   
β -37.34a -7.98 12.06a 
SE 7.582 5.586 5.018 
AME% -2.42a -0.70 0.70a 
CILTA 
   
β 6.46a 7.79a 8.82a 
SE 0.311 0.346 0.422 
AME% 1.23a 0.94a 0.40a 
RELTA 
   
β 0.99a 1.96a 3.40a 
SE 0.190 0.200 0.223 
AME% 0.11a 0.15a 0.14a 
CDLTA 
   
β 7.13a 12.19a 15.76a 
SE 0.466 0.515 0.510 
AME% 0.73a 0.57a 1.30a 
CLTA 
   
β 0.37 1.05b 0.25 
SE 0.482 0.453 0.508 
AME% 0.02 0.09b 0.01 
MBSTA 
   
β -0.64 -2.94a -3.85a 
SE 0.893 0.853 0.836 
AME% -0.09 -0.75a -1.33a 
LIR 
   
β -0.435 -2.48a -4.81a 
SE 0.464 0.525 0.637 
AME% -0.02 -0.21a -0.27a 
SPREAD 
   
β -6.10a -11.31a -15.68a 
SE 0.688 0.892 1.096 
AME% -0.64a -0.99a -0.96a 
TRADTA 
   
β -51.14 82.17b 28.18 
SE 44.63 36.07 43.32 
AME% -2.95 7.23b 1.59 
NSFTA 
   
β 108.32 29.74 9.92 
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SE 76.60 86.25 89.93 
AME% 48.83 14.39 5.30 
NIITA 
   
β -77.79a -39.90a -13.48a 
SE 3.265 3.340 3.741 
AME% -4.03a -3.42a -0.76a 
RERLTA 
   
β -2.95a -3.55a -3.92a 
SE 0.366 0.380 0.423 
AME% -0.25a -0.34a -0.26a 
REMLTA 
   
β 15.79a 14.80a 15.88a 
SE 1.727 1.703 1.848 
AME% 0.85a 1.28a 0.97a 
RENFNRLTA 
   
β 8.61a 11.36a 11.96a 
SE 0.743 1.055 1.272 
AME% 1.61a 0.18a 0.03a 
BDTA 
   
β 11.62a 13.53a 15.55a 
SE 0.598 0.564 0.611 
AME% 0.93a 1.23a 0.85a 
TUCTA 
   
β -9.60a -4.52a 0.05 
SE 0.581 0.490 0.450 
AME% -0.82a -0.40a 0.00 
STDTD 
   
β -3.84a -4.08a -4.18a 
SE 0.222 0.225 0.247 
AME% -0.19a -0.30a -0.15a 
VCRTA 
   
β -0.22a -0.28a -0.28a 
SE 0.030 0.028 0.036 
AME% -0.10a -0.13a -0.13a 
FCSBTA 
   
β -0.07a -0.10a -0.12a 
SE 0.015 0.023 0.030 
AME% -0.03a -0.01a -0.01a 
LLRNPL 
   
β -0.67a -0.60a -0.27a 
SE 0.021 0.023 0.017 
AME% -0.07a -0.02a -0.01a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel 
logistic regression results of all independent variables that are not significant in all three time periods or are 
significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. β is the 
regression coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage.  
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Table 4: Univariate Regression Analysis for All Banks with ranking 
Variable  1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag 3 Years Lag  Rank 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
TETA      5 
β  -118.0046a -78.3307a -26.8250a   
SE  1.958 1.991 1.437   
AME%  -52.21a -12.44a -1.40a   
NPACR  
   
 13 
β  -61.8227a -59.8196a -32.0309a   
SE  1.4194 1.5158 0.9211   
AME%  -23.19a -10.53a -1.92a   
LLRTA  
   
 4 
β  226.1444a 202.4610a 132.0195a   
SE  4.5209 4.2604 4.7299   
AME%  58.06a 21.11a 2.60a   
PD90TA  
   
 2 
β  132.8156a 128.1063a 107.1189a   
SE  2.5497 3.4981 4.8608   
AME%  68.22a 19.31a 2.35a   
NAATA  
   
 9 
β  93.0304a 95.5749a 64.8830a   
SE  1.7678 2.0556 1.8676   
AME%  35.26a 9.25a 4.31a   
OREOTA  
   
 12 
β  133.7940a 130.1982a 77.7526a   
SE  3.0969 2.7788 2.4406   
AME%  28.78a 8.81a 5.08a   
NPATA  
   
 15 
β  61.4833a 68.4851a 43.4345a   
SE  1.3492 1.6684 1.0674   
AME%  21.43a 9.11a 2.92a   
LLPTL  
   
 14 
β  58.7813a 54.5288a 36.4989a   
SE  0.9237 1.2300 1.3511   
AME%  22.87a 7.97a 2.96a   
LLPTA  
   
 3 
β  120.3485a 115.2256a 93.5506a   
SE  1.5309 2.2250 2.9432   
AME%  62.07a 29.44a 2.67a   
NPLTL  
   
 17 
β  44.6085a 41.7751a 26.9399a   
SE  0.8300 0.9684 0.8418   
AME%  14.73a 4.82a 1.95a   
NPLTA  
   
 8 
β  77.9467a 79.7153a 59.6845a   
SE  1.2544 1.7377 1.6073   
AME%  35.36a 14.33a 5.01a   
NCOTA  
   
 1 
β  142.3555a 130.1408a 91.1873a   
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SE  1.9951 2.8493 3.0657   
AME%  68.69a 20.40a 7.06a   
NCOTL  
   
 10 
β  78.7936a 69.5501a 45.6649a   
SE  1.2693 1.7141 1.7668   
AME%  34.64a 8.03a 3.22a   
ROA  
   
 7 
β  -95.7321a -76.4859a -58.5776a   
SE  1.1160 1.5979 1.8411   
AME%  -48.40a -32.34a -3.70a   
TIETLB  
   
 16 
β  50.5999a 45.5311a 33.0639a   
SE  1.6673 1.8924 2.2087   
AME%  15.80a 5.70a 0.70a   
TDTA  
   
 11 
β  52.3850a 15.0219a 3.7117a   
SE  1.0468 0.7647 0.5178   
AME%  30.77a 1.51a 0.20a   
TLBTA  
   
 6 
β  117.2084a 77.9171a 26.8385a   
SE  1.9600 2.0430 1.4386   
AME%  51.65a 12.67a 1.42a   
DIR  
   
 18 
β  47.7084a 44.6106a 34.7815a   
SE  1.5661 1.8040 2.1400   
AME%  14.31a 5.42a 0.76a   
NIETA  
   
 19 
β  78.0376a 53.8628a 32.1676a   
SE  2.0561 2.0986 2.1687   
AME%  13.32a 3.70a 2.51a   
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel 
logistic regression results of final set of variables that I use for multivariate logit regression analysis. This 
excludes variables that are not significant in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average 
Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. β is the regression coefficient, SE is standard 
error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Ranking is based on the absolute values of AME 
for the 1-year lagged time estimate, where the highest value gets 1, second highest get 2 and so on. 
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Table 5: Univariate Regression Analysis by Size Categories 
 
1 Year Lag  2 Years Lag  3 Years Lag 
Variable Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
T1CR 
β -0.0522a -0.0395a -0.0303a  -0.0098 -0.0074 -0.0130  -0.0197 -0.0389a -0.0942a 
SE 0.0145 0.0096 0.0119  0.0125 0.0083 0.0115  0.0134 0.0098 0.0169 
AME% -0.01a -0.01a -0.02a  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02a -0.07a 
LCDTA 
β 6.9635a 9.1758a 9.6523a  10.1704a 11.9750a 10.6419a  12.2691a 13.5446a 11.6008a 
SE 0.5640 0.3966 0.4758  0.6220 0.4709 0.5300  0.7265 0.5890 0.6528 
AME% 1.06a 1.87a 4.73a  1.15a 1.67a 4.28a  1.06a 0.64a 3.05a 
LCDTLB 
β 3.6191a 6.7362a 7.6911a  7.2912a 9.5619a 9.0527a  9.6107a 11.0393a 10.0263a 
SE 0.5087 0.3722 0.4228  0.5487 0.4090 0.4734  0.6221 0.5044 0.5851 
AME% 0.46a 1.02a 3.74a  0.76a 1.18a 3.50a  0.78a 0.50a 2.45a 
CIR 
β 3.3758a 4.4042a 5.8322a  3.7419a 3.0850a 4.2537a  2.8670a 1.8569a 2.3266a 
SE 0.1180 0.1305 0.2379  0.1631 0.1066 0.2026  0.1670 0.1386 0.2019 
AME% 1.19a 1.07a 1.40a  0.18a 0.34a 0.88a  0.22a 0.04a 0.34a 
LATA 
β -7.572a -8.1826a -7.1650a  -8.0728a -9.5089a -7.3258a  -8.7778a -11.7216a -8.4475a 
SE 0.4811 0.3892 0.4780  0.5386 0.4685 0.5286  0.6361 0.6032 0.6753 
AME% -1.18a -1.54a -4.17a  -0.75a -0.91a -4.03a  -0.56a -0.30a -1.51a 
LATLB 
β -8.8840a -8.9201a -7.7038a  -8.4974a -9.6625a -7.2781a  -8.5310a -11.4797a -8.0802a 
SE 0.5042 0.3889 0.4615  0.5127 0.4573 0.5054  0.5660 0.5765 0.6322 
AME% -1.52a -1.85a -4.47a  -0.75a -1.00a -4.02a  -0.40a -0.29a 1.56a 
TDTA 
β   8.8027a    1.6607b    -1.3802b 
SE   0.9847    0.6797    0.6726 
AME%   2.16a    0.31b    -0.10b 
TSTA 
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β -8.6739a -10.9957a   -9.5133a -11.8198a   -10.2561a -13.0528a  
SE 0.5403 0.4570   0.6572 0.5284   0.6931 0.6422  
AME% -1.39a -2.95a   -0.99a -1.80a   -0.66a -0.77a  
NDFTLB 
β -0.2394 3.5957 3.4052a  4.4099 1.5689 2.2322c  -3.0404 1.3124 2.4690c 
SE 3.4931 2.2543 1.4002  3.6198 2.4678 1.3577  5.4197 2.5421 1.3498 
AME% -0.58 4.20 3.64a  2.73 2.08 3.00c  -1.03 1.62 3.50c 
ROE 
β -4.4351a -5.2891a -5.2738a  -6.2301a -6.0581a -5.5514a  -5.6339a -4.9294a -3.7541a 
SE 0.1019 0.0889 0.1202  0.2511 0.1956 0.2614  0.2821 0.2231 0.2920 
AME% -3.38a -2.36a -2.53a  -1.77a -1.20a -1.37a  -0.13a -0.11a -0.38a 
TLTA 
β 5.4205a 4.1157a 1.2829a  6.5851a 6.4929a 2.5276a  6.7373a 9.2323a 4.5209a 
SE 0.4281 0.3462 0.3821  0.4805 0.4211 0.4212  0.5544 0.5581 0.5412 
AME% 0.67a 0.27a 0.36a  0.46a 0.23a 0.61a  0.35a 0.07a 0.42a 
CDTA 
β 1.5602b 5.8812a 5.6162a  1.5414c 4.0491a 3.7458a  1.8841b 1.1356 3.1841a 
SE 0.7292 0.7093 0.7897  0.8381 0.8255 0.9237  0.9180 1.0489 1.1021 
AME% 0.14b 0.20a 1.46a  0.04c 0.07a 0.77a  0.06b 0.01 0.31a 
FTA 
β 0.3693 -4.1357a -8.2792a  1.6148c -3.2472a -8.4080a  -0.3068 -1.0412 -5.2451a 
SE 0.7270 0.7176 0.6031  0.9278 0.8225 0.8067  0.9864 1.0373 1.1876 
AME% 0.05 -0.06a -2.28a  0.03c -0.02a -0.53a  -0.01 0.01 -0.02a 
NIIOI 
β 4.4919a 0.8369 -3.4542a  3.8830a -1.0210 -3.2621a  3.6829a -3.9671a -5.1988a 
SE 0.5737 0.6764 0.7444  0.6920 0.8242 0.7800  0.7889 1.0657 0.9751 
AME% 0.44a 0.02 -0.96a  0.10a -0.01 -0.67a  0.07a -0.02a -0.45a 
TATE 
β 0.2077a 0.2560a 0.2589a  0.3241a 0.3822a 0.2473a  0.2214a 0.2857a 0.1781a 
SE 0.0052 0.0047 0.0073  0.0123 0.0122 0.0109  0.0128 0.0139 0.0130 
AME% 0.16a 0.12a 0.13a  0.06a 0.03a 0.12a  0.01a 0.01a 0.04a 
TLTD 
β 0.5701b -0.1199 -0.3885  2.5502a 2.6556a 1.2739a  3.3416a 4.9792a 3.4556a 
SE 0.2877 0.2710 0.2761  0.3217 0.2857 0.2860  0.3698 0.3540 0.3869 
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AME% 0.05c 0.01 -0.08  0.15a 0.06a 0.26a  0.07a 0.04a 0.21a 
GTA 
β -10.5866a  -10.5270a  -13.5371a  -10.3964a  -4.0062a  -1.8601a 
SE 0.6727  0.5186  0.6577  0.6042  0.5322  0.3689 
AME% -2.87a  -0.58a  -1.50a  -0.12a  -0.04a  -0.07a 
GTL 
β -8.3703a -10.2954a -7.4900a  -8.1913a -12.0490a -8.5302a  -2.1919a -3.3367a -2.9409a 
SE 0.5470 0.3869 0.4413  0.4769 0.4603 0.4309  0.3467 0.2989 0.3787 
AME% -0.25a -1.71a -3.17a  -0.20a -0.22a -2.29a  -0.02a -0.05a -0.12a 
GWTA 
β -14.5980a -104.7285a -36.7457a  -1.5949 -15.8040 -9.2876  27.6268a -5.7619 11.4870 
SE 11.9250 26.7816 10.2001  11.5297 11.7553 7.8129  9.6711 12.2323 7.5505 
AME% -1.39a -3.23a -9.80a  -0.07 -0.23 -1.77  0.38a -0.03 0.79 
CILTA 
β 10.1078a 7.7677a 1.7804a  12.6912a 8.9642a 2.3917a  13.5057a 10.3087a 3.8282a 
SE 0.5988 0.4291 0.6421  0.6805 0.4732 0.6666  0.7908 0.5796 0.7231 
AME% 1.57a 1.38a 0.49a  1.82a 1.07a 0.53a  1.29a 0.47a 0.49a 
RELTA 
β 1.0490a 1.5218a 1.4017a  1.5928a 3.2402a 2.1762a  2.5273a 3.9208a 3.9239a 
SE 0.3669 0.3016 0.3063  0.4029 0.3474 0.3511  0.4481 0.3418 0.4767 
AME% 0.09a 0.04a 0.35a  0.07a 0.03a 0.36a  0.06a 0.11a 0.14a 
CDLTA 
β 2.8389b 7.8635a   8.9305a 12.5435a   13.6913a 18.1662a  
SE 1.3248 0.6875   1.2282 0.7305   1.2440 0.8666  
AME% 0.30b 0.55a   0.74a 0.53a   0.62a 0.35a  
TLBTE 
β 0.2077a 0.2560a 0.2591a  0.3241a 0.3822a 0.2474a  0.2214a 0.2857a 0.1781a 
SE 0.0052 0.0047 0.0073  0.0123 0.0122 0.0109  0.0128 0.0139 0.0130 
AME% 0.16a 0.12a 0.13a  0.06a 0.03a 0.12a  0.01a 0.01a 0.04a 
CLTA 
β 7.5144a 0.5503 -7.5830a  7.6814a 0.2516 -7.1797a  7.4591a -0.5557 -7.4446a 
SE 0.6804 0.7456 1.0513  0.7513 0.8354 1.1063  0.8608 0.9639 1.2589 
AME% 0.97a 0.02 -1.55a  0.58a 0.01 -1.03a  0.47a -0.01 -0.40a 
MBSTA 
β 0.6494 -1.6820 -1.5964  -4.8826c -4.7150a -2.7702b  -3.8813 -5.1033a -4.5602a 
SE 1.8506 1.5711 1.4216  2.6380 1.5336 1.2073  2.3946 1.3790 1.2737 
AME% 0.07 -0.20 -0.36  -0.90c -1.01a -1.12b  -0.76 -1.61a -2.36a 
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LIR 
β -0.6797 -1.2629 1.4972c  -3.2734a -4.5719a -0.3171  -5.0943a -7.3982 -1.5774 
SE 0.7039 0.7940 0.8054  0.8943 0.9934 0.9851  1.1994 1.2146 1.2032 
AME% 0.06 -0.03 0.37c  -0.08a -0.06a -0.06  -0.04a -0.03a -0.11 
SPREAD 
β -6.1172a -10.0043a -3.5569a  -10.3972a -18.4982a -8.3618a  -11.9769a -24.3364a -16.0074a 
SE 1.0654 1.2983 1.3084  1.4562 1.7440 1.7401  1.6760 2.1362 2.4162 
AME% -0.65a -0.36a -0.88a  -0.41a -0.34a -1.55a  -0.40a -0.13a -0.97a 
TRADTA 
β 89.7684 -13.9184 -30.5807  9.2615 119.0759 91.4177a  304.6563a -176.7780 -39.4006a 
SE 108.3878 94.151 48.8628  133.2548 77.9609 7.4045  95.0434 168.5809 7.3900 
AME% 8.52 -0.37 -7.40  0.23 1.70 -12.03a  7.60a -0.91 -3.10a 
NIITA 
β -18.6458a -97.1302a   3.8238 -52.7417a   12.8367c -16.7123a  
SE 5.2556 5.1856   6.3593 5.4710   7.6069 6.2698  
AME% -1.69a -2.80a   0.18 -0.84a   0.20c -0.10a  
RERLTA 
β 0.4428 -3.0140a -6.0275a  0.4778 -3.2125a -6.8234a  0.4260 -2.8865a -8.3303a 
SE 0.6137 0.5546 0.6605  0.6684 0.6173 0.7250  0.7727 0.6942 0.8616 
AME% 0.04 -0.12a -2.10a  0.02 -0.06a -1.83a  0.01 -0.02a -1.14a 
REMLTA 
β 18.6465a 15.5434a 13.3932a  19.0738a 17.6875a 14.3176a  16.7800a 20.0907a 15.4857a 
SE 3.4344 2.5867 2.4106  3.9394 2.8744 2.6466  4.6133 3.1800 3.1926 
AME% 1.92a 0.45a 3.23a  0.68a 0.23a 2.57a  0.46a 0.10a 1.13a 
RENFNRLTA 
β 10.6773a 9.0961a 5.7021a  11.9684a 12.9172a 6.2298a  12.8180a 13.4702a 8.1425a 
SE 1.7904 1.0785 1.3671  2.3789 1.5463 1.5849  2.7048 1.8666 2.0276 
AME% 1.25c 1.30a 1.35a  0.22c 0.16a 0.62a  0.15 0.03a 0.10a 
BDTA 
β 8.0703a 16.2543a 11.4863a  7.8173a 15.1256a 15.1578a  12.9337a 18.5776a 17.9425a 
SE 1.4128 1.3251 0.8340  1.5872 0.9836 1.0449  1.6069 1.2114 1.1843 
AME% 0.85a 0.94a 4.83a  0.27a 0.31a 2.40a  0.25a 0.11a 0.96a 
TUCTA 
β -11.8125a -14.4943a -5.5267a  -7.3750a -6.3925a -1.9082a  -2.1256 -0.6428 1.5723b 
SE 1.4966 1.1147 0.7493  1.5088 0.9426 0.6534  1.4178 0.8630 0.6606 
AME% -1.32a -0.32a -1.12a  -0.21a -0.06a -0.33a  -0.01 -0.01 0.12b 
STDTD 
β -1.7062a -5.2038a -3.9550a  -2.3061a -6.3418a -4.4467a  -2.3812a -5.9328a -5.6942a 
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SE 0.3507 0.3753 0.4047  0.4015 0.4472 0.4709  0.4636 0.4909 0.5232 
AME% -0.17a -0.17a -0.56a  -0.08a -0.07a -0.31a  -0.06a -0.02a -0.07a 
IRUITA 
β -0.1680 -0.6289a -0.1296a  -1.4493a -0.9279a -0.1209b  -0.9008a -1.5591a -0.0966c 
SE 0.1384 0.1387 0.0545  0.2782 0.1512 0.0530  0.2584 0.2000 0.0506 
AME% -0.02 -0.30a -0.09a  -0.13c -0.25a -0.10b  -0.06 -0.10a -0.08 
VCRTA 
β -0.9208a -1.0250a -0.2213a  -1.5727a -1.6921a -0.3056a  -1.8046a -2.2448a -0.3079a 
SE 0.2450 0.1393 0.0685  0.2693 0.1875 0.0671  0.2965 0.2447 0.0666 
AME% -0.08 -0.40a -0.14a  -0.12c -0.20a -0.21a  -0.07b -0.05a -0.23a 
FCSBTA 
β -0.0913 -0.0826a -0.0717a  -0.1698 -0.1203a -0.0950a  -0.3026 -0.1978a -0.1080a 
SE 0.1023 0.0257 0.0173  0.1378 0.0397 0.0252  0.1872 .0712 0.0369 
AME% -0.01 -0.03b -0.05a  -0.01 -0.01a -0.01a  -0.01 -0.01a -0.01b 
NSITA 
β -0.9189a -1.1907a -0.0982  -1.5607a -1.7555a -0.2024a  -1.7683a -2.0992a -0.1854a 
SE 0.2436 0.1571 0.0685  0.2676 0.1904 0.0683  0.2912 0.2269 0.0677 
AME% -0.10 -0.30a -0.06  -0.13c -0.20a -0.13a  -0.08c -0.05a -0.13a 
IBFCTA 
β -0.3850 -0.4603 -1.0516c  -0.9098 -1.4898a -0.1550a  -1.3430b -0.0582c -0.0826a 
SE 0.3758 0.4233 0.6220  0.6338 0.5936 0.0649  0.5787 0.0347 0.0232 
AME% -0.04 -0.01 -0.03  -0.07 -0.05 -0.02b  -0.18b -0.02c -0.05a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel logistic regression results of all independent variables across 
different bank size categories that are not significant in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time 
periods. The sampling period is between 1985-2016. I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile 
as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. β is the regression coefficient, SE is 
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Table 6: Univariate Regression Analysis by Size Categories with ranking 
 
1 Year Lag  2 Years Lag  3 Years Lag Ranking 
Variable Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks SB MB LB 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
TETA 6 5 1 
β -104.5323a -130.1084a -120.8708a  -79.3857a -100.3526a -62.2437a  -27.4832a -35.8680a -22.1070a    
SE 3.2361 4.2753 3.1002  3.3538 3.6284 2.9461  2.4525 2.4180 2.9787    
AME% -62.18a -44.10a -54.59a  -10.96a -4.08a -34.83a  -0.45a -1.11a -3.94a    
NPACR 13 12 16 
β -57.2967a -68.9085a -53.1749a  -54.6331a -72.6386a -46.1104a  -30.8899a -47.1803a -28.4403a    
SE 2.2476 2.9380 2.0797  2.1369 2.1867 2.1660  1.6521 2.0623 1.7933    
AME% -29.20a -21.26a -20.61a  -13.27a -7.71a -14.17a  -1.06a -0.15a -6.58a    
LLRTA 5 4 5 
β 213.0666a 240.7152a 231.7835a  198.8182a 286.6373a 176.7561a  141.3965a 173.0129a 78.7335a    
SE 8.0482 7.3646 10.1898  8.0616 8.4806 10.0358  8.7002 9.7912 10.1420    
AME% 63.01a 48.09a 47.76a  22.69a 6.29a 15.84a  4.50a 0.50a 4.56a    
PD90TA 10 3 3 
β 133.9768a 139.6740a 117.3466a  128.8366a 140.7921a 104.5770a  113.9995a 117.5897a 92.9058a    
SE 4.9223 4.1417 6.7189  6.2654 5.6501 8.0909  7.2826 7.7970 10.1162    
AME% 43.65a 50.76a 51.97a  18.07a 11.99a 29.47a  7.59a 1.21a 12.05a    
NAATA 11 10 9 
β 87.7152a 98.6135a 89.9165a  91.2369a 106.0918a 90.1672a  60.6484a 85.2727a 65.1436a    
SE 2.8367 3.0422 3.5646  3.5265 3.0938 4.1568  3.5138 3.7726 4.1951    
AME% 43.59a 28.57a 36.72a  6.58a 4.89a 15.74a  2.88a 0.50a 4.66a    
OREOTA 12 13 11 
β 122.6557a 148.6665a 128.2099a  108.5423a 148.4729a 100.4943a  88.4473a 100.6918a 64.8086a    
SE 5.8518 4.2552 6.1331  4.1746 4.2838 5.5546  4.4715 5.2020 5.7444    
AME% 28.78a 20.01 a 27.70a  14.76a 4.83a 15.47a  4.21a 0.69a 5.60a    
NPATA 14 15 18 
β 57.5061a 63.4320a 59.719a  67.9820a 73.0869a 58.4588a  45.2425a 58.9372a 40.8855a    
SE 2.0917 2.2385 3.1924  2.5115 2.0663 2.7041  2.0632 2.2254 2.4771    
AME% 27.42a 18.06a 17.85a  10.14a 5.97a 9.27a  3.03a 0.50a 2.58a    
44 | P a g e  
 
LLPTL 15 14 15 
β 50.3822a 62.6381a 71.1554a  52.4631a 59.8731a 58.3550a  36.1935a 43.3581a 32.1781a    
SE 1.4754 1.5675 2.5860  2.1884 1.9814 2.8988  2.2964 2.5763 3.2276    
AME% 24.71a 18.93a 21.14a  3.94a 4.69a 10.59a  1.87a 0.44a 3.16a    
LLPTA 2 2 4 
β 111.6439a 125.6934a 130.3305a  112.8078a 123.4805a 117.4030a  92.0200a 93.5506a 93.5506a    
SE 2.3703 2.1606 4.2779  3.9636 3.7424 5.2697  4.5473 2.9432 2.9432    
AME% 81.30a 56.30a 48.55a  29.72a 21.26a 24.12a  7.86a 2.67a 2.67a    
NPLTL 17 16 19 
β 37.7979a 48.1177a 52.6437a  33.6181a 47.8420a 43.2023a  24.2412a 36.2740a 27.6767a    
SE 1.2911 1.4320 2.3153  1.3998 1.4320 2.0705  1.4766 1.7402 1.9735    
AME% 14.77a 11.87a 14.32a  5.50a 2.50a 7.06a  1.19a 0.22a 2.17a    
NPLTA 9 9 10 
β 72.1163a 81.9581a 80.1566a  76.6422a 88.3124a 77.8734a  59.0820a 78.4115a 57.4972a    
SE 2.0370 2.1214 3.1803  3.2444 2.7119 3.5575  2.8788 3.1037 3.5359    
AME% 46.56a 30.02a 31.61a  15.90a 8.81a 15.62a  4.63a 0.75a 5.26a    
NCOTA 1 1 6 
β 134.5371a 145.7577a 156.7221a  128.4773a 143.0513a 126.1068a  97.0111a 108.7911a 75.2839a    
SE 2.8553 3.2351 5.8626  4.9892 4.5495 6.4348  5.3360 5.7823 7.4377    
AME% 96.88a 63.92a 47.15a  21.35a 11.32a 20.64a  5.72a 0.93a 6.36a    
NCOTL 8 11 12 
β 71.0714a 84.7499a 91.1711a  68.6089a 77.1802a 69.2162a  47.4138a 53.2410a 39.9651a    
SE 1.5848 2.3689 3.4579  2.8728 2.6383 3.6113  2.9994 3.3405 4.3282    
AME% 53.11a 24.72a 26.30a  5.60a 3.43a 12.30a  2.38a 0.35a 3.70a    
ROA 4 7 7 
β -86.9303a -102.0375a -103.9933a  -82.1382a -78.7770a -91.1763a  -76.9376a -56.2362a -53.4303a    
SE 1.9747 1.7691 2.3017  3.2715 2.5243 4.1054  3.7828 2.8210 4.2183    
AME% -63.23a -43.17a -43.95a  -26.60a -23.25a -22.14a  -2.62a -2.10a -7.34a    
TIETLB 18 19 14 
β 61.4023a 47.7399a 40.9523a  57.8087a 44.3314a 39.8235a  36.4754a 36.8810a 41.0876a    
SE 3.1827 2.5850 3.1309  3.6377 2.9744 3.3368  4.0068 3.4618 3.7925    
AME% 14.07a 6.76a 22.92a  6.90a 1.98a 14.84a  1.70a 0.37a 7.04a    
TDTA 3 8  
β 93.2730a 73.8422a   46.6249a 24.8628a   14.1678a 6.6342a     
SE 2.6247 1.8049   2.4809 1.5792   1.7131 1.0472     
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AME% 65.22a 35.73a   3.34a 0.69a   0.66a 0.03a     
TLBTA 7 6 2 
β 104.0208a 129.7856a 118.6901a  79.5195a 91.3966a 61.8247a  26.9838a 35.8971a 22.1775a    
SE 3.2385 4.3062 3.0341  3.2817 2.9565 2.9201  2.4658 2.4175 2.9764    
AME% 61.66a 43.66a 53.71a  9.85a 8.57a 34.59a  0.66a 1.10a 3.99a    
DIR 19 18 17 
β 57.6155a 46.8472a 36.4952a  55.6349a 44.4691a 37.9377a  33.6129a 38.6343a 43.0988a    
SE 2.9947 2.4835 2.7541  3.4871 2.8618 3.0714  3.8476 3.3762 3.6524    
AME% 12.90a 7.09a 20.42a  6.59a 2.26a 13.28a  1.43a 0.41a 6.87a    
NIETA 16 17  
β 93.6376a 92.4090a   75.5076a 52.9018a   63.1194a 26.8552a     
SE 4.1514 3.3347   3.5111 3.3639   3.8580 4.1414     
AME% 15.86a 7.23a   8.31a 1.79a   3.84a 0.24a     
NIM  20 8 
β  -109.2913a -108.9558a   -64.2987a -72.3164a   -24.8567a -34.0273a    
SE  8.0180 10.1674   7.3971 9.6534   7.4900 8.9746    
AME%  -6.11a -38.72a   -2.79a -24.13a   -0.75a -9.27a    
CDLTA   20 
β   10.2700a    12.6876a    14.1905a    
SE   0.5645    0.5577    0.5723    
AME%   5.96a    7.27a    8.00a    
TSTA   21 
β   -10.3733a    -9.9772a    -10.3493a    
SE   0.5779    0.6435    0.7304    
AME%   -6.01a    -4.79a    -2.86a    
NIITA   13 
β   -128.8201a    -90.1715a    -39.4006a    
SE   7.2345    7.4045    7.3900    
AME%   -24.09a    -12.03a    -3.10a    
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). The table reports univariate panel logistic regression results of the final set of variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 4), 2-years 
(columns 5 to 7), and 3-years (columns 8 to 10) lagged time periods across different size categories that I use for multivariate logit regression analysis. This excludes variables that are not significant 
in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. The sampling period is between 1985-2016. I consider banks 
corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator 
is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. β is the regression coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Ranking (columns 11 to 13) is based on the absolute 
values of AME for the 1-year lagged time estimate for small banks (SB), medium banks (MB), and large banks (LB), where the highest value gets 1, second highest gets 2 and so on.
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2.4.3 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the set of explanatory variables5 selected in the 
preceding section for further multivariate analysis. Column 1 presents the list of covariates 
along with five measures of descriptive statistics: mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
and maximum. Columns 2 and 3 report descriptive measures for all banks in my sample for 
failed and censored (when no fail has been observed) groups of banks, respectively. Subsequent 
columns present similar information for small, medium, and large banks respectively. 
Conventionally, the average total assets of failure banks exhibit lower amount 
compared to the censored group across bank size categories. In addition, the mean of covariates 
bearing a positive relationship with bank failure is higher for the failed group of observations 
than for its censored counterpart, and vice-versa. For example, PD90TA is expected to have a 
positive relationship with bank failure, and its mean across all size categories show that its 
values is higher for the failed group of observations than for its censored counterpart. 
Contrarily, TETA, for instance, is expected to have a negative relationship with bank failure, 
and its mean across all size categories show that its value is lower for the failed group of 
observations than for its censored counterpart. My expectations are well supported by all 
covariates across respective size categories except TDTA. The mean of TDTA for failed groups 
of banks is higher than for its censored counterpart, implying that failed banks have higher total 
deposits. This is contrary to the intuition, where I expect failed banks to have funding and 
liquidity problems, and hence lower total deposits. In subsequent regression analysis, this might 
lead to a positive relationship between TDTA and bank failure. Generally, median values of 
respective covariates reported in Table 5 are also sufficiently close to their respective mean 
values, thus problems that could arise due to significant skewness are not expected. 
                                                          
5To mitigate the effect of outliers on my statistical estimates, all explanatory variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile.  
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Additionally, there is no unexpected variability in the values of standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum descriptive statistics for all variables across different bank size categories. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 8 shows that some of the variables exhibit moderate to 
strong correlation with other variables. Issues associated with multicollinearity therefore need 
to be addressed carefully when developing multivariate models. Section 2.5.1 discusses how I 
address this issue in my study. 
2.5 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this section, I discuss the development and performance evaluation of multivariate 
regression models. I then provide a comparative discussion on the results for all, small, 
medium, and large banks. 
2.5.1 Model-Building Strategy 
Although several studies attempted to develop a model that is numerically stable and 
applicable, they lack consensus on the criteria for including a variable in the multivariate 
model. According to Hosmer et al. (2013), the standard error of a multivariate regression model 
increases with the number of variables and makes the model more dependent on the observed 
data. Thus, I use the approach suggested by Gupta et al. (2018) to minimise the number of 
explanatory variables entering the multivariate models. This approach requires the ranking of 
variables in univariate regression (reported in Table 3 and 4) based on the magnitude of their 
AME (the variable with the highest value of AME for 1-year lagged (T-1) is ranked 1, and so 
on), and then each variable is introduced in turn into the multivariate model in declining order 
of their respective AME. Gupta et al. (2018) justify that the higher the value of AME, the higher 
the change in the predicted probability due to unit changes in the variable’s value. In addition, 
a variable with a higher value of AME (e.g. NCOTA in Table 3) is more efficient than a variable 
with a lower value of AME (e.g. NIETA in Table 3) in discriminating between failed and 
48 | P a g e  
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
Variable Failed Censored Failed Censored Failed Censored Failed Censored 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LTA 
Mean 10.9246 11.3457 9.5470 9.9575 10.9893 11.2158 12.9477 12.9897 
Median 10.6463 11.2007 9.5273 9.9256 10.8479 11.1810 12.8090 12.7849 
SD 1.4872 1.3444 0.5951 0.6346 0.7409 0.6589 1.1271 1.1391 
Minimum 8.7324 8.7324 8.7324 8.7324 9.8074 9.8032 11.2188 11.2180 
Maximum 15.8916 15.8916 11.4079 11.4803 12.7020 13.0739 15.8916 15.8916 
NCOTA 
Mean 0.0202 0.0031 0.0216 0.0030 0.0200 0.0030 0.0185 0.0035 
Median 0.0190 0.0010 0.0225 0.0006 0.0184 0.0010 0.0155 0.0014 
SD 0.0152 0.0062 0.0155 0.0066 0.0153 0.0059 0.0143 0.0063 
Minimum -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 
Maximum 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 0.0395 
PD90TA 
Mean 0.0108 0.0025 0.0124 0.0028 0.0113 0.0025 0.0073 0.0022 
Median 0.0063 0.0006 0.0091 0.0003 0.0073 0.0006 0.0029 0.0008 
SD 0.0108 0.0046 0.0110 0.0053 0.0110 0.0045 0.0091 0.0039 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 
LLRTA 
Mean 0.0239 0.0091 0.0233 0.0090 0.0236 0.0089 0.0251 0.0097 
Median 0.0259 0.0081 0.0250 0.0078 0.0256 0.0080 0.0282 0.0085 
SD 0.0117 0.0054 0.0117 0.0058 0.0120 0.0050 0.0114 0.0057 
Minimum 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
Maximum 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 0.0359 
TETA 
Mean 0.0318 0.1009 0.0312 0.1174 0.0303 0.0982 0.0355 0.0897 
Median 0.0224 0.0915 0.0224 0.1005 0.0224 0.0918 0.0224 0.0838 
SD 0.0197 0.0431 0.0192 0.0607 0.0169 0.0337 0.0246 0.0327 
Minimum 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 0.0224 
Maximum 0.2292 0.3445 0.1496 0.3445 0.1308 0.3445 0.2292 0.3445 
OREOTA 
Mean 0.0324 0.0041 0.0312 0.0040 0.0347 0.0043 0.0296 0.0038 
Median 0.0335 0.0006 0.0324 0.0000 0.0393 0.0008 0.0266 0.0009 
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SD 0.0213 0.0087 0.0211 0.0091 0.0211 0.0088 0.0215 0.0079 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 
NIETA 
Mean 0.0353 0.0319 0.0423 0.0353 0.0329 0.0309 0.0292 0.0306 
Median 0.0296 0.0297 0.0385 0.0321 0.0275 0.0291 0.0233 0.0287 
SD 0.0232 0.0129 0.0252 0.0149 0.0213 0.0115 0.0211 0.0128 
Minimum 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 
Maximum 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 
NIM 
Mean 0.0207 0.0393 0.0241 0.0400 0.0194 0.0396 0.0183 0.0380 
Median 0.0172 0.0390 0.0216 0.0399 0.0157 0.0392 0.0133 0.0377 
SD 0.0129 0.0097 0.0137 0.0110 0.0120 0.0090 0.0124 0.0096 
Minimum 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 
Maximum 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 0.0693 
TDTA 
Mean 0.9305 0.8539 0.9455 0.8540 0.9385 0.8652 0.8923 0.8310 
Median 0.9587 0.8761 0.9587 0.8802 0.9587 0.8805 0.9251 0.8581 
SD 0.0585 0.0817 0.0357 0.0941 0.0388 0.0618 0.0920 0.0970 
Minimum 0.3926 0.3926 0.3926 0.3926 0.6253 0.3926 0.3926 0.3926 
Maximum 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 0.9587 
TIETLB 
Mean 0.0315 0.0333 0.0343 0.0322 0.0302 0.0340 0.0297 0.0329 
Median 0.0284 0.0333 0.0307 0.0323 0.0268 0.0340 0.0275 0.0328 
SD 0.0202 0.0186 0.0210 0.0191 0.0196 0.0185 0.0198 0.0182 
Minimum 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0029 0.0015 
Maximum 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 0.0725 
LLPTL 
Mean 0.0388 0.0073 0.0427 0.0082 0.0374 0.0068 0.0358 0.0074 
Median 0.0301 0.0030 0.0356 0.0025 0.0277 0.0030 0.0289 0.0035 
SD 0.0352 0.0139 0.0375 0.0171 0.0349 0.0126 0.0312 0.0130 
Minimum -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0054 
Maximum 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 0.0963 
ROA 
Mean -0.0283 0.0075 -0.0306 0.0049 -0.0284 0.0081 -0.0244 0.0089 
Median -0.0292 0.0095 -0.0345 0.0081 -0.0293 0.0097 -0.0209 0.0101 
SD 0.0212 0.0110 0.0210 0.0139 0.0208 0.0100 0.0218 0.0093 
Minimum -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 -0.0520 
Maximum 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286 0.0173 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286 
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TLBTA 
Mean 0.9686 0.8991 0.9692 0.8826 0.9701 0.9018 0.9646 0.9103 
Median 0.9780 0.9085 0.9780 0.8995 0.9780 0.9082 0.9780 0.9161 
SD 0.0199 0.0431 0.0192 0.0607 0.0170 0.0337 0.0249 0.0328 
Minimum 0.7615 0.6557 0.8504 0.6557 0.8692 0.6557 0.7615 0.6557 
Maximum 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 0.9780 
NPLTA 
Mean 0.0625 0.0097 0.0597 0.0093 0.0643 0.0096 0.0632 0.0102 
Median 0.0774 0.0051 0.0664 0.0041 0.0819 0.0051 0.0856 0.0058 
SD 0.0277 0.0135 0.0271 0.0141 0.0271 0.0133 0.0293 0.0134 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 0.0856 
NCOTL 
Mean 0.0335 0.0056 0.0364 0.0057 0.0330 0.0054 0.0300 0.0058 
Median 0.0296 0.0018 0.0370 0.0012 0.0285 0.0018 0.0251 0.0023 
SD 0.0258 0.0109 0.0267 0.0123 0.0261 0.0105 0.0231 0.0102 
Minimum -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0051 
Maximum 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 0.0692 
NPACR 
Mean -0.0301 0.0968 -0.0321 0.1138 -0.0343 0.0938 -0.0193 0.0861 
Median -0.0521 0.0905 -0.0521 0.1002 -0.0521 0.0907 -0.0521 0.0835 
SD 0.0408 0.0492 0.0352 0.0667 0.0361 0.0408 0.0530 0.0388 
Minimum -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 -0.0521 
Maximum 0.3073 0.3482 0.1205 0.3482 0.1222 0.3482 0.3073 0.3482 
NPATA 
Mean 0.1058 0.0169 0.1024 0.0168 0.1098 0.0171 0.1033 0.0166 
Median 0.1299 0.0096 0.1146 0.0090 0.1388 0.0099 0.1388 0.0096 
SD 0.0423 0.0221 0.0399 0.0227 0.0411 0.0221 0.0471 0.0215 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 
DIR 
Mean 0.0330 0.0351 0.0353 0.0334 0.0314 0.0353 0.0326 0.0364 
Median 0.0293 0.0351 0.0313 0.0333 0.0281 0.0355 0.0293 0.0361 
SD 0.0213 0.0195 0.0219 0.0196 0.0205 0.0190 0.0218 0.0201 
Minimum 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0034 0.0017 
Maximum 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 
LLPTA 
Mean 0.0218 0.0039 0.0230 0.0037 0.0214 0.0038 0.0209 0.0044 
Median 0.0187 0.0018 0.0201 0.0012 0.0182 0.0018 0.0170 0.0021 
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SD 0.0183 0.0070 0.0190 0.0073 0.0183 0.0066 0.0174 0.0073 
Minimum -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 
Maximum 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 0.0463 
NPLTL 
Mean 0.1125 0.0178 0.1066 0.0195 0.1151 0.0172 0.1165 0.0173 
Median 0.1214 0.0091 0.1103 0.0083 0.1257 0.0091 0.1352 0.0096 
SD 0.0536 0.0259 0.0522 0.0307 0.0536 0.0241 0.0552 0.0240 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 0.1690 
CDLTA 
Mean 0.0539 0.0319 0.0233 0.0171 0.0582 0.0325 0.0926 0.0453 
Median 0.0206 0.0127 0.0034 0.0026 0.0280 0.0133 0.0649 0.0255 
SD 0.0715 0.0480 0.0420 0.0352 0.0711 0.0478 0.0861 0.0545 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 0.2577 
TSTA 
Mean 0.1246 0.2615 0.1406 0.2733 0.1183 0.2678 0.1122 0.2373 
Median 0.1026 0.2440 0.1158 0.2588 0.0970 0.2517 0.0956 0.2195 
SD 0.1029 0.1547 0.1144 0.1683 0.0971 0.1537 0.0917 0.1389 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.6886 0.6886 0.6886 0.6886 0.5197 0.6886 0.5694 0.6886 
Number of observations 1,817 296,308 630 73,903 783 148,289 404 74,116 
NOTE: The table provides descriptive statistics of the annual data of bank-specific variables over the period 1985 to 2016, followed by measures across respective size 
categories. Banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets are considered as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium 
banks. Banks are separated between failed and censored (for which the failure rate has not yet occurred) groups, and descriptive measures are reported for both groups 
separately. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ in other years. Column 1 lists the main variables that are described in Table 2 along 
with the names of descriptive measures that I report in subsequent columns. Columns 2 and 3 report descriptive measures for failed and censored groups respectively, while 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Final Set of Variables 
Variable PD90TA NCOTA LLPTA LLRTA TETA TLBTA ROA NAATA NCOTL TDTA OREOTA NPACR LLPTL 
PD90TA 1 
            
NCOTA 0.2984 1 
           
LLPTA 0.303 0.9003 1 
          
LLRTA 0.1135 0.4864 0.5516 1 
         
TETA -0.1406 -0.2214 -0.2 -0.132 1 
        
TLBTA 0.1404 0.221 0.1998 0.1315 -0.9997 1 
       
ROA -0.144 -0.5808 -0.6448 -0.4097 0.0637 -0.064 1 
      
NAATA 0.1725 0.5786 0.5667 0.5947 -0.1998 0.1998 -0.5047 1 
     
NCOTL 0.2957 0.9632 0.8557 0.4018 -0.2076 0.2073 -0.54 0.5155 1 
    
TDTA 0.1487 0.1446 0.1209 0.042 -0.6036 0.6051 -0.0428 0.1148 0.1608 1 
   
OREOTA 0.1683 0.4289 0.3656 0.3906 -0.1848 0.1849 -0.3949 0.5312 0.3925 0.1481 1 
  
NPACR -0.2381 -0.3936 -0.3544 -0.2577 0.9245 -0.9243 0.2376 -0.5 -0.3645 -0.5708 -0.4629 1 
 
LLPTL 0.2666 0.7997 0.8722 0.3902 -0.0617 0.0617 -0.5574 0.448 0.8191 0.0191 0.2937 -0.2032 1 
NPATA 0.3773 0.5653 0.5387 0.5815 -0.1998 0.1997 -0.488 0.8578 0.4979 0.1306 0.7402 -0.5278 0.4131 
TIETLB 0.3796 0.2989 0.3196 -0.0807 -0.2794 0.2797 -0.078 0.0669 0.3465 0.2353 0.053 -0.2832 0.3192 
NPLTL 0.4545 0.5534 0.5326 0.4339 -0.1023 0.1025 -0.4477 0.8203 0.5394 0.06 0.4725 -0.3894 0.6172 
DIR 0.3705 0.2974 0.3198 -0.0734 -0.2643 0.2644 -0.0732 0.0655 0.3402 0.1339 0.0451 -0.2673 0.3273 
NIETA 0.1244 0.2226 0.2148 0.1848 0.0881 -0.0887 -0.3443 0.1599 0.1981 -0.0479 0.1961 0.0035 0.238 
NIM 0.1816 0.0856 0.0799 0.054 -0.0841 0.0838 0.2784 -0.0727 0.0739 0.1822 -0.0167 -0.0506 0.0156 
CDLTA -0.0992 0.0213 0.0881 0.2149 -0.0238 0.0236 -0.1188 0.1631 -0.0378 -0.0935 0.134 -0.0692 -0.0107 
TSTA -0.0306 -0.1125 -0.1498 -0.3316 0.0549 -0.0544 0.1803 -0.1972 -0.0105 0.0497 -0.1642 0.1036 -0.0168 
 
NPATA TIETLB NPLTL DIR NIETA NIM CDLTA TSTA 
     
NPATA 1 
            
TIETLB 0.0501 1 
           
NPLTL 0.7755 0.1894 1 
          
DIR 0.0482 0.9857 0.1934 1 
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NIETA 0.2052 0.0568 0.2051 0.0612 1 
        
NIM -0.0109 0.2728 -0.0795 0.2547 0.3607 1 
       
CDLTA 0.1686 -0.1135 0.0245 -0.0994 0.037 0.0108 1 
      
TSTA -0.2313 0.1119 -0.0401 0.098 -0.2296 -0.161 -0.3677 1 
     
     Notes: This table presents the correlation among the final set of variables estimated over the sample period 1985-2016.
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censored banks. I also exclude a variable from the multivariate models if, when added it (i) 
changes the sign of any previously added variable, (ii) holds the opposite sign to that generated 
by univariate analysis, (iii) holds the identical sign to univariate analysis, but is insignificant 
with a p-value greater than 0.10, and (iv) makes a previously introduced variable insignificant 
with a p-value greater than 0.10. This screening mechanism ensures that the method is useful 
to appropriately address the issue of multicollinearity and develops a multivariate model with 
a ‘best’ set of variables that explains the variance of the dependent variable. Using panel 
logistic regression, this process is applied to all, small, medium, and large banks respectively 
for all three (T – 1, T – 2, and T – 3) respective lagged time periods. I do this to observe any 
variances that may arise due to different estimation models across different bank size classes.  
I eventually end up with six variables to be used in the multivariate model for all banks. 
The variables are net charge off (NCOTA), past due 90+ days (PD90TA), loan loss reserves 
(LLRTA), total equity (TETA), other real estate owned (OREOTA), and total of non-interest 
expense (NIETA), and they are expressed as a ratio with respect to the bank’s total assets. For 
small banks, the multivariate regression model is explained by seven variables. Five out of the 
seven variables (NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, OREOTA, and NIETA) are common to 
explanatory variables for all banks. The other two variables are total deposits to total assets 
ratio (TDTA) and total interest expenses to total liabilities (TIETLB). Among large banks, five 
variables (PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, Net Interest Margin (NIM), and Loan Loss Provisions to 
Total Loans (LLPTL)) are included in the multivariate regression model. Only three variables 
(PD90TA, LLRTA, and TETA) are similar to the variables of all banks. For medium banks, 
the multivariate regression model contains six variables as a combination of the explanatory 
variables for small and large banks (NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, OREOTA, and NIM). 
These results generally underpin my second hypothesis (H2) that the factors affecting the 
probability of banks’ failure vary across small, medium, and large size categories. 
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To further evaluate the consistency and strength of respective sets of main variables in 
jointly predicting the probability of banks’ failure (robustness check), I estimate another set of 
multivariate models supplementing control variables (discussed in Section 2.3.4.3). This also 
helps me to control for potential differences in bank stability, banking crises, and state-level 
economic conditions. To gauge their intertemporal predictive ability, I estimate regression 
models for 2-years and 3-years lagged periods. The models and their results are presented in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11. 
2.5.2 Evaluation of Classification Performance  
The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve and the area under the ROC (AUROC) 
curve are viable measures to evaluate the classification performance of early-warning models 
developed to identify distressed banks (Betz et al., 2014). The ROC curve describes the trade-
off between true-positive (sensitivity: a bank actually fails, and the model classifies it as 
expected failure) and false-negative (1 – specificity: a bank actually fails but the model 
classifies it as expected survival) for an entire range of classification thresholds (Gupta et al., 
2018). However, ROC offers a range of performance assessments. This means that the accuracy 
of the predicted class probabilities is mostly overlooked. I therefore use the AUROC, which is 
by far the most common non-parametric method for evaluating a fitted prediction model’s 
ability to assign a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative 
one (Betz et al., 2014; Cole and White, 2012). In other words, the AUROC gauges the ability 
of the prediction model to discriminate between those banks which experience the event of 
interest, and those which do not. Its value varies between 0.5 and 1.0, which summarises the 
classification performance of the model developed. The value of 1 represents a perfect model, 
whereas the value of 0.5 represents no discrimination ability of the model. Generally, there is 
no guide for classifying the predictive accuracy of a model based on AUROC, however any 
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value above 0.7 is acceptable and above 0.8 is considered to be excellent (Hosmer et al., 2013). 
Thus, the higher the AUROC, the better the model’s prediction. 
Table 9: Multivariate Regression Model for All Banks 
Panel A: Regression Results 
 Without Control Variables  With Control Variables 
Variable 1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag 3 Years Lag  1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag 3 Years Lags 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
NCOTA 
β 39.8244a 35.8465a 29.6089a  19.3895a 22.7565a 22.8679a 
SE 2.6997 3.6711 4.1561  3.4203 4.1896 5.4609 
AME% 15.0422a 6.1886a 2.5228a  5.3925a 5.1108a 2.2872a 
PD90TA 
β 30.8333a 68.6989a 67.0855a  35.7708a 63.9088a 87.8005a 
SE 3.6360 4.6782 4.7960  4.7021 5.5617 6.3381 
AME% 11.6461a 11.8604a 5.7161a  9.9483a 14.3532a 8.7816a 
LLRTA 
β 38.7496a 90.7056a 41.4054a  45.3049a 66.7501a 35.3956a 
SE 3.8866 5.8187 5.9059  4.8571 6.4110 7.4069 
AME% 14.6362a 15.6597a 3.5280a  12.5999a 14.9913a 3.5401a 
TETA 
β -75.4119a -40.1401a -12.6109a  -81.5346a -48.3109a -25.2473a 
SE 2.2137 1.8575 1.2173  2.7717 2.4545 1.8338 
AME% -28.4841a -6.9299a -1.0745a  -22.6759a -10.8501a -2.5251a 
OREOTA 
β 25.6350a 56.5833a 47.0656a  11.9870a 32.9740a 33.8065a 
SE 1.9345 3.0603 2.8371  2.2337 3.3489 3.5696 
AME% 9.6827a 9.7687a 4.0103a  3.3337a 7.4056a 3.3812a 
NIETA 
β 3.4345c 3.5456 6.5127b  17.1175a 12.1606a 21.1530a 
SE 1.8988 2.8338 2.8252  2.3013 2.8837 3.4003 
AME% 1. 2972c 0.6121 0.5549b  4.7606a 2.7311a 2.1156a 
GHPI 
β     -11.8082a -12.2518a -16.3320a 
SE     0.7100 0.7338 0.8243 
AME%     -3.2840a -2.7516a -1.6334a 
SL 
β     2.3327a 2.7928a 2.2307a 
SE     0.1377 0.1448 0.1479 
AME%     0.6487a 0.6272a 0.2231a 
GFC 
β     1.7208a 2.4787a 3.5303a 
SE     0.1319 0.1392 0.1290 
AME%     0.4786a 0.5566a 0.3531a 
FOPCT 
β     2.7074a 3.1634a 3.2666a 
SE     0.1368 0.14717 0.1289 
AME%     0.7529a 0.7104a 0.3267a 
FDIC 
β     2.8677a 2.4352a 1.4718a 
SE     0.1399 0.1502 0.1426 
AME%     0.7975a 0.5469a 0.1472a 
FED 
β     2.8925a 2.4565a 1.4033a 
SE     0.1853 0.1925 0.1974 
AME%     0.8044a 0.5517a 0.1403a 
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2  2615a 1805a 1495a  1923a 1308a 1560a 




-4722 -6698 -7189  -3230 -4606 -4683 
R2  0.7569 0.3018 0.0810  0.7722 0.5131 0. 2998 
No. of “0”  276,981 258,270 240,317  257,801 239,877 223,809 
No. of “1” 1,694 1,554 1,342  1,546 1,337 1,040 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel 
logistic regression results for 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years lagged periods, estimated over a sampling period of 
1985-2016. Columns 2, 3 and 4 do not include control variables and the rest include control variables in the 
multivariate estimates. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s binary indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. 
A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard 
error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-
square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the 
model’s goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in my sample, while No. of “0” counts the 
number of “non-failure” observations.  
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Table 10: Multivariate Regression Models without Control Variables by Size Categories 
 
Panel A: Regression Results 
                                               1 Year Lag                                            2 Years Lag                                                3 Years Lag 
Variable  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
     (1) (2) (3) (4)            (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
NCOTA 
β 39.8244a 47.7780a 26.7794a   35.8465a 35.2795a 24.3572b   29.6089a 34.9807a 18.6729c  
SE 2.6997 4.3729 6.9356   3.6711 5.8198 9.7469   4.1561 7.7074 9.7194  
AME% 15.0422a 25.9338a 8.2233a   6.1886a 9.2955a 2.4260b   2.5228a 2.3449a 0. 4449c  
PD90TA 
β 30.8333a 40.0387a 49.2210a 30.7840b  68.6989a 60.4810a 103.1499a 49.6830a  67.0855a 74.9498a 59.3297a 49.4819a 
SE 3.6360 5.5941 9.7116 13.4527  4.6782 7.5487 12.4985 14.7570  4.7960 9.4391 12.5299 13.6310 
AME% 11.6461a 21.7330a 15.1145a 14.3720b  11.8604a 15.9356a 10.2738a 17.2549a  5.7161a 5.0242a 1.4135a 21.8576a 
LLRTA 
β 38.7496a 37.2199a 76.9432a 90.8796a  90.7056a 80.8907a 151.7489a 111.7549a  41.4054a 48.9785a 89.8852a 51.0923a 
SE 3.8866 6.2611 11.4386 13.0387  5.8187 9.6021 14.3551 16.0917  5.9059 12.0932 14.1703 15.1547 
AME% 14.6362a 20.2029a 23.6273a 42.4285a  15.6597a 21.3132a 15.1143a 38.8126a  3.5280a 3.2832a 2.1416a 22.5689a 
TETA 
β -75.4119a  -76.8456a -58.5020a  -40.1401a  -46.1721a -28.6889a  -12.6109a  -19.4217a -16.7651a 
SE 2.2137  7.2994 5.3171  1.8575  4.4201 3.5789  1.2173  2.9238 2.9133 
AME% -28.4841a  -23.5974a -27.3126a  -6.9299a  -4.5988a -9.9637a  -1.0745a  -0. 4627a -7.4056a 
OREOTA 
β 25.6350a 30.3981a 29.5583a   56.5833a 50.6729a 58.6815a   47.0656a 56.9582a 50.5365a  
SE 1.9345 2.9128 5.6556   3.0603 5.2876 7.1723   2.8371 6.1759 7.4430  
AME% 9.6827a 16.5000a 9.0766a   9.7687a 13.3513a 5.8447a   4.0103a 3.8181a 1.2040a  
NIETA 
β 3.4345c 24.7046a    3.5456  50.8636a    6.5127b 56.7940a   
SE 1.8988 3.2496    2.8338 5.1278    2.8252 5.8014   
AME% 1. 2972c 13.4096a    0.6121  13.4016a    0.5549b 3.8071a   
TDTA 
β  40.3383a     15.4303a     6.7069a   
SE  2.6588     2.0183     1.4217   
AME%  21.8956a     4.0656a     0.4496a   
TIETLB 
β  6.4420c     25.9831a     10.8052b   
SE  3.3363     4.4912     5.2393   
AME%  3.4967c     6.8460a     0.7243c   
NIM 
β   -69.8740a -61.2067a    -90.6152a -77.2748a    -42.6528a -37.2785a 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results without control variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 5), 2-years 
(columns 6 to 9), and 3-years (columns 10 to 13) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1985-2016. I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile 
of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive 
coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the 
chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model’s goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in my sample, while No. 
of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations.  
 
Table 11: Multivariate Regression Models with Control Variables by Size Categories 
Panel A: Regression Results 
                                               1 Year Lag                                            2 Years Lag                                                3 Years Lag 
Variable  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks  All Banks Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
     (1) (2) (3) (4)            (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
NCOTA 
β  19.3895a 23.6037a 16.1267b   22.7565a 16.8937a 7.9462   22.8679a 9.4457 11.5266  
SE  3.4203 5.9249 7.8013   4.1896 6.2052 7.1901   5.4609 6.9608 8.1313  
AME% 5.3925a 8.3371a 5.0714b   5.1108a 6.3238a 4.8672   2.2872a 3.6989 8.1205  
PD90TA 
β  35.7708a 36.8391a 29.7863a 74.9467b  63.9088a 41.6546a 41.1333a 23.3172  87.8005a 49.0316a 50.1830a 25.9338 
SE  4.7021 7.3648 11.5435 18.1738  5.5617 7.8294 9.5826 20.0476  6.3381 8.2395 10.4303 19.1263 
AME% 9.9483a 13.0121a 9.3670a 30.3851a  14.3532a 15.5926a 25.1950a 9.5130  8.7816a 19.2007a 35.3538a 24.0660 
SE   9.5580 9.3690    11.4190 10.8521    9.7505 8.6466 
AME%   -21.4566a -28.5753a    -9.0253a -26.8376a    -1.0162a -16.4670a 
LLPTL 
β    14.8423a     18.7471a     6.1916  
SE    4.0385     4.9228     5.4214 
AME%    6.9293a     6.5109a     2.7350 
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2  2615a 1134a 184a 332a  1805a 473a 614a 199a  1495a 599a 336a 106a 
Log Likeli-
hood  
-4722 -1561 -931 -580  -6698 -1920 -1691 -1153  -7189 -1859 -2043 -1413 
R2  0.7569 0.7765 0.6956 0.6850  0.3018 0.2818 0.2508 0.2723  0.0810 0.1003 0.0796 0.1141 
No. of “0”  276,981 67,482 53,792 26,753  258,270 62,347 48,553 24,137  240,317 58,013 43,297 21,532 
No. of “1” 1,694 573 347 198  1,554 515 398 256  1,342 403 403 276 
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LLRTA 
β  45.3049a 55.4850a 74.4268a 48.0865a  66.7501a 63.1352a 75.4361a 109.3064a  35.3956a 32.9799a 52.4253a 58.7668a 
SE  4.8571 7.9362 11.1310 14.5004  6.4110 8.6515 9.3138 21.5749  7.4069 9.1973 10.1822 14.3517 
AME% 12.5999a 19.5980a 23.4054a 19.4953a  14.9913a 23.6334a 46.2061a 44.5949a  3.5401a 12.9149a 36.9335a 54.5342a 
TETA 
β  -81.5346a  -80.0039a -78.6671a  -48.3109a  -28.9044a -32.2108a  -25.2473a  -13.3598a -12.8896a 
SE  2.7717  6.4577 5.8419  2.4545  2.9681 5.6366  1.8338  2.4391 3.1857 
AME% -22.6759a  -25.1593a -31.8934a  -10.8501a  -17.7045a -13.1414a  -2.5251a  -9.4119a -11.9612a 
OREOTA 
β  11.9870a 21.5538a 23.7403a   32.9740a 22.1463a 25.7580a   33.8065a 13.5405a 24.2017a  
SE  2.2337 3.5277 4.8817   3.3489 3.9491 4.1493   3.5696 4.3868 4.9287  
AME% 3.3337a 7.6131a 7.4657a   7.4056a 8.2900a 15.7773a   3.3812a 5.3024a 17.0500a  
NIETA 
β  17.1175a 41.0303a    12.1606a  44.0242a    21.1530a 43.3831a   
SE  2.3013 3.8786    2.8837 4.6609    3.4003 4.8454   
AME% 4.7606a 14.4924a    2.7311a 16.4796a    2.1156a 16.9887a   
TDTA 
β   35.1497a     12.6272a     5.0683a   
SE   2.9340     1.8330     1.3056   
AME%  12.4153a     4.7267a     1.9847a   
TIETLB 
β   56.1849a     61.8262a     71.8786a   
SE   5.5543     5.5448     5.6244   
AME%  19.8453a     23.1434a     28.1475a   
NIM 
β    -31.9666a -8.4281     -56.3848a -77.9860a    -35.9209a -26.9491a 
SE    9.7895 11.9581    7.9308 14.1350    7.9246 9.1266 
AME%   -10.0527a -3.4169    -34.5369a -31.8168a    -25.3062a -25.0081a 
LLPTL 
β     18.0002a     20.5102a     20.4884a 
SE     11.9581     6.1476     5.0810 
AME%    7.2977a     8.3678a     19.0128a 
GHPI 
β  -11.8082a -8.0294a -13.0414a -10.1367a  -12.2518a -14.9996a -10.3922b -9.2679a  -16.3320a -16.8950a -16.8401a -12.8330a 
SE  0.7100 1.6400 1.4633 1.3588  0.7338 1.4891 0.9543 1.4679  0.8243 1.4993 1.0103 1.2233 
AME% -3.2840a -2.8361a -4.1012a -4.1096a  -2.7516a -5.6148a -6.3654a -3.7811a  -1.6334a -6.6160a -11.8638a -11.9087a 
SL 
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β  2.3327a 2.2009a 2.1595a -0.9551b  2.7928a 2.4410a 4.5441a 3.9445a  2.2307a 2.3423a 4.2429a 3.5135a 
SE  0.1377 0.2429 0.3850 0.4718  0.1448 0.2372 0.3478 0.4437  0.1479 0.2350 0.3504 0.3618 
AME% 0.6487a 0.7773a 0.6791a -0.3872b  0.6272a 0.9137a 2.7833a 1.6093a  0.2231a 0.9172a 2.9891a 3.2605a 
GFC 
β  1.7208a 1.6672a 1.7609a 1.7093a  2.4787a 1.6290a 2.0769a 3.0810a  3.5303a 2.9303a 3.3281a 4.8514a 
SE  0.1319 0.2904 0.2593 0.3044  0.1392 0.2998 0.2174 0.3424  0.1290 0.2600 0.2226 0.2969 
AME% 0.4786a 0. 5888a 0.5537a 0.6930a  0.5566a 0.6098a 1.2722a 1.2570a  0.3531a 1.1475a 2.3447a 4.5020a 
FOPCT 
β  2.7074a 3.8462a 2.1136a 2.0205a  3.1634a 4.4577a 1.8411a 2.6174a  3.2666a 4.6263a 2.0534a 3.3944a 
SE  0.1368 0.2568 0.3237 0.4021  0.14717 0.2738 0.2120 0.3828  0.1289 0.2598 0.2167 0.2461 
AME% 0.7529a 1.3585a 0.6647a 0.8191a  0.7104a 1.6686a 1.1277a 1.0678a  0.3267a 1.8116a 1.4466a 3.1499 a 
FDIC 
β  2.8677a 3.9195a 1.9182a 0.1997  2.4352a 3.0064a 2.9880a 1.3465a  1.4718a 1.8555a 2.0219a 0.3370 
SE  0.1399 0.2334 0.3215 0.2826  0.1502 0.2303 0.3095 0.3201  0.1426 0.2292 0.2945 0.2151 
AME% 0.7975a 1.3844a 0.6032a 0.0809  0.5469a 1.1254a 1.8302a 0.5493a  0.1472a 0.7266a 1.4244a 0.3127 
FED 
β  2.8925a 3.8668a 1.9393a 0.4448  2.4565a  3.2687a 2.7800a 1.1506a  1.4033a 2.1849a 1.7908a 0.3549 
SE  0.1853 0.3366 0.4273 0.3625  0.1925 0.3124 0.3721 0.7462  0.1974 0.3092 0.3535 0.2743 
AME% 0.8044a 1.3658a 0.6098a 0.1803  0.5517a 1.2236a 1.7028a 0.4694a  0.1403a 0.8556a 1.2616a 0.3294 
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2  1923a 140a 364a 551a  1308a 655a 1025a 177a  1560a 617a 671a  421a 
Log Likeli-
hood  
-3230 -952 -596 -392  -4606 -1064 -1167 -843  -4683 -1101 -1273 -803 
R2  0.7722 0.7901 0.7872 0.7678  0.5131 0.6240 0.6088 0.4522  0. 2998 0.5564 0.5107 0.5532 
No. of “0”  257,801 62,329 45,696 22,627  239,877 57,999 40,643 20,122  223,809 54,301 36,202 18,030 
No. of “1” 1,546 512 284 175  1,337 403 321 230  1,040 308 285 194 
Panel C: Model Performance 
 All Banks  Small Banks  Medium Banks Large Banks 
AUROC-W 0.9805  0.9767  0.9864 0.9709 
AUROC-H 0.9785  0.9077  0.9212 0.9869 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with control variables for 1-year (columns 2 to 5), 2-years (columns 
6 to 9), and 3-years (columns 10 to 13) lagged periods across different size categories. The sampling period runs between 1985-2016. I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total 
assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient 
(β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, 
the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model’s goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in my sample, while No. of “0” 
counts the number of “non-failure” observations. Panel C shows the accuracy of models’ performance measured by area under the ROC curve. AUROC-W represents within sample and AUROC-H 
represents hold-out sample area under ROC curves.
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performance. Although few studies (e.g., Betz et al., 2014; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011) in the 
literature of bank failure have reported the AUROC,  from a policy perspective and for the 
empirical tests in this paper this metric is fundamental for comparing performance and 
providing a validation of the models.  
Following the approach of Gupta et al., (2018), I report area under ROC (AUROC) 
curves for respective models to evaluate the within-sample and out-of-sample classification 
performance of the models developed. For within-sample validation, I estimate the models 
using the entire sample data. To validate models’ out-of-sample predictive performance, I first 
estimate the models using all available information up to the year 2011, and then predict the 
probability of bank failure for the year 2012. Subsequently, I incorporate 2012 in the estimation 
sample and predict the probability of bank failure for 2013 and so on, up to the year 2016. 
Finally, I use these predicted probabilities from the year 2012 until the year 2016 to estimate 
out-of-sample AUROC for respective multivariate regression models. 
2.5.3 Multivariate Regression Results and Discussion 
 
2.5.3.1 All Banks 
The results in columns 1, 5 and 9 of Table 9 indicate that the coefficients on NCOTA, PD90TA, 
LLRTA, and OREOTA have a positive influence on the probability of failure, implying that a 
weaker asset quality is associated with a higher bank failure. This is consistent with 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), who find that credit risk has a prominent role in the overall 
stability of a bank. The coefficient on NIETA is positively related to bank failure. This suggests 
that a high level of bank operating expenses increases the likelihood of failure. This is in line 
with the findings of DeYoung (1998) who shows that poor management reduces the efficiency 
of using resources, thereby increasing the probability of default. In contrast, the coefficient on 
TETA is negative, suggesting that a higher capital is associated with a lower probability of 
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failure. This is intuitive as the capital serves as a main line of defence against bank failure 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013). All of these results are supported by several studies within the 
theoretical literature (e.g., Bryant, 1980; Repullo, 2004).  
 Turning to the control variables, house price inflation shows significantly negative 
values for all three-time lagged periods. This implies that declining real estate prices increase 
the probability of bank failure. This result is similar to the findings of Berger et al. (2016) who 
report that house price inflation has a negative effect, mostly on the 2 years preceding the 
failure. In contrast, foreign ownership is positively related to bank failure, suggesting that 
banks are more likely to fail if they have a greater percentage of foreign ownership. This result 
is in line with the findings of Berger et al. (2000) who show that foreign banks are generally 
less efficient than domestic banks in the US. The banking crises (SL and GFC) and primary 
regulator (FED and FDIC) dummies have significant and positive values for all lagged periods. 
Overall, the baseline model is parsimonious and offers a good model that fits the data. This is 
illustrated by, for example, the McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo R-squared, which is 77%. This 
value outperforms similar models in the early warning system literature (e.g., Cole and White, 
2012; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). Additionally, the results of area under ROC (AUROC) 
curves of multivariate model for all banks, as shown in Figure 2, exhibit that my models are 
excellent (around or above 90%) in classifying within-sample bank failures across all lagged 
time periods. However, AUROC values of the hold-out sample vary across different forecast 
horizons. The lowest estimate is 73% for the 3 years prior to the forecasting horizon, which is 
considered to be acceptable, while the 1- and 2-year forecast horizons are above 91%, 
suggesting excellent classification performance of my multivariate models.
64 | P a g e  
 
















Notes: This table reports area under ROC curves for respective multivariate regression models developed for all banks.
65 | P a g e  
 
2.5.3.2 Small Banks 
Table 10 (columns 2, 6 and 10) reports the results of the main variables of multivariate 
regression models for small banks. NCOTA, PD90TA, LLRTA, OREOTA, and NIETA are 
identical to the multivariate regression models for all banks, are statistically significant, and 
have signs consistent with the discussion in Section 2.2.4.2. The other two variables are total 
deposits to total assets ratio (TDTA) as a measure of funding, and total interest expenses to 
total liabilities (TIETLB) as a proxy of liquidity. The coefficient on TDTA is significantly 
positive, suggesting that higher deposits are associated with a higher probability of failure. This 
is consistent with Acharya and Naqvi (2012) who theoretically show that banks with excessive 
deposits are more likely to take risks by mitigating the lending standards to increase loans, 
because managers compensate based on the volume of loans. It is also consistent with a recent 
empirical paper by Khan et al. (2017) who find that banks holding higher deposits generally 
take more risks. This risk-taking can be attributed to the moral hazard of deposit insurance 
(Keeley, 1990). Moreover, I find the coefficient of TIETLB is significant and positively related 
to bank failure, implying that a higher share of interest expenses to total liabilities is associated 
with a higher probability of failure. This is in line with the findings of Betz et al. (2014) who 
show that the share of interest expenses to total liabilities has a positive effect on bank failure. 
These results are important to the literature in two ways. First, the low funding risk, as proxied 
by higher deposit ratios, has a more adverse effect on small banks and participates heavily in 
their failures. Second, the ratio of total interest expenses to total liabilities (TIETLB) 
contributes to explaining the relationship between liquidity risk and bank failure, specifically 
in small banks. 
 Next, I complement the models estimated in Table 8 with control variables (see 
columns 2, 6 and 10 in Table 11). I find that all variables are statistically significant, and the 
sign of respective coefficients remains the same as the multivariate models estimated without 
66 | P a g e  
 
control variables. An exception is NCOTA, which is insignificant for the 3-years lagged 
estimate. Furthermore, all control variables are statistically significant, and have a sign 
consistent with the control variables of the multivariate regression model for all banks. 
 The within-sample area under ROC (AUROC) curves of multivariate models developed 
across small banks are above 91%, suggesting excellent classification performance of my 
multivariate models for small banks across all time periods. The AUROC for out-of-sample for 
the 1- and 2-year horizons are excellent (above 83%), while that for the 3-year horizon is 
acceptable with 73% (see Figure 3). These values and the shapes of ROC curves are relatively 
similar to the values and shapes of the ROC curves of all banks. This might indicate that small 
banks dominate the sample. Therefore, the effects of medium and large banks could be 
disregarded, thereby leading to a heterogeneous sampling and biased estimates. This clearly 
supports the necessity of distinction between different size classes when analysing bank 
failures. 
2.5.3.3 Medium Banks 
Table 10 (columns 3, 7 and 11) illustrates that five out of six main variables (NCOTA, 
PD90TA, LLRTA, OREOTA, and TETA) of the multivariate regression model for medium 
banks remain the same as the multivariate models estimated for all and small banks. They are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign of respective coefficients across all lagged 
periods. The sixth main variable is net interest margin (NIM), which is also statistically 
significant and has a negative sign across the three lagged periods, suggesting that a larger 
amount of returns generated by investments reduces the probability of failure for medium 
banks. This is consistent with the hypothesis that banks dealing heavily with risky loans tend 
to have higher net interest margins (Angbazo, 1997).
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Notes: This table reports area under ROC curves for respective multivariate regression models developed for small banks.
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Table 11 reports the results after introducing control variables. All variables (main and control) 
are statistically significant and all coefficients hold the same sign previously reported except 
NCOTA, which is insignificant for 2-years and 3-years lagged estimates. Both within-sample 
and out-of-sample classification of all multivariate models across all time periods are above 
81%, which is considered to be excellent (see Figure 4). 
2.5.3.4 Large Banks 
As reported in Table 10 (columns 4, 8 and 12), multivariate regression models for large banks 
contain the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLPTL) as one of the main variables 
that has not been reported for all, small, and medium banks. The coefficient on LLPTL is 
positive and statistically significant for 1-year and 2-years lagged estimates but becomes 
insignificant for the 3-years lagged estimate. This indicates that risky loan portfolios increase 
the probability of failure of large banks more than other banks. Similarly, Poghosyan and Čihak 
(2011) find that the deterioration of the loan portfolio enhances the probability of bank default. 
The rest of the main variables (PD90TA, LLRTA, TETA, and NIM) are statistically significant 
and have a sign consistent with the discussion in Section 2.4.2 across all three-time lagged 
periods. 
 In the presence of control variables, I find that three out of the five main variables are 
statistically significant and have the same sign as those of large banks’ multivariate models 
estimated without control variables across the three-time lagged periods (see Table 11). 
However, of the other two variables, NIM is insignificant for the 1-year lagged period, and 
PD90TA is insignificant for 2-years and 3-years lagged estimates. The control variables are 
statistically significant, and their coefficients have expected signs, except primary regulators 
(FED and FDIC) are insignificant for the 1-year and 3-years lagged estimates.
69 | P a g e  
 














Notes: This table reports area under ROC curves for respective multivariate regression models developed for medium banks. 
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The within-sample and out-of-sample AUROC estimated for multivariate models for large 
banks are close to, or higher than, 0.80, implying superior classification performance across all 
time periods (see Figure 5). Yet the shapes of ROC curves of hold-out sample estimates are 
steps rather than concave, due to the scarcity of failures in out-of-sample validation6. 
2.6 Interaction between Bank Size and Bank Charter 
 
To test the hypothesis that the impact of bank size on the probability of bank failure varies with 
bank charter, I add interaction between bank size and bank charter to the multivariate regression 
models reported in Table 9. Table 12 reports the results of multivariate regression models with 
interaction terms for bank size and bank charter. These results are presented with and without 
control variables, and for the three lagged periods. The size category “Small Banks” and bank 
charter “National Chartered Banks” are taken as the reference group, and thus main and 
interaction effects are reported for medium banks, large banks and state-chartered banks. 
 The notable result of interactions between bank size and bank charter is that all 
explanatory variables, as well as control variables, are statistically significant and have signs 
consistent with the discussion in section 2.5.2.1.7 This shows the robustness and consistency of 
my explanatory variables. 
 The impact of medium sized banks (MB) is significantly negative across all estimates, 
but the main effect of large banks (LB) is only significantly negative for 2-years and 3-years 
lagged estimates. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables. The sign and 
statistically significant differences between medium and large banks for the 1-year lagged
                                                          
6 One should be aware of this when analysing the performance of forecasting models for hold-out samples because 
it may mislead the estimates of AUROC (Gupta et al., 2018). 
7 Except NIETA, which is insignificantly negative for 2-years lagged estimate and positive for 3-years lagged 
time without control variables. 
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Notes: This table reports area under ROC curves for respective multivariate regression models developed for large banks.
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period, which is the main concern of this paper, confirms my earlier results and clearly 
reinforces my hypothesis that the probability of bank failure varies with size categories. The 
effects of state-chartered banks are significantly negative for all estimates with and without 
control variables8. This is mostly consistent with Danisewicz et al. (2017), who show that the 
depositor preference law leads to less risk taking, and a lower probability of failure among 
state-chartered banks.9 
Turning to the effects of bank size and bank charter, I observe a negative but 
insignificant relationship between medium sized banks and bank charter “MB×State Charter” 
for the 1-year lagged estimate. However, this relationship becomes positive and statistically 
significant for 2- and 3-years lagged estimates. For interaction terms between large sized banks 
and bank charter “LB×State Charter”, I find relatively similar findings of “MB×State Charter”. 
These results are robust to the presence of control variables. 
 Overall, the impact of bank size on probability of bank failure varies with bank charter, 
and it might be appropriate to consider this when predicting the failure of US banks. 
2.7 Additional Robustness Check  
  
According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), the effects of financial crises are likely to differ by 
crisis type. To test the reliability of my multivariate results, I examine bank failure during 
banking crises (the credit crunch and subprime lending crisis), market crises (the 1987 stock 
market crash, the 1998 Russian debt crisis and long-term capital management bailout, the 
dot.com bubble, and the September 11 terrorist attack (2000–2002)), and normal times (all non-
crisis years) as three separate groups. I rerun all multivariate regressions separately for 
                                                          
8 An exception is the coefficient of the 1-year lagged time without control variables, which is significantly positive. 
9 State chartered banks were subject to depositor preference law (DPL), which changes the priority structure of 
debt claims, from 1909, whereas nationally chartered banks were subject to DPL from 1993 onwards. 
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Table 12: Multivariate Regression Models with interaction between Bank Size and Bank Charted 
Panel A: Regression Results 
 Without Control Variables   With Control Variables 
   1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag 3 Years Lag  1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag 3 Years Lag 
Variable β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME%  β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
NCOTA 38.998a 2.7118 14.73a 35.666a 3.7124 5.99a 29.939a 4.1816 2.66a  27.606a 3.8695 6.50a 31.308a 4.5665 6.74a 33.890a 6.4200 2.55a 
PD90TA 30.512a 3.6420 11.52a 67.238a 4.7684 11.30a 66.400a 4.8608 5.90a  41.919a 5.3508 9.87a 70.985a 5.8977 15.27a 100.822a 7.4880 7.58a 
LLRTA 40.001a 3.9157 15.11a 91.097a 5.9487 15.31a 40.211a 5.9427 3.58a  37.022a 5.5305 8.71a 60.303a 6.6313 12.97a 30.747a 8.7848 2.31a 
TETA -75.874a 2.2259 -28.65a -40.615a 1.8965 -6.83a -12.508a 1.2240 -1.11a  -83.817a 2.9414 -19.73a -46.240a 2.2630 -9.95a -26.354a 2.0396 -1.98a 
OREOTA 25.653a 1.9475 9.69a 58.195a 3.1593 9.78a 48.086a 2.8721 4.28a  16.834a 2.5731 3.96a 37.812a 3.3371 8.13a 42.443a 4.4424 3.19a 
NIETA 3.459c 1.9709 1.31c -0.480 2.9576 -0.08 2.792 2.8957 0.25  15.257a 2.6780 3.59a 7.812a 3.0852 1.68a 15.721a 4.0011 1.18a 
MB -0.276b 0.1330 -0.11a -1.272a 0.1888 -0.15a -1.264a 0.1686 -0.07a  -0.218 0.1692 -0.09a -0.751a 0.1895 -0.09a -1.395a 0.2405 -0.05a 
LB 0.057 0.1457 -0.03 -1.108a 0.2077 -0.11a -1.110a 0.1869 -0.05a  0.511a 0.1843 -0.02 -0.107  0.2002 -0.03 -1.022a 0.2650 -0.03a 
SC 0.316b 0.1258 0.09a -0.953a 0.1836 -0.08a -1.487a 0.1684 -0.08a  -6.359a 0.8218 -10.75a -7.894a 0.8515 -18.5a -9.594a 1.1271 -16.2a 
MB × SC -0.040 0.1602  0.845a 0.2230  1.099a 0.2052   -0.255 0.2145  0.583a 0.2301  1.353a 0.2894  
LB × SC -0.194 0.1789  0.947a 0.2512  1.259a 0.2315   -1.049a 0.2402  -0.012 0.2497  1.233a 0.3239  
GHPI           -11.935a 0.7770 -2.81a -11.666a 0.7378 -2.51a -17.606a 1.0134 -1.32a 
FOPCT           2.673a 0.1496 0.63a 3.074a 0.1427 0.66a 3.449a 0.1621 0.26a 
SL           2.595a 0.1441 0.61a 3.319a 0.1440 0.71a 2.991a 0.1619 0.22a 
GFC           1.790a 0.1390 0.42a 2.576a 0.1403 0.55a 3.764a 0.1542 0.28a 
FED           9.141a 0.8382 2.15a 9.295a 0.8519 2.00a 9.138a 1.1092 0.69a 
FDIC           9.077a 0.8261 2.14a 9.222a 0.8411 1.98a 9.191a 1.0954 0.69a 
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 2616a 1692a 1540a  1586a 1387a 1187a 
Log 
Likelihood 
-4689 -6665 -7137  -2941 -4234 -4408 
R2 0.7599 0.299 0.0889  0.8093 0.6433 0.4554 
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No. of “0” 276,973 258,269 240,317  257,800 239,877 223,809 
No. of “1” 1,687                          1,554 1,342  1,546 1,337 1,040 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). Panel A presents multivariate panel logistic regression results with interaction terms (between bank size and the bank charted) 
for 1-year, 2-years, and 3-years lagged periods. Size category “Small Banks” and bank charted “National Charted” are considered reference groups, and thus main and interaction effects are reported 
for medium banks (MB), large banks (LB) and State charted banks (SC). Results are reported separately for multivariate models without control variables (columns 2 to 10) and with control variables 
(columns 11 to 19). The sampling period runs between 1985-2016. I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, 
and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood 
and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panel B reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination 
(McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure the model’s goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in my sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations.
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all, small, medium, and large banks with the same control variables used in the main 
multivariate regressions (see Section 2.3.4.3) with the exception of the credit crunch and 
subprime lending crisis, to avoid collinearity. Table 13 reports the findings for all, small, 
medium, and large banks across various types of financial crises and normal times. For all 
banks, the results are the same at all times except that OREOTA becomes insignificant during 
the market crises. For small banks, all variables are significant with expected signs and have 
AMEs above 5% during banking crises. However, some variables (NCOTA, OREOTA, and 
TIETLB) during market crises and PD90TA during normal times become insignificant. For 
medium and large banks, the main result is that the ratio of total equity to total assets (TETA) 
remains significant with high AMEs at all times, primarily during banking crises. This is in 
line with Berger and Bouwman (2013) who find that higher capital improves the probability of 
surviving for medium and large banks during banking crises. Other findings among medium 
and large banks are relatively similar to the main results. 
2.8 Conclusion  
 
The threat of bank failure affects not only the stability of the financial system but also the 
economy as a whole. For example, the failure of small banks in the early 1990s and the failure 
of large banks during the recent financial crisis are associated with considerable costs, high 
unemployment, and low economic performance. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of such 
failures is central to policy-makers, regulators, bank managers, and academics. Although the 
literature has clarified the relevant drivers of bank failures, almost none of existing studies have 
empirically analysed the factors and the extent to which they affect the probability of bank 
failure across size classes. In this paper, I contribute to the extant literature by recognising the 
differences in US bank failures engendered by size heterogeneity. I develop separate early-
warning models for small, medium, and large banks, and report any differences in comparison 
to all bank failure prediction models, irrespective of bank size. I also compare 
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    Table 13: Financial Crises and Normal Times 




All Banks  Small Banks 
Banking Crises Market Crises Normal Times  Banking Crises Market Crises Normal Times 
β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME%  β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
NCOTA 13.07a 4.58 9.28a 24.99b 11.54 3.76 b 28.22a 6.53 3.79a  20.71b 9.77 11.84b 23.68 17.48 6.51 26.43a 10.38 5.29a 
PD90TA 17.34a 6.37 12.30a 28.49b 13.22 4.28b 39.96a 9.18 5.36a  33.32a 11.88 19.05a 45.38 b 19.36 12.47 b 10.52 14.20 2.11  
LLRTA 48.11a 6.21 34.13a 69.45a 15.43 10.44a 54.85a 9.57 7.36a  55.07a 13.90 31.48a 40.08 c 22.40 11.01 c 89.77a 13.72 17.97a 
TETA -70.40a 3.11 -49.95a -51.27a 7.66 -7.71a -98.57a 5.19 -13.22a           
OREOTA 12.16a 2.89 8.63a 2.39 8.46 0.36 19.17a 4.06 2.57a  24.02a 5.91 13.73a -0.80 13.16 -0.22 25.25a 5.68 5.06a 
NIETA 7.84a 3.18 5.56a 36.45a 6.43 5.48a 15.91a 4.04 2.13a  33.84a 6.53 19.34a 45.72 a 9.82 12.56 a 41.70a 6.53 8.35a 
TIETLB           47.45a 13.74 27.12a 17.64 21.22 4.85 28.48a 7.12 5.70a 
TDTA           29.37a 4.87 16.79a 37.03 a 9.31 10.18 a 39.68a 4.75 7.94a 
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 2054a 518a 700a  442a 209 a 498a 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1685 -327 -907  -344 -140 -332 
R2 0.7776 0.8473 0.797  0.8458 0.8775 0.7709 
No. of “0” 57,668 45,976 154,156  13,926 10,808 37,595 
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     Table 13: Financial Crises and Normal Times (continued) 




Medium Banks  Large Banks 
Banking Crises Market Crises Normal Times  Banking Crises Market Crises Normal Times 
β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME%  β SE AME% β SE AME% β SE AME% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
NCOTA 9.96 13.12 5.17  -47.14 34.12 -9.43 33.05a 13.44 5.69a           
PD90TA 25.50  20.61 13.22  -10.10 26.88 -2.02 14.99 26.78 2.58  79.96a 26.04 96.53a -960.30b 493.9 -9.78b 75.38 67.98 7.47 
LLRTA 104.35a 20.49 54.12a 120.19b 51.23 24.05 b 56.08a 19.52 9.66a  28.76 18.75 34.73 430.60 291.87 4.39 147.42c 80.04 14.61c 
TETA -63.56a 9.46 -32.96a -171.12a 48.29 -34.23 a -102.02a 10.92 -17.58a  -59.96a 6.56 -72.39a -625.78b 295.70 -6.37b -123.09b 59.14 -12.20b 
OREOTA 18.16b 8.43 9.42b 17.27 19.54 3.45 20.10a 8.19 3.46a           
NIM -78.38a 17.85 -40.65a -17.44 25.22 -3.49 -41.51b 20.30 -7.15b  -24.01c 14.92 -28.98c 543.82c 294.48 5.54c -69.24 47.17 -6.86 
LLPTL           28.52a 6.32 34.43a 41.54 81.17 0.42 -12.10 20.44 -1.20 
Panel D: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Wald Chi2 92a 17b 207a  294a 5 20b 
Log 
Likelihood 
-241 -47 -174  -261 -13 -54 
R2 0.6818 0.9341 0.8411  0.6932 0.9213 0.8730 
No. of “0” 10,191 6,847 28,656  5,054 3,467 14,103 
No. of “1” 98 21 95  121 5 35 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). Panels A and C present the results of checks to establish the robustness of my results. The crises include banking crises (the 
credit crunch and the subprime lending crisis), market crises (the stock market crash; the Russian debt crisis; the dot.com bubble and September 11), and normal times. The sampling period runs between 
1985-2016. I consider banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of total assets as small banks, those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. If a bank fails in year t, 
the bank’s failure indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. A positive coefficient (β) suggests a positive relationship with failure likelihood and vice-versa. SE is standard error of respective 
coefficients and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Panels B and D report the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey and Zavoina's R2) to measure 
the model’s goodness of fit. No. of “1” counts the number of failures in my sample, while No. of “0” counts the number of “non-failure” observations.   
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the consistency (statistical significance and average marginal effects) of covariates when 
analysing bank failures across size categories. Furthermore, I contribute to the existing body 
of literature by using univariate regression analysis as a variable selection technique to examine 
the relative importance of an exhaustive list of 61 accounting-based variables that have been 
employed as candidate predictors within the previous bank failure literature. I also propose an 
atheoretical econometric method suggested by Gupta et al. (2018) on multivariate model 
building strategy based on variables’ AMEs and their inter-temporal discrimination ability. 
The main results show that factors affecting bank failure and the magnitudes of 
mutually significant factors (AMEs) vary across small, medium, and large banks. Further 
interesting results of this paper are as follows. First, credit risk has a significant impact on bank 
failure probability across size classes and for the three-time lagged periods, implying that weak 
assets quality, represented by net charge off, past due 90+ days, loan loss reserves, and other 
real estate owned, increases the risk of failure. Second, small banks are most likely to fail if 
they have high deposit ratios, are more cost inefficient, and have a high liquidity risk, while 
medium and large banks with poor capital and low net interest margins are more likely to fail.  
My results are robust to up-to three years of lagged regression estimates, the inclusion 
of various control variables such as regulatory effects and house price inflation, interaction 
between bank size and bank charter, and macroeconomic crisis periods and normal times. 
Moreover, the AUROC of all multivariate models developed across bank size classes for out-
of-sample have an excellent performance for different forecast horizons.  
 My study sheds light on the importance of bank size in explaining bank failure. It 
provides a broad implication which may assist policy-makers, regulators, and researchers in 
analysing all types of bank risk. They should put strong emphasis on the variances among bank 
size categories. 
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3. COHORT RISK ANALYSIS OF BANKS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, the United States (U.S.) banking industry has undergone a 
substantial change that has featured an increase in the number of bank mergers and acquisitions. 
This has led to the opening of thousands of new banks, reorganisations of multibank holding 
companies (MBHCs), and a large number of bank failures. This transformation has been driven 
by several forces, including but not limited to: deregulation of deposit accounts, 
implementation of capital requirements, financial innovations in off-balance sheet items, and 
technology.10 All these forces have significantly contributed towards shrinking the role of 
banks in reducing transaction costs and asymmetric information; and boosting the function of 
risk management by transferring risk, and dealing with financial instruments and markets 
(Allen and Santomero, 1997). In fact, risk management has become the most important activity 
in the banking industry and has permanently changed the business over recent decades (Bülbül 
et al., 2019). Typically, banks are dealing in financial assets and services, implying that they 
are in risk business and the risk management role can exaggerate the effects on the overall risk 
either directly or indirectly over time. It clearly appears that banking organisations, particularly 
large banks, have intensified their risk exposure by substituting from cash and securities 
holdings into loans (specially commercial real estate loans), and increasing their reliance on 
financial innovations such as derivatives and securitisations (Allen and Santomero, 1997; 
Berger et al., 1995; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
The academic literature has significantly analysed most aspects of bank risk. Several 
theory papers have explained the major risks in banks, particularly liquidity risk and credit risk 
                                                          
10 See Berger et al. (1995) for a comprehensive review of the transformation in the U.S. Banking Industry. 
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(e.g., Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Qi, 1994). In addi-
tion, a tremendous number of empirical studies have dealt with the determinants of these risks 
related to bank-specific, market, and macroeconomic factors (e.g., Calem and Rob, 1999; Delis 
and Staikouras, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), with 
special emphasis on bank failures or default risk (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; DeYoung and Torna, 
2013; Liu and Ngo, 2014). Nevertheless, the systematic trend in bank risk and the determinants 
of this trend have not received much attention. I am aware of only two studies, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010) and Stiroh (2004), who study the trends in non-interest income and their 
effects on bank risk. While a considerable amount of research has documented a systematic 
increase in idiosyncratic risk in publicly listed firms. (e.g., Ang et al., 2006; Brown and 
Kapadia, 2007; Campbell et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2004; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009; Pástor 
and Pietro, 2003),11 to the best of my knowledge, almost no empirical study has systematically 
analysed this subject broadly across the banking sector. Exceptions can be Delis et al. (2014) 
and Berger and Bouwman (2009). Delis et al. (2014) provide a new bank risk indicator, using 
the variability of the profit function, and show that the average bank’s risk has increased from 
1985 to 2007. Berger and Bouwman (2009) develop comprehensive measures of bank liquidity 
creation and report that it has increased over time. However, they do not focus on the systematic 
trend in bank risk, nor do they examine the reasons behind this trend as I do in this study. This 
is perhaps surprising because banks play crucial roles in the economy by providing financial 
funds to all industries and facilitating the transfer of risk. Consequently, any shocks to the 
banking system can have severe effects on the majority of firms and industries that can lead to 
adverse crisis (e.g., global financial crisis in 2008). The purpose of this study is to address the 
gap in the banking literature and focus more on the trend in bank risk and its determinants. 
                                                          
11 The number of listed banks is extremely small compared to other listed firms. In addition, most studies exclude 
financial firms. 
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My primary contributions to the literature are threefold. First, I analyse the trend in two 
major sources of bank risk: liquidity risk and credit risk over time. Secondly, I provide an 
explanation for this trend. And finally, I examine the trends of several bank-specific 
characteristics and their relationships to explain trends in these risks.  
In the first step for my study I assess bank risk using two main measures. First, I 
consider liquidity risk measure introduced by Berger and Bouwman (2009) as the ratio of 
liquidity creation to gross total assets or GTA (total assets plus allowance for loan and lease 
losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve).12 Second, credit risk measure is calculated as a 
bank’s risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet activities divided by GTA.13 To identify the 
systematic trend in bank risks, I calculate the annual averages of liquidity risk and credit risk 
using annual data for virtually all U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. On average, liquidity 
risk and credit risk have been rising for all banks over this sampling period. Figures 1 and 2 
graphically display the same information as is presented in Table 1 and can be interpreted as 
the time trend of liquidity and credit risk for all U.S. banks. They clearly show that the average 
of liquidity risk has increased steadily from 0.93% in 1980 to 37% in 2017; and the average of 
credit risk increased from 57% in 1992 to a peak of 71 % in 2008, dropped sharply between 
2008 and 2012, then accelerated strongly from about 2012 onward.  
I hypothesise that this increasing risk is related to an incredible number of new banks 
that joined the industry after 1980.14 This growth of new banks can be attributed to the evolution 
of regulatory changes, and technical and financial innovations. Generally, these banks adopt 
risker business strategies to grow faster and compete aggressively against their established 
counterparts. In addition, the financial crises, specifically banking crises, have contributed to a 
                                                          
12 Table 3 illustrates Berger and Bouwman's (2009) three-step procedure to develop the bank liquidity creation 
measure. 
13 As a robustness check, I use two alternative risk measures: first, liquidity risk measure as developed by 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014); second, Z-score as a measure of credit risk. A detailed discussion of the measures 
and the results of their analyses are provided in Section 6.6 of the paper. 
14 More than 6500 banks have entered the market from 1980 to 2017. 
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situation whereby these banks have to take more risk in order to offset the losses. My general 
strategy to test the hypothesis is to split the data by bank age into two subsamples: young banks 
subsample and old “established” banks.15 The young subsample contains all banks that were 
started from 1980 onwards and are separated into three ten-year groups: cohort of banks started 
between 1980 and 1989, cohort of banks started between 1990 and 1999, and cohort of banks 
started between 2000 and 2009. The old “established” banks consist of all banks that started 
operations before 1980 and are considered as a benchmark group for assessing the risk of young 
banks. Next, I compute cross-sectional averages of risk measures, growth, and profitability on 
a cohort–year basis. Interestingly, I find that banks in each cohort grow faster than those in 
preceding cohorts but are less profitable. More importantly, I show that there is generally no 
significant trend in bank risk after accounting for successive cohorts of young banks.16 In 
addition, risk differences across successive cohorts, which I refer to as the cohort risk 
phenomenon, seem to persist. 
To explain the cohort risk phenomenon, I focus on banks’, particularly young banks’ 
business strategies which have contributed to their fast growth over recent decades. 
Specifically, I consider internal factors that have been adopted heavily by these banks. These 
factors include brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, 
and non-interest income. I derive these factors from an extensive prior literature (e.g., Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Cole and White, 2012; Deyoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). I find 
that successive cohorts of new or young banks are characterised by their increasing reliance on 
these factors. I then demonstrate that the cohort risk phenomenon decreases or is even 
eliminated once I control for these factors. In general, I conclude that the adoption of business 
strategy based on more brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet 
                                                          
15 The average age of young banks is 26 years, while the average age of old banks is 83 years. 
16 For example, simply accounting for the decade in which banks started causes the trend in my measures of bank 
risk to change from a statistically significant to a statistically insignificant trend (see Table 4). 
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items, and non-interest income, along with less capital in each new cohort explains the cohort 
risk phenomenon. 
Finally, I perform a variety of robustness checks on my main results. First, I split my 
sample into small, medium and large banks, and re-estimate my regressions separately for these 
three groups. Second, I control for time trend. Third, I exclude mergers and acquisitions and 
bank failures. Fourth, I control for two banking crises (savings and loan crisis and subprime 
mortgage crisis). Fifth, I limit my sample to “true” commercial banks. Sixth, I use two 
alternative measures of liquidity risk and credit risk. Seventh, I apply an alternative cohort 
measurement period of five years. In all cases, my main results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
In summary, my results make three contributions to the banking literature. First, I 
systematically show that there is a positive trend in bank risk measured by liquidity risk and 
credit risk. Second, I propose a simple explanation for the increase in bank risk: banks that start 
or open later in the sample have persistently higher risk than banks that open earlier. Third, I 
document that the increasing riskiness of successive cohorts and the persistence in their risk 
differences are consistent with their continuing adoption of risky business strategies that rely 
predominantly on brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet items, and 
non-interest income. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview 
of the relevant literature and develops the empirical hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents a 
discussion on the dataset, sample, and covariates. Section 3.4 presents the results of the 
hypotheses tests. Section 3.5 addresses robustness issues, and Section 3.6 offers concluding 
remarks. 
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Fig. 1. Liquidity Risk 
This figure illustrates the average liquidity risk for all banks on yearly basis. 
 
 Fig. 2. Credit Risk 
This figure illustrates the average credit risk for all banks on yearly basis. 
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3.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
The literature on bank risk is extensive and diversified. I limit my review to the existing studies 
that help to develop my empirical hypotheses regarding the trend in bank risk, increasing risk 
levels for successive cohorts of new banks, and internal bank factors that explain the cohort 
risk phenomenon. 
3.2.1 Trend in Bank Risk 
Numerous studies have analysed trends in firm-specific risk across listed, financial and non-
financial companies (e.g., Ang et al., 2006; Brown and Kapadia, 2007; Campbell et al., 2001; 
Irvine and Pontiff, 2009; Pástor and Pietro, 2003). In the most important paper, Campbell et al. 
(2001) provide empirical evidence that the average levels of idiosyncratic risk using stock 
return volatility have noticeably increased over the past 50-60 years. However, I am aware of 
only two studies that consider the trend of risk over time using data on unlisted banks, which 
represent the great majority of financial firms in the United States. First, Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) report that liquidity risk, measured by liquidity creation in real terms to GTA, increased 
between 1993 and 2003. Second, Delis et al. (2014) show that the average for risk weighted 
assets ratio for the U.S. banking industry increased over the period 1986 to 2007. Yet, they do 
not focus on the systematic trend in bank risk, nor do they examine the reasons for this trend, 
as I do in this paper. According to a recent empirical study by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) 
which is supported by several theoretical models (e.g., Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), liquidity risk and credit risk individually and jointly contribute 
to banks’ probability of default. Hence, I expect the liquidity risk and credit risk are positively 
related, and increase over time. Based on the existing literature and my expectation, I 
hypothesise the following: 
H1: The US banks have exhibited increasing liquidity risk and credit risk 
over the past few decades. 
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3.2.2 Explanation for Increase in Bank Risk  
3.2.2.1 Successive Cohorts of New Banks 
The seminal work of Campbell et al. (2001) has been extended by several studies to investigate 
the determinants of firm-specific risk trends. These studies suggest that the increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility is attributable to the changes in firm characteristics, stock market 
conditions, and/or macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Ang et al., 2006; Brandt et al., 2010; Irvine 
and Pontiff, 2009). However, Fink et al. (2005) report that the rise in idiosyncratic risk is driven 
by firms listing earlier in their lives. Brown and Kapadia (2007) also show that increases in 
idiosyncratic risk are the result of new listings by young and risker firms.  
In a related vein, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) examine the profit efficiency of new bank 
charters and report that de novo banks are less profit efficient than established banks due to 
costly excess branch capacity, reliance on expensive large deposits, and affiliation with a 
multibank holding company. They also find that the low profit efficiency across these banks 
associated with high and significant standard deviation, suggests that, young banks tend to be 
riskier than established banks. New banks initially experience low financial performance and 
may take years to become financially mature. This financial fragility can lead to the ultimate 
risk a bank faces which is the risk of failure, especially during difficult economic conditions. 
 Few studies have focused on the failure of new financial institutions in the United 
States. DeYoung (1999) estimates a series of split-population duration models and finds that 
compared to small established banks, new banks have low initial failure rates due to large initial 
capital cushions, then high failure rates as fast growth and losses erode capital, and finally 
normal failure rates as de novo banks reach financial maturity. DeYoung (2003) shows that 
new banks and established banks fail for similar operational reasons, but that new banks are 
more sensitive to adverse changes in local market conditions. In general, these studies conclude 
that new banks are riskier and more likely to fail than established banks. Thus, I expect that 
87 | P a g e  
 
risk for banks that start up later, specifically post deregulation, should remain persistently 
higher than for banks that start up earlier. Pairing these results with my expectation leads me 
to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The increase in liquidity risk and/or credit risk becomes insignificant 
once successive cohorts of new banks are accounted for. 
 
3.2.3 Reasons for the Cohort Risk Phenomenon 
To examine the potential explanation for the increasing risks of successive cohorts of new 
banks, I concentrate on five bank-specific factors (brokered deposits, commercial real estate 
loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income) that have been focused on and 
have indicated high risks in the banking literature in recent decades.  
3.2.3.1 Brokered Deposits 
My first bank-specific factor is the amount of brokered deposits borrowed by banks. A sizable 
number of banks, especially young banks, tend to have a higher proportion of their funding in 
the form of brokered deposits to allow them to grow fast and compete intensely with other 
financial institutions (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole and White, 2012). Consequently, I 
expect successive cohorts of new banks to exhibit an excessive concentration on these deposits. 
Though, such funds are expensive and usually invested in high-risk activities to cover the high 
interest costs (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) document that 
failing thrifts are more active in using brokered deposits than solvent thrifts.17 Cole and White 
(2012) suggest that higher levels of brokered deposits have a positive effect on bank failure. 
More recently, Berger and Bouwman (2013) conclude that banks, especially small banks, are 
less likely to survive if they have more brokered deposits. Therefore, I hypothesise that the 
                                                          
17 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989; and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act restricted the acceptance of brokered deposits to well and adequately cap-
italised banks only. 
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increasing risks in successive cohorts of new banks are related to their greater reliance on 
brokered deposits. 
H3.1a: Successive cohorts exhibit increasing brokered deposits. 
H3.1b: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once brokered 
deposits factor is accounted for. 
 
3.2.3.2 Commercial Real Estate Loans 
According to Berger et al. (1995), commercial real estate lending is one of the riskiest and least 
diversifiable investments that banks make. They also show that the commercial real estate loans 
rose by more than 50 percent, from 6.3 percent in 1979 to 9.8 percent in 1994. This category 
of loans has demonstrated its toxic nature during the 07/08 crisis. Cole and White (2012) report 
that this type of commercial real estate loan has been one of the main determinants of bank 
failure during the recent banking crisis. Furthermore, Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that 
banks, specifically small banks, are more likely to fail if they have more commercial real estate 
loans. Thus, I conjecture that each new cohort relies more on commercial real estate loan than 
preceding cohorts, thereby increasing the risks for successive cohorts.  
H3.2a: Successive cohorts exhibit increasing commercial real estate 
loans. 
H3.2b: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once commercial 
real estate loan is accounted for. 
 
3.2.3.3 Capital 
Berger et al. (1995) show that the ratio of equity to gross total assets for all banking 
organisations in the U.S. market increased from 5.7 percent in 1979 to 7.7 percent in 1994. 
Hence, I expect this growth in capital to continue due to the major impact of capital on a bank’s 
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soundness. Several studies, such as Allen et al. (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2011), and Thakor 
(2012), suggest that a higher amount of capital reduces the overall bank risk. Moreover, most 
empirical studies conclude that the capital and bank risk are negatively related (e.g., Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Khan et al., 2017). In contrast, some theories argue that increasing bank 
capital could increase bank risk taking (e.g., Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980). I therefore predict that bank capital plays a central role in the increasing 
risks for successive cohorts. 
H3.3a: Successive cohorts banks exhibit increasing equity capital. 
H3.3b: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once banks equity 
capital is accounted for. 
 
3.2.3.4 Off-Balance Sheet Items 
Off-balance sheet items are generally classified into lending products (e.g., loan commitments 
and letters of credit) and derivative products (e.g., futures, options and swaps) (Angbazo, 
1997). Before 1990, banks were not required to hold capital against off-balance sheet activities. 
As a result, some banks shifted into off-balance sheet activities (Berger et al., 1995). (Berger 
et al., 1995) show that derivatives, for example, grew from 1.9 percent in 1990 to 3.9 percent 
in 1994, even after the implementation of Basel Accord risk-based capital standards.18 I expect 
this transformation to continue and the concentration on off-balance sheet items to grow over 
time because banks can use these products not only to reduce monitoring costs and increase 
returns, but also to avoid capital adequacy requirements, ‘regulatory arbitrage’ and elude 
taxation (Diamond, 1984; Flannery, 1998; Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014; Pennacchi, 1988). 
However, this growth can increase asset risk and enhance the subsidy from deposit insurance 
                                                          
18 The Basel Accord risk-based capital standards were implemented in 1990 to correct the issues that related to 
the flat rate standards by requiring banks to hold different amounts of capital, depending on the perceived credit 
risk of different on- and off-balance sheet assets (Berger et al., 1995). 
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if the flat rate deposit insurance premium does not reflect the marginal risk associated with new 
investment opportunities (Angbazo, 1997), which is consistent with the moral hazard 
hypothesis that off-balance sheet items increase bank risk (e.g., Avery and Berger, 1991). 
Based on the above discussion, I test the following hypotheses: 
H3.4a: Successive cohorts exhibit increasing off-balance sheet items. 
H3.4b: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once the off-balance 
sheet items factor is accounted for. 
 
3.2.3.5 Non-Interest Income 
According to DeYoung and Torna (2013), the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, which 
allowed banks to deal with non-traditional activities, accelerated the changes in banks’ business 
models and income mixes. For instance, the ratio of non-interest income to operating income 
for all U.S. banks peaked at 35% in 2013, up from 10% in 1983 (FDIC data). This transition 
from traditional interest income sources has been facilitated by innovations in information, 
communications and financial technologies, and supported banks to grow faster and confront 
the high competition from other financial institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
Thus, I expect successive cohorts of new banks to strongly focus on these activities. However, 
revenues from these activities tend to be more volatile than traditional interest-based income 
(DeYoung and Torna, 2013). De Jonghe (2010) concludes that “the heterogeneity in extreme 
bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-
interest generating activities increase banks’ tail beta”. Stiroh (2004) argues that even a small 
exposure to non-interest income, particularly trading revenue, increases risk. Similarly, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that the very risky banks are reliant on generating 
non-interest income. Recently, DeYoung and Torna (2013) report that the probability of 
distressed bank failure increased with noninterest income from asset-based non-traditional 
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activities such as investment banking, insurance underwriting and venture capital. Based on 
the discussion above, I hypothesise the followings: 
H3.5a: Successive cohorts exhibit increasing non-interest income. 
H3.5b: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once non-interest 
income is accounted for. 
 
3.2.3.6 All Five Bank-Specific Factors 
The theoretical and empirical studies discussed above suggest that brokered deposits, 
commercial real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income are 
closely related to bank risk. Hence, I expect these factors jointly affect the increasing risks in 
successive cohorts of new banks. To investigate this, I test the following hypothesis: 
H3.6: The cohort risk effect becomes insignificant once brokered 
deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, 
and non-interest income are jointly accounted for. 
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
3.3.1 Sample 
My dataset includes virtually all chartered banks in the United States from the beginning of 
1980 through to the end of 2017. The year 1980 is selected as the starting point due to the 
introduction of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which lib-
eralised several constraints on the banking system and strengthened the Federal Reserve Bank’s 
control over monetary policy (Kane, 1981). For all banks in my sample, I construct financial 
variables using data from the annual Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) at the end 
of the fourth quarter, which is 31 December of each year.19 The Call Report is a report that all 
                                                          
19 All explanatory variables have been winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile which is widely used in the 
literature (e.g., Acharya and Mora, 2015; Berg and Gider, 2017) to mitigate the effect of possible outliers.  
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banks regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve, or 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency are required to file with the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) on a quarterly basis, and contains information on 
banks’ balance sheets and income statements. Due to mergers and acquisitions, new entry, and 
failures, the dataset is an unbalanced panel and consists of 418,796 bank-year observations for 
23,074 banks. To obtain a more homogeneous dataset, banks must meet three conditions to be 
included in the final sample. First, I exclude banks with zero or missing information on gross 
total assets (GTA), total equity capital, total loans and total deposits. Second, following Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), I exclude very small banks with average GTA below $25 million be-
cause they argue that these banks are not likely to be viable commercial banks in equilibrium. 
This exclusion reduces my sample by 24,084 bank-year observations but does not substantially 
affect the results. Third, I drop banks established after the year 2009 to ensure that my sample 
contains comparatively settled banks that have had enough time to form their strategies.20 The 
final sample contains 375,006 bank-year observations for 19,963 banks. In all my analyses, I 
classify the banks as established banks and new banks according to their founding year. The 
established banks (consisting of 306,180 bank-year observations on 14,848 banks) are banks 
that started operations before 1980 and are considered as a benchmark for assessing the risk of 
new banks. The new banks (consisting of 68,826 bank-year observations on 5,190 banks) con-
tain all banks that started after 1980. They are subsequently split into three ten-year groups: a 
cohort of 2,532 banks that started between 1980 and 1989, a cohort of 1,342 banks that started 
between 1990 and 1999, and a cohort of 1,323 banks that started between 2000 and 2009. I 
select the 10-year cohorts as a base in my analysis to be consistent with prior research (Brown 
and Kapadia, 2007; Fama and French, 2004; Srivastava, 2014) and to be exposed to comparable 
effects such as economic, technological, and innovation changes. 
                                                          
20 I re-ran the analyses including all banks established after 2009 and the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Panel A in Table 1 presents the annual distribution of observations for all banks, 
established (pre-1980s) banks, and new banks (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts). The total 
number of banks drops sharply from around 14,000 in the early 1980s to 5,646 in 2017. This 
fall can be attributed to the consolidation of the banking industry (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
Panel B in Table 1 presents the annual distribution of observations for established (pre-1980s) 
banks, and new banks (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts). The number of banks for each new 
cohort (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) grows in the first ten years and then diminishes over time. 
Most banks in my sample are established (pre-1980 banks); therefore, they are highly 
comparable to the pattern for all banks. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Notes: This table reports the annual distribution of banks and cohorts as well as the annual averages of liquidity risk and 
credit risk. U.S. banks started to report risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk in Call Reports from 1990, but it is 
available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992. All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1980 13,812 0.93%  13,632 180   
1981 13,850 1.44%  13,484 366   
1982 13,886 3.12%  13,268 618   
1983 13,938 8.09%  13,007 931   
1984 13,795 16.09%  12,543 1,252   
1985 13,837 16.05%  12,306 1,531   
1986 13,716 16.48%  11,986 1,730   
1987 13,492 16.76%  11,593 1,899   
1988 13,065 16.39%  11,093 1,972   
1989 12,644 15.99%  10,633 2,011   
1990 12,299 16.65%  10,235 1,910 154  
1991 11,994 17.41%  9,920 1,820 254  
1992 11,671 19.27% 57.3% 9,639 1,721 311  
1993 11,341 20.75% 57.7% 9,373 1,625 343  
1994 10,940 22.37% 59.5% 9,050 1,514 376  
1995 10,418 20.52% 59.8% 8,535 1,412 471  
1996 10,060 21.70% 61.9% 8,155 1,311 594  
1997 9,735 22.32% 62.4% 7,781 1,202 752  
1998 9,300 22.25% 62.4% 7,285 1,111 904  
1999 9,019 24.54% 64.5% 6,925 995 1,099  
2000 8,779 24.78% 65.7% 6,607 912 1,074 186 
2001 8,462 25.94% 66.0% 6,288 832 1,031 311 
2002 8,206 26.94% 66.0% 6,067 772 975 392 
2003 8,083 28.49% 66.2% 5,924 728 936 495 
2004 7,957 30.54% 67.7% 5,788 686 876 607 
2005 7,858 31.04% 68.9% 5,612 639 836 771 
2006 7,759 30.31% 69.8% 5,434 606 779 940 
2007 7,632 30.60% 71.1% 5,265 568 710 1,089 
2008 7,421 30.34% 71.2% 5,080 526 668 1,147 
2009 7,178 29.89% 69.2% 4,936 499 619 1,124 
2010 7,608 28.32% 66.0% 5,311 542 630 1,125 
2011 7,260 28.62% 63.8% 5,156 492 562 1,050 
2012 7,031 29.30% 62.9% 5,101 427 522 981 
2013 6,758 31.42% 64.2% 4,956 401 488 913 
2014 6,478 32.66% 64.9% 4,803 379 452 844 
2015 6,179 34.26% 66.7% 4,625 355 415 784 
2016 5,899 35.96% 67.6% 4,470 330 384 715 
2017 5,646 37.02% 68.1% 4,314 311 358 663 
Total 375,006   306,180 37,116 17,573 14,137 
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3.3.2 Covariates 
In this section, I discuss the key dependent and independent variables. 
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Since the great majority of banks in my sample are not publicly listed and hence market-based 
measures of risk (e.g., return volatility) are not obtainable, I exploit accounting-based 
information to assess bank risk. I measure banks’ risk using liquidity risk and credit risk.  
3.3.2.1.1 Liquidity Risk 
To measure banks liquidity risk, I employ a liquidity creation indicator introduced by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), which has been widely used as a key measure of liquidity risk in the 
banking literature (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Distinguin et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2017). The 
advantages of using this indicator are that it includes the different sources and uses of liquidity 
in one measure (Berger and Bouwman, 2016) and provides information about the liquidity 
profile of each bank, about the cash value of assets that could be monetised, and about the 
availability of market funding to assess bank liquidity (Distinguin et al., 2013). To construct 
the liquidity risk measure, I follow Berger and Bouwman's (2009) three-step procedure. In step 
1, I classify the bank, based on balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities, as liquid or 
illiquid. I exclude equity for two reasons. First, theories argue that banks do not create liquidity 
when illiquid assets are transformed into equity (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Second, my 
alternative measure of liquidity risk, as a robustness check, defined by Imbierowicz and Rauch 
(2014), does not take into account equity when calculating the liquidity risk indicator. I also 
ignore semiliquid activities as in Khan et al. (2017) because these activities produce roughly 
zero net liquidity creation. In step 2, I apply weights to the classified activities in the first step. 
In step 3, I combine the classified and weighted activities in the first and second steps, 
respectively, to compute the liquidity-creation (liquidity risk) measure which is normalised by 
GTA as follows: 
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Liquidity Creation = [0.5 (Illiquid Assets + Liquid Liabilities + illiquid guarantees) − 0.5 
(Liquid Assets + Illiquid Liabilities + Liquid guarantees and derivatives)]/GTA 
The definition of liquidity risk measure along with its calculation is provided in Tables 2 and 
3, respectively. 
3.3.2.1.2 Credit Risk 
The second measure to gauge bank risk is credit risk defined as the bank’s Basel I risk-weighted 
assets. This is a weighted sum of the bank’s assets and off-balance-sheet activities, divided by 
GTA, and it is used in several banking studies as a measure of bank risk (e.g., Berger et al., 
2016; Berger and Bouwman, 2009, 2013; Khan et al., 2017).21 All banks report their risk-
weighted assets in Call Reports from 1990 because Basel I risk-based capital requirements 
became effective in December 1990.22 The description of credit risk measure is provided in 
Table 2. 
3.3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Likewise, I do not consider market-based covariates because my sample is dominated by 
unlisted banks. I use several explanatory variables including brokered deposits, commercial 
real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income, that are derived 
from banks’ balance sheets and income statements; and motivated by prior literature discussed 
in Section 2. All variables are expressed as a ratio with respect to the bank’s GTA except non-
interest income, which is divided by total operating income. A description of these variables is 
provided in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                          
21 According to Berger and Bouwman (2009), it is essential to divide the dependent variable by GTA to make it 
meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid assigning excessive weight to large banks. 
22 This variable is available on the FDIC website, https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/download_large_list_outside.asp, 
only from 1992. Thus, I use it from that time onward. 
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Gross Total Assets (GTA) Total assets + the allowance for loan and the lease losses + the allocated transfer 
risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). 
Profitability (ROA)  Return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by GTA. 
Growth The growth rate of gross total assets. 
Credit Risk (RWAGTA) Risk-weighted Assets and off-balance-sheet activities divided by GTA. A 
higher value indicates higher riskiness. 
Credit Risk (Z-score) The Z-score is the natural logarithm of ROA + TEGTA divided by the standard 
deviation of the ROA for rolling 5-year windows. It measures a bank’s distance 
to default. I use the natural logarithm of Z-score due to its high skewness 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). A higher z-score indicates lower riskiness and 
greater bank stability. 
Liquidity Risk (BB) The BB measure (as proposed by Berger and Bouwman, 2009) represents a 
bank’s liquidity creation, which considers several on and off balance sheet items 
shown in Table 3. It measures to what degree a bank can finance illiquid assets 
with liquid liabilities. It is standardised by GTA. A high value indicates high 
liquidity risk.  
Liquidity Risk (IR) The IR measure is introduced by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) and calculated 
as [(Demand Deposits + Transaction Deposits + Brokered Deposits + NOW 
Accounts + Unused Loan Commitments) - (Cash + Currency & Coin + Trading 
Assets + Fed Funds Purchased + Commercial Paper + Securities available for 
Sale) ± Net Inter-Bank Lending Position ± Net Inter-Bank Acceptances ± Net 
Derivative Position] divided by GTA. It measures the ability of bank to handle 
unforeseen liquidity demand. Values above zero indicate that the bank cannot 
deal with unexpected bank default. 
BDGTA Brokered Deposits divided by GTA 
CRELGTA Commercial Real Estate Loans (construction and land development loans + real 
estate loans secured by multi-family (5 or more) residential properties + real 
estate loans secured by nonfarm non-residential properties) divided by GTA 
Capital ratio (TEGTA) Total Equity divided by GTA 
OBSGTA Off-balance sheet (Unused Commitments + Derivatives) divided by GTA 
NIIOI Non-Interest Income divided by total operating income (interest income + non-
interest income) 
Dum pre-1980s Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank opened prior to 1980 
Dum1980s Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank opened in the 1980-1989 cohort 
Dum1990s Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank opened in the 1990-1999 cohort 
Dum2000s Dummy variable equals 1 if the bank opened in the 2000-2009 cohort 
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Table 3: Methodology to construct liquidity creation measure 
This table explains Berger and Bouwman (2009) methodology to construct liquidity creation measure in three steps: 
Step 1: Bank activities are classified as liquid and illiquid, based on the bank activities category in Panel A. 
Step 2: I assign weights to all bank activities classified in Step 1.  
Step 3: I combine the bank activities classification in Step 1 with weights in Step 2 in two ways to construct liquidity 
creation measure (cat fat) shown in Panel B. 
 
3.4 Tests of Hypotheses 
3.4.1. Hypothesis 1 
To identify any systematic trend in banks’ risks, I compute the annual averages of liquidity risk 
and credit risk for all banks over the period 1980-2017. Panel A in Table 1 reports that the 
average of liquidity risk and credit risk increased for all banks over the sample period. Figures 
Panel A: Liquidity classification of bank activities 
Assets 
Illiquid assets (weight = ½) Liquid assets (weight = -½) 
Commercial real estate loans (CRE). 
Loans to finance agricultural production. 
Commercial and industrial loans (C&I).  
Other loans and lease financing receivables.  
Other real estate owned (OREO). 
Investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries. 




Cash and due from other institutions.  
All securities (regardless of maturity).  
Trading assets.  
Fed funds sold. 
Liabilities  
Liquid liabilities (weight = ½) Illiquid liabilities + equity (weight = -½) 
Transactions deposits. 
Savings deposits.  
Overnight federal funds purchased Trading. 
Trading liabilities. 
Bank’s liability on bankers’ acceptances. 
Subordinated debt. 
Other liabilities.  
 
Off-Balance Sheet 
Illiquid guarantees (weight = ½) Liquid guarantees & derivatives (weight = -½) 
Unused commitment. 
Net standby letters of credit. 
Commercial and similar letters of credit. 
All other off-balance sheet liabilities. 
Net participations acquired. 
Interest rate derivatives. 
Foreign exchange derivatives. 
Equity and commodity derivatives. 
Panel B:  Calculation of liquidity creation measure 
Cat fat = (1/2 * illiquid assets + 1/2 * liquid liabilities + 1/2 * illiquid guarantees) – (1/2 * liquid 
assets + 1/2 * illiquid liabilities + 1/2 * Liquid guarantees and derivatives) 
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1 and 2 graphically display the same information as Panel A in Table 1 and can be interpreted 
as the time trend for liquidity risk and credit risk for all U.S. banks. They clearly show that the 
average for liquidity risk increased steadily from 0.93% in 1980 to 37% in 2017, and the 
average for credit risk increased from 57% in 1992 to a peak of 71% in 2008, but fell sharply 
between 2008 and 2012, and then accelerated strongly from about 2012 onward. This supports 
the hypothesis that the liquidity risk and credit risk in banks are increasing over time. In 
addition, it is consistent with the arguments of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Delis et al. 
(2014).  
3.4.2. Hypothesis 2 
To test the power of successive cohorts in explaining the positive systematic trend in liquidity 
risk and credit risk, I split my sample by banks’ age into two subsamples: young banks 
subsample and old “established” banks. The young subsample contains all banks that were 
started from 1980 and I separate them into three ten-year groups: a cohort of banks that started 
between 1980 and 1989, a cohort of banks that started between 1990 and 1999, and a cohort of 
banks that started between 2000 and 2009. The old “established” banks consist of all banks that 
started operations before 1980 and are considered as the benchmark group for assessing the 
riskiness of young banks. Subsequently, I estimate pooled regressions at the bank level with 
and without dummy variables for each cohort of new banks. The dummies allow each cohort 
to have different means, while the time trend is the same across cohorts (Brown and Kapadia, 
2007). The results are reported in Table 4. Columns (2) and (6) show that the time trends in 
liquidity risk and credit risk across all banks are 0.1% per year and significant when I am not 
accounting for founding year. Column (4) shows that the time trend in credit risk is decreased 
and insignificantly different from zero once the cohort dummy variables are included.23 
                                                          
23 The time trend in credit risk is strongly decreased from 1.72e-07 to 1.34e-09 and converted to be insignificant, while 
time trend in liquidity risk is decreased from 2.28e-07 to 1.11e-08 but still significant. 
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Columns (7) and (9) show that the t-statistic for time trend is decreased from around 160 to 
approximately 8. This suggests that the significance of time trend in liquidity risk fell sharply 
when accounting for the cohort specific dummy variables. As expected, coefficients of cohort 
dummy variables are large, increasing over time, and statistically significant (Columns 4 and 
8). The results show that there is mostly no trend in liquidity risk and credit risk for individual 
banks. Instead, the observed increases in average liquidity risk and credit risk are simply the 
result of successive cohorts of riskier banks.  
 
Table 4: Pooled regression with and without cohort dummy variables 
Variable 
Credit Risk Liquidity Risk 
 β t β t β t β t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Time trend 0.001a 200.2 0.001 1.60 0.001a 159.5 0.001a 7.8 
Dum1980s   0.037a 141.6   0.089a 194.6 
Dum1990s   0.083a 255.4   0.155a 224.0 
Dum2000s   0.105a 296.2   0.187a 244.7 
Adjusted R2 15.73% 46.88% 6.35% 28.72% 
Observations 214,678 214,678 375,006 375,006 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. This table reports the time trend in annual estimates of 
credit risk and liquidity risk using bank-level observations. All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
 
To demonstrate the existence of risk phenomenon in successive cohorts and the risk 
differences between the cohorts, I first compute cross-sectional averages of risk measures, 
growth, and profitability on a cohort–year basis.24 This yields a sample that contains 122 
cohort–year observations: 38 annual observations for the pre-1980 banks (1980 to 2017), 38 
annual observations for the 1980s cohort (1980 to 2017), 28 annual observations for the 1990s 
cohort (1990 to 2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000 to 2017).25 Using 
the averages of data has two key advantages. First, it reduces potential endogeneity issues 
                                                          
24 I provide summary data of growth and profitability for confirmation, but they are beyond the scope of my study. 
25 An exception is the ratio of risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, which has 96 cohort–year observations 
(26 annual observations for the pre-1980 banks, 1980s cohort, and 1990s cohort; and 18 annual observations for the 
2000s cohort) because US banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990. In addition, the growth ration has 118 
cohort–year observations. 
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(Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Second, it mitigates the impact of survivor bias on results 
(DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). 
Panel A in Table 5 reports the overall averages of the growth, profitability, liquidity 
risk, and credit risk by calculating the average of annual cohort-year averages for both 
established and new banks. The growth averages are 0.045, 0.161, 0.198, and 0.232 for pre-
1980 banks, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts respectively, and the profitability averages are 
0.094, 0.041, 0.042, and -0.012 for pre-1980 banks, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts 
respectively. In addition, the liquidity risk averages are 0.181, 0.270, 0.338, and 0.370 for pre-
1980 banks, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts respectively; and the credit risk averages are 
0.634, 0.672, 0.704, and 0.724 for pre-1980 banks, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s cohorts, 
respectively. Furthermore, in Panel A of Table 5, I test the statistical significance of risk 
differences between the averages of each successive cohort and its predecessor. I use 38 annual 
differences between pre-1980 and the 1980s cohort, 28 annual differences between the 1980s 
and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts.26 Several 
results are apparent in Panel A of Table 5. First and foremost, the liquidity risk and credit risk 
levels increase with successive cohorts. Second, the growth of each successive cohort is larger 
than its predecessor. These results confirm that successive cohorts of new banks adopt riskier 
business strategies to grow faster. Third, the profitability is decreasing in successive cohorts. 
Finally, the differences between the successive cohorts are statistically significant. 
Next, I estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a cohort-year 
basis: 
Riskcy= β0 + γ1 Dum1980s + γ2 Dum1990s + γ3 Dum2000s + εcy          (1) 
                                                          
26 For credit risk, I use 26 annual differences between pre-1980 and the 1980s cohort, 26 annual differences be-
tween the 1980s and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts. 
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where Riskcy is the liquidity risk (or credit risk) calculated on a cohort-year basis. The 
Dum1980s, Dum1990s, and Dum2000s are dummy variables equal to one if the cohort–year 
observations are for the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s cohorts respectively, and zero otherwise. The 
dummy variable for pre-1980s banks is considered as the reference category; therefore, it is 
excluded from Equation (1). εcy is the error term.  
 Panel B in Table 5 reports results for Equation (1). The Table shows that each cohort 
has significantly higher risks (liquidity risk or credit risk) than its predecessor. Particularly, the 
F-tests on the differences in coefficients of the cohort dummies are also significant at a p-value 
of 10% or better. The only exception is that the difference in liquidity risk between the 1990s 
and 2000s cohorts is insignificant.  
In summary, the successive cohorts of new banks provide an adequate explanation for 
the positive trend in average liquidity risk and credit risk. 
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Table 5: Successive cohorts of banks and inter-cohort differences 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts 
based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A reports the overall averages on a cohort–year basis and the significance 
of differences across cohorts. I use 38 annual differences between pre-1980 and the 1980s cohorts, 28 annual differences between the 1980s and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual 
differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts to estimate the significance of differences across cohorts. Panel B shows the OLS regression results after controlling for 
cohorts. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regression is estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations 
(except risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because US banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in 
Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 
38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s 
cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
Panel A: Averages and inter-cohort differences 
Cohort Growth Profitability Credit Risk Liquidity Risk 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference 
Pre 1980s 0.045  0.094  0.634  0.181  
1980s 0.161 0.115a 0.041 -0.053a 0.672 0.037a 0.270 0.088a 
1990s 0.198 0.037a 0.042 0.001 0.704 0.032a 0.338 0.068a 
2000s 0.232 0.034a -0.012 -0.054a 0.724 0.020c 0.370 0.032a 
Panel B: Control for Cohorts 
Variable β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Dum1980s 0.108a 0.035 -0.041a 0.012 0.037a 0.010 0.067a 0.019 
Dum1990s 0.149a 0.038 -0.056a 0.013 0.070a 0.010 0.114a 0.021 
Dum2000s 0.233a 0.044 -0.104a 0.015 0.089a 0.011 0.148a 0.024 
Constant 0.044c 0.025 0.092a 0.008 0.634a 0.007 0.210a 0.013 
Observations 118 122 96 122 
F-value 11.03a 18.25a 23.47a 15.78a 
Adjusted R2 20.45% 29.96% 41.50% 26.81% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 9.58a 12.26a 12.34a 11.81a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 1.20 1.40 8.87a 4.71b 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 3.33c 9.86a 2.80c 1.66 
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Figures 3 and 4 plot the cross-sectional averages of liquidity risk and credit risk, 
respectively, for each cohort by year. They demonstrate that each cohort has relatively higher 
risk than its predecessor. This phenomenon is strongly noticeable following the recent global 
financial crisis of 2008 and onward, indicating that banks, particularly new banks, have been 
taking excessive risks following the crisis to offset their losses.  
Fig. 3. Liquidity Risk 
This figure illustrates the liquidity risk for each year by cohort. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on 
their year of opening: prior to 1980, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. The definition of liquidity risk is 
provided in Table 2 and calculated as overall average on a cohort–year basis. 
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                                                                            Fig. 4. Credit Risk 
This figure illustrates the credit risk for each year by cohort. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on their 
year of opening: prior to 1980, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. The credit risk is measured as the risk-
weighted assets divided by Gross Total Assets (GTA) and calculated as overall average on a cohort–year basis. 
 
3.4.3. Hypothesis 3 
To observe the trend in bank-specific factors across the successive cohorts, I calculate, 
individually, the overall averages of brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, 
off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income for each cohort by averaging their cohort–
year observations. I also test differences in averages between the cohorts.27 Panel A of Table 6 
shows that the earliest to the latest cohorts have increasing brokered deposits of 0.005, 0.011, 
0.030, and 0.049; increasing commercial real estate loans of 0.129, 0.201, 0.250, and 0.322; 
increasing capital of 0.094, 0.101, 0.111, and 0.124; increasing off-balance sheet items of 
0.076, 0.105, 0.146, and 0.147; and increasing non-interest income of 0.080, 0.116, 0.118, and 
                                                          
27 I follow an identical approach described in Section 4.2 to test the risk phenomenon in successive cohorts. 
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0.095, respectively (figures not presented for brevity).28 Next, I estimate the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression on a cohort–year basis: 
Characteristiccy = β0 + γ1 Dum1980s + γ2 Dum1990s + γ3 Dum2000s + εcy   (2) 
The Characteristiccy refers to one of the bank-specific factors (brokered deposits, commercial 
real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, or non-interest income) calculated on a 
cohort–year basis.  
 The results for Equation (2) presented in Panel B of Table 6, show that the differences 
between each bank-specific factor for the new cohorts and the preceding cohorts are positively 
significant. All these results support my third hypothesis (H3.1a to H3.5a) that new banks in 
successive cohorts focus more on brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, off-
balance sheet items, and non-interest income than their predecessors. In addition, the results 
are in line with certain researchers (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Stiroh, 2004).
                                                          
28 The only exception is that the difference in non-interest income between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts is de-
creasing but insignificant. 
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Table 6: Bank-specific characteristics of successive cohorts and inter-cohort differences 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts 
based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A reports the overall averages on a cohort–year basis and the significance 
of differences across cohorts. I use 38 annual differences between pre-1980 and the 1980s cohorts, 28 annual differences between the 1980s and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual 
differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts to estimate the significance of differences across cohorts. Panel B shows the OLS regression results after controlling for 
cohorts. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regression is estimated by using 122 cohort–year 
observations, composed of 38 annual observations for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual 
observations for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.
Panel A: Averages and inter-cohort differences 
Cohort BDGTA CRELGTA TEGTA OBSGTA NIIOI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 A D A D A D A D A D 
Pre 1980s 0.005  0.129  0.094  0.076  0.080  
1980s 0.011 0.006a 0.201 0.072a 0.101 0.007a 0.105 0.028a 0.116 0.036a 
1990s 0.030 0.019a 0.250 0.049a 0.111 0.010a 0.146 0.041a 0.118 0.002a 
2000s 0.049 0.019a 0.322 0.072a 0.124 0.013a 0.147 0.001 0.095 -0.023 
Panel B: Control for Cohorts 
Variable β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Dum1980s 0.007b 0.003 0.072a 0.016 0.011b 0.005 0.028a 0.007 0.027a 0.009 
Dum1990s 0.021a 0.003 0.120a 0.017 0.017a 0.006 0.069a 0.008 0.025a 0.009 
Dum2000s 0.036a 0.003 0.192a 0.019 0.034a 0.007 0.070a 0.009 0.001 0.011 
Constant 0.008a 0.002 0.129a 0.011 0.098a 0.004 0.076a 0.005 0.094a 0.006 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 34.84a 35.59a 7.98a 29.67a 4.30a 
Adjusted R2 45.62% 46.17% 17.28% 41.55% 7.57% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 5.42b 20.19a 4.16b 13.36a 8.96a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 17.20a 7.82a 0.75 23.08a 0.06 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 13.27a 11.70a 5.08b 0.01 3.87b 
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Prior to estimating the main regressions, I examine the correlation coefficients of the 
variables used in this study. Table 7 reports correlations between bank-specific factors and risk 
measures. The table shows that the liquidity risk shows strong positive correlation with the 
credit risk. This positive relationship is supported by both theoretical and empirical banking 
literature (e.g., Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Imbierowicz and 
Rauch, 2014). The table also shows that the brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, 
and off-balance sheet items are strongly and positively correlated with two measures of risk 
(liquidity risk and credit risk), as well as with each other. This suggests that these factors are 
most likely responsible for the increase in liquidity risk and credit risk. The capital, measured 
by total equity to GTA, is positively correlated with credit risk but insignificant; and is weakly 
negatively correlated with liquidity risk. These different correlations are consistent with the 
divergent theories in the literature (e.g., Allen et al., 2011; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Koehn 
and Santomero, 1980; Mehran and Thakor, 2011). In contrast, the non-interest income ratio is 
negatively correlated with credit risk but insignificant, and is significantly positively correlated 
with liquidity risk. This is in line with the different findings in prior studies (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Kwast, 1989). Finally, some of the 
variables exhibit moderate to strong correlation with other variables. To address the issues 
associated with multicollinearity, the highest correlated variables (brokered deposits, 
commercial real estate loans, and off-balance sheet items) have been orthogonalised which is 





                                                          
29 I also orthogonalise the highest two variables and the results remain unchanged. 
109 | P a g e  
 
Table 7: Correlation Test 
Variable RWAGTA LCGTA BDGTA CRELGTA TETA OBSGTA NIIOI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RWAGTA 1 
      
LCGTA 0.823a 1 
     
BDGTA 0.838a 0.746a 1 
    
CRELGTA 0.924a 0.895a 0.912a 1 
   
TETA 0.023 -0.198b 0.138 -0.021 1 
  
OBSGTA 0.754a 0.846a 0.614a 0.822a 0.143 1 
 
NIIOI -0.072 0.769a 0.168c 0.513a -0.304a 0.593 1 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. 
 
 I now turn to my main regressions to test whether the bank-specific factors of 
successive cohorts separately explain the cohort risk phenomenon. I regress the risk on one of 
the five bank-specific factors while controlling for cohorts, as follows: 
Riskcy = β0 +β1 Xcy + γ1 Dum1980s + γ2 Dum1990s + γ3 Dum2000s + εcy       (3) 
where Xcy is one of bank level factors, specifically brokered deposits, commercial real estate 
loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, or non-interest income.  
Then, I regress the risk on all five bank-specific factors and control for cohorts to 
investigate the extent to which the bank-specific factors of successive cohorts jointly explain 
the cohort risk phenomenon, as follows: 
Riskcy = β0 +β1 ∑Xcy + γ1 Dum1980s + γ2 Dum1990s + γ3Dum2000s + εcy    (4) 
where ∑Xcy are all bank level factors (brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, 
off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income).30  
                                                          
30 All regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except for risk-weighted assets, as a proxy 
for credit risk, which uses 96 cohort–year observations because US banks started to report it in Call Reports from 
1990), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980s banks (1980–
2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual 
observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations 
for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. 
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 My main results are reported in Table 8. Panel A (columns 2 to 6) shows that brokered 
deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income have 
a positive and significant impact on credit risk as a dependent variable.31 Nonetheless, capital 
has a negative and significant relationship with credit risk. The results are similar to the 
correlation analysis in Table 7 except in the case of capital which has a contrary relationship. 
The coefficients on cohort dummies are generally smaller, but still increasing, than my findings 
for credit risk in Panel B of Table 5.32 Furthermore, the differences in cohort dummies remain 
significant in most cases suggesting less persuasive results for the hypothesis that a singular 
variable is a principal factor behind the persistence of risk across cohorts. Most importantly, 
the last column of Panel A in Table 8 shows that the coefficients of cohort dummies are 
generally decreasing and much smaller than those in Panel B of Table 5, and, additionally, that 
F-tests on the differential coefficients on cohort dummies are no longer statistically significant, 
indicating that the increasing credit risk of successive cohorts is no longer evident once I 
control for all five bank-specific variables (brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, 
capital, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income). This result supports the hypothesis 
(H3.6) that all these variables are responsible for the observed cohort risk phenomenon. 
 Panel B in Table 8 reports the results for liquidity risk after controlling for bank-specific 
characteristics and cohorts. The relationships between liquidity risk and bank-specific 
characteristics are identical to the correlation analysis in Table 7. The key results are that only 
brokered deposits and commercial real estate loans, separately (columns 2 and 3), explain the 
increase in liquidity risk across successive cohorts, because the coefficients of the cohort 
dummies declined, and F-tests of their differences are insignificant. 
                                                          
31 An exception is non-interest income which has an insignificant relationship with credit risk. 
32 The capital, however, has higher values than those in Equation (1). 
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 Overall these findings broadly suggest that the increasing of brokered deposits, 
commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income, as well as 
decreasing capital, account for the cohort risk phenomenon.
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Table 8: Differences in financial risks after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics 

















Control for all variables 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA 2.047a 0.191         0.033a 0.003 
CRELGTA   0.625a 0.032       0.012a 0.002 
TEGTA     -0.708a 0.199     -0.449a 0.101 
OBSGTA       1.157a 0.177   0.033a 0.004 
NIIOI         0.177 0.178 -0.261a 0.061 
Dum1980s 0.019a 0.007 -0.020a 0.006 0.035a 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.031a 0.012 -0.023a 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.027a 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.073a 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.068a 0.010 -0.018a 0.005 
Dum2000s 0.020b 0.010 -0.015b 0.008 0.109a 0.012 0.032b 0.013 0.092a 0.012 -0.024a 0.007 
Constant 0.611a 0.005 0.537a 0.006 0.708a 0.022 0.521a 0.018 0.614a 0.021 0.684a 0.012 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 67.65a 184.00a 22.98a 36.20a 17.84a 195.57a 
Adjusted R2 73.73% 88.51% 48.07% 59.71% 41.49% 94.25% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 7.05a 13.27a 12.60a 0.00 6.65a 22.26a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 1.23 24.45a 13.64a 0.88 9.77a 1.38 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.76 10.84a 8.74a 5.46b 3.70c 0.77 
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA 3.921a 0.450         0.025a 0.003 
CRELGTA   1.068a 0.056       0.006b 0.003 
TEGTA     -1.805a 0.267     -0.689a 0.101 
OBSGTA       1.995 a 0.142   0.028a 0.005 
NIIOI         1.893a 0.094 0.969a 0.078 
Dum1980s 0.039b 0.015 -0.009 0.005 0.089a 0.017 0.010 0.012 0.015c 0.009 0.008 0.006 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into 
four cohorts based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk 
after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-
specific characteristics. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 
122 cohort–year observations (except risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call 
Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit 
risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual 
observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables 
are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
Dum1990s 0.029 0.019 -0.014 0.012 0.145a 0.018 -0.024 0.016 0.066a 0.010 0.013c 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.003 0.025 -0.058a 0.016 0.210a 0.022 0.007 0.018 0.145a 0.011 0.053a 0.010 
Constant 0.178a 0.011 0.070a 0.010 0.378a 0.028 0.057a 0.013 0.032a 0.011 0.187a 0.013 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 38.27a 135.29a 27.75a 80.07a 152.98a 328.33a 
Adjusted R2 55.20% 81.62% 46.93% 72.33% 83.40% 95.88% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 6.10a 0.71 27.19a 0.71 2.63c 2.11 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 0.26 0.24 9.48a 5.86b 24.95a 0.38 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 1.46 10.19a 8.14a 3.98b 38.93a 23.24a 
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3.5 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I perform a set of robustness checks on my findings in Section 4. First, I split 
my sample into small, medium, and large banks and re-estimate my regressions separately for 
these three groups. Second, I control for time trend. Third, I exclude mergers and acquisitions 
and bank failures. Fourth, I control for two banking crises. Fifth, I limit my sample to “true” 
commercial banks. Sixth, I use two alternative measures of liquidity risk and credit risk. 
Seventh, I apply an alternative cohort measurement period of five years. In all cases, I show 
that my main results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
3.5.1 Heterogeneity in Bank Size 
Several empirical studies have shown that bank size has an impact on liquidity risk (e.g., 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Kashyap et al., 2002) and credit risk (e.g., Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2011; Stiroh, 2004). To account for size differences in banks, I follow Imbierowicz and Rauch 
(2014) and define the bottom 25 percentile of GTA as small banks, the top 25 percentile as 
large banks, and the rest as medium banks, as threshold in each year. I then run the analysis 
separately for each bank size. This gives me a sample of 93,755 bank-year observations for 
5,320 small banks, 187,506 bank-year observations for 9,785 medium banks, and 93,745 bank-
year observations for 4,858 large banks.  
 Table 9 and Panel A of Table 10 report the overall averages and the significance of 
cohort risk and bank-specific characteristic differences for both established and new banks 
across bank size classes. Consistent with the summary data in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the average 
levels of liquidity risk, credit risk, and bank-specific factors for small, medium, and large banks 
generally increase with successive cohorts and the differences are significant.33 Panel B of 
Table 10 displays the regression results for bank-specific factors while controlling for cohort 
                                                          
33 An exception is non-interest income which decreases in the 1990s and 2000s for small and medium banks, but 
the differences are not significant. 
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dummies. I find results similar to my main findings in Section 4 and prior results in Panel A of 
Table 10. 
 Panels A and B of Table 11 provide the estimation results for the three different bank 
sizes. The basic results are hold for small, medium, and large banks, with a few notable 
exceptions. Specifically, non-interest income has a significant and negative association with 
the credit risk for small banks; the coefficients on cohort dummies while controlling for all five 
bank-specific variables are tremendously small, but still increasing, compared to coefficients 
on cohort dummies for credit risk without control variables for large banks; the liquidity risk 
cohort phenomenon is explained by all bank-specific factors for large banks only.
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Table 9: Averages and differences across bank size categories 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over 
the period 1980-2017. I consider small banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of average Gross Total 
Assets (GTA), those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. The banks are sorted into 
four cohorts based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. I use 
38 annual differences (26 annual observations for credit risk) between pre-1980 and the 1980s cohorts, 28 annual 
differences (26 annual observations for credit risk) between the 1980s and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual 
differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts to estimate the significance of differences across cohorts. All 
financial characteristics are calculated as overall averages on a cohort–year basis to estimate the significance of 
differences across cohorts.  All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.
Cohort Profitability Credit Risk Liquidity Risk 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference 
Small Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.008  0.610  0.135  
1980s -0.001 -0.009a 0.628 0.018b 0.212 0.077a 
1990s 0.001 0.002a 0.655 0.027a 0.249 0.037a 
2000s -0.009 -0.010a 0.700 0.044a 0.312 0.062a 
Observations 93,755 93,755 93,755 
Medium Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.009  0.630  0.172  
1980s 0.004 -0.005a 0.675 0.044a 0.281 0.109a 
1990s 0.003 -0.001a 0.694 0.019b 0.329 0.047a 
2000s -0.003 -0.006a 0.722 0.027c 0.363 0.034a 
Observations 187,506 187,506 187,506 
Large Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.008  0.668  0.247  
1980s 0.007 -0.001a 0.690 0.022a 0.332 0.084a 
1990s 0.005 -0.002a 0.728 0.038a 0.406 0.073a 
2000s 0.001 -0.004a 0.736 0.008 0.421 0.015a 
Observations 93,745 93,745 93,745 
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Table 10: Bank-specific characteristics of cohorts and inter-cohort differences across bank size categories 
Panel A: Averages and inter-cohort differences 
Cohort BDGTA CRELGTA TEGTA OBSGTA NNIOI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 A D A D A D A D A D 
Small Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.003  0.076  0.100  0.047  0.077  
1980s 0.004 0.001a 0.145 0.069a 0.103 0.003a 0.060 0.013a 0.116 0.038a 
1990s 0.012 0.008a 0.186 0.040a 0.125 0.022a 0.086 0.025a 0.103 -0.013 
2000s 0.031 0.019a 0.283 0.097a 0.142 0.017a 0.096 0.100c 0.098 -0.004 
Medium Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.004  0.130  0.094  0.064  0.089  
1980s 0.009 0.005a 0.215 0.085a 0.098 0.004a 0.090 0.025a 0.109 0.020b 
1990s 0.025 0.015a 0.255 0.040b 0.109 0.011a 0.119 0.028a 0.108 -0.001 
2000s 0.044 0.019a 0.332 0.077a 0.122 0.013a 0.129 0.010c 0.087 -0.020 
Large Banks 
Pre 1980s 0.009  0.183  0.087  0.154  0.121  
1980s 0.027 0.018a 0.208 0.025c 0.107 0.020a 0.248 0.094a 0.147 0.026b 
1990s 0.049 0.022a 0.255 0.046b 0.112 0.005a 0.371 0.122a 0.148 0.001 
2000s 0.072 0.023a 0.312 0.056a 0.132 0.013a 0.265 -0.105 0.109 -0.038 
Panel B: Control for Cohorts 
Small Banks 
Variable β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Dum1980s 0.001 0.001 0.066a 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.013b 0.005 0.037a 0.007 
Dum1990s 0.007a 0.002 0.107a 0.010 0.021a 0.006 0.039a 0.005 0.023a 0.008 
Dum2000s 0.020a 0.002 0.204a 0.011 0.044a 0.007 0.048a 0.006 0.019b 0.006 
Constant 0.005 0.001 0.078a 0.006 0.104a 0.004 0.047a 0.004 0.078a 0.004 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 35.75a 114.41a 13.61a 27.09a 7.73a 
Adjusted R2 46.28% 73.77% 23.81% 39.28% 14.31% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 0.04 53.24
a 1.12 6.25a 22.79a 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. I consider small banks corresponding to the bottom 25 percentile of 
average Gross Total Assets (GTA), those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 
1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A reports the overall averages (A) on a cohort–year basis and the significance of differences (D) across cohorts. I use 38 annual differences between pre-
1980 and the 1980s cohorts, 28 annual differences between the 1980s and 1990s cohorts, and 18 annual differences between the 1990s and 2000s cohorts to estimate the significance of differences across 
cohorts. Panel B shows the OLS regression results after controlling for cohorts. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regression is 
estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations, composed of 38 annual observations for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual 
observations for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.  
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 15.08
a 16.57a 5.53b 21.28a 2.61c 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 29.18
a 62.56a 7.96a 1.67 0.11 
Medium Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Dum1980s 0.005c 0.002 0.080a 0.016 0.008 0.005 0.026a 0.006 0.018b 0.008 
Dum1990s 0.016a 0.003 0.121a 0.018 0.015b 0.006 0.054a 0.007 0.018b 0.009 
Dum2000s 0.032a 0.003 0.198a 0.020 0.032a 0.007 0.064a 0.008 -0.002 0.010 
Constant 0.007a 0.002 0.134a 0.011 0.097a 0.003 0.065a 0.004 0.090a 0.005 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 34.18a 34.13a 7.19a 29.24a 2.74b 
Adjusted R2 45.13% 45.10% 13.31% 41.18% 4.13% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 2.93
c 22.66a 2.37 15.01a 4.71b 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 13.81
a 5.10b 0.98 15.30a 0.00 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 20.24
a 12.06a 5.20b 1.43 3.48b 
Large Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Dum1980s 0.014a 0.004 0.025 0.018 0.025a 0.005 0.094a 0.018 0.026b 0.011 
Dum1990s 0.031a 0.005 0.072a 0.020 0.026a 0.006 0.216a 0.020 0.026b 0.012 
Dum2000s 0.054a 0.005 0.129a 0.023 0.038a 0.007 0.110a 0.023 -0.011 0.014 
Constant 0.013a 0.003 0.183a 0.013 0.092a 0.004 0.154a 0.013 0.121a 0.008 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 33.75a 12.01a 11.85a 36.99a 3.92a 
Adjusted R2 44.81% 21.44% 21.19% 47.16% 6.75% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 10.32
a 1.87 18.39a 24.65a 5.25b 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 11.43
a 5.32b 0.01 35.12a 0.00 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 13.46
a 5.30b 2.73c 17.90a 6.48a 
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Table 11: Financial risks after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics across bank size categories 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Small Banks   
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   1.977a 0.334         0.042a 0.003 
CRELGTA     0.695a 0.069       0.036a 0.004 
TEGTA       -0.132 0.160     -0.134 0.103 
OBSGTA         1.053a 0.169   0.024a 0.003 
NIIOI           -0.292c 0.175 -0.562a 0.086 
Dum1980s 0.017b 0.008 0.019a 0.007 -0.036a 0.007 0.016b 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.030a 0.011 -0.023a 0.006 
Dum1990s 0.045a 0.008 0.033a 0.007 -0.023a 0.009 0.047a 0.008 0.020b 0.008 0.049a 0.008 -0.039a 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.089a 0.009 0.053a 0.010 -0.042a 0.014 0.094a 0.011 0.054a 0.009 0.090a 0.009 -0.067a 0.013 
Constant 0.611a 0.005 0.595a 0.005 0.545a 0.008 0.625a 0.018 0.544a 0.012 0.638a 0.017 0.727a 0.013 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 35.18a 43.78a 78.32a 25.72a 45.72a 26.83a 119.25a 
Adjusted R2 51.16% 64.30% 76.50% 51.00% 65.32% 52.10% 90.87% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 4.33b 7.19a 20.54a 3.83b 0.93 7.14a 13.09a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 10.78a 3.16c 3.99b 11.37a 2.50 3.14c 10.02a 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 20.98a 4.93b 4.57b 20.29a 18.84a 18.94a 11.73a 
Medium Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.420a 0.227         0.064a 0.002 
CRELGTA     0.639a 0.032       0.039a 0.002 
TEGTA       -0.811a 0.208     -0.466a 0.101 
OBSGTA         1.114a 0.200   0.018a 0.002 
NIIOI           0.154 0.205 -0.209a 0.068 
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Dum1980s 0.043a 0.011 0.031a 0.007 -0.022a 0.006 0.039a 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.040a 0.012 -0.022a 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.063a 0.011 0.027a 0.008 -0.004 0.006 0.066a 0.010 0.020 0.012 0.063a 0.011 -0.020a 0.004 
Dum2000s 0.090a 0.012 0.018c 0.010 -0.019b 0.007 0.112a 0.012 0.039a 0.014 0.094a 0.013 -0.029a 0.007 
Constant 0.631a 0.008 0.606a 0.006 0.528a 0.006 0.715a 0.022 0.538a 0.018 0.614a 0.024 0.740a 0.012 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 19.54a 60.79a 172.15a 20.68a 27.11a 14.72a 213.29a 
Adjusted R2 36.93% 71.57% 87.81% 45.32% 52.37% 36.62% 94.70% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 14.43a 15.70a 13.49a 13.10a 1.97 10.20a 19.01a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 2.79c 0.17 12.49a 6.28a 0.18 3.33c 0.39 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 4.69b 0.97 6.02a 12.69a 2.83c 5.22b 3.23c 
Large Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   1.493a 0.131         0.060a 0.003 
CRELGTA     0.526a 0.030       0.032a 0.002 
TEGTA       -0.663a 0.223     -0.356a 0.091 
OBSGTA         -0.066 0.087   0.026a 0.004 
NIIOI           0.161 0.149 -0.165a  0.061 
Dum1980s 0.022b 0.010 -0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.028a 0.010 0.030b 0.015 0.018 0.011 -0.025a 0.007 
Dum1990s 0.060a 0.010 0.014c 0.008 0.033a 0.005 0.067a 0.010 0.071a 0.018 0.060a 0.010 -0.010 0.009 
Dum2000s 0.067a 0.011 -0.006 0.010 0.017a 0.006 0.087a 0.013 0.072a 0.013 0.074a 0.013 -0.002 0.008 
Constant 0.678a 0.007 0.640a 0.005 0.553a 0.007 0.734a 0.023 0.681a 0.018 0.643a 0.024 0.748a 0.014 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 15.89a 60.55a 122.07a 15.14a 12.01a 12.23a 115.97a 
Adjusted R2 31.98% 71.49% 83.60% 37.31% 31.67% 32.11% 90.64% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 4.40b 0.47 0.00 7.24a 4.17b 2.26 13.03a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 12.23a 7.88a 40.98a 14.82a 12.24a 13.27a 8.93a 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.41 6.83a 6.79a 2.68 0.00 1.14 1.53 
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
Small Banks   
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BDGTA   3.763a 0.773         0.036a 0.005 
CRELGTA     1.478a 0.086       0.027a 0.006 
TEGTA       -1.403a 0.212     -0.587a 0.118 
OBSGTA         2.003a 0.218   0.023a 0.004 
NIIOI           1.719a 0.100 0.777a 0.100 
Dum1980s 0.060a 0.015 0.059a 0.014 -0.038a 0.011 0.068a 0.013 0.034a 0.012 -0.004 0.010 -0.014 0.008 
Dum1990s 0.083a 0.017 0.054a 0.017 -0.075a 0.014 0.114a 0.015 0.005 0.015 0.043a 0.009 -0.016 0.011 
Dum2000s 0.139a 0.020 0.062a 0.024 -0.163a 0.022 0.200a 0.019 0.042b 0.018 0.104a 0.010 -0.010 0.020 
Constant 0.166a 0.011 0.145a 0.011 0.049a 0.008 0.312a 0.024 0.069a 0.013 0.030a 0.009 0.225a 0.018 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 18.10a 22.10a 121.31a 29.31a 44.07a 119.64a 172.80a 
Adjusted R2 29.78% 41.09% 79.91% 48.35% 58.74% 79.68% 91.91% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 14.09a 16.08a 14.13a 24.94a 7.39a 0.22 2.71 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 1.80 0.07 13.54a 8.56a 3.87b 24.77a 0.11 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 6.70a 0.13 38.52a 20.95a 5.16b 28.52a 0.31 
Medium Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   4.113a 0.521         0.051a 0.003 
CRELGTA     1.009a 0.053       0.025a 0.003 
TEGTA       -1.844a 0.266     -0.729a 0.105 
OBSGTA         2.158a 0.185   0.017a 0.002 
NIIOI           2.003a 0.107 1.064a 0.082 
Dum1980s 0.079a 0.019 0.059a 0.016 -0.001 0.010 0.095a 0.016 0.023c 0.014 0.042a 0.010 0.025a 0.006 
Dum1990s 0.107a 0.021 0.040b 0.019 -0.015 0.012 0.135a 0.018 -0.009 0.017 0.070a 0.010 0.015b 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.147a 0.024 0.012 0.026 -0.052a 0.016 0.207a 0.022 0.008 0.020 0.153a 0.012 0.049a 0.011 
Constant 0.204a 0.013 0.173a 0.011 0.068a 0.009 0.384a 0.028 0.063a 0.015 0.023b 0.011 0.229a 0.015 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 15.61a 33.34a 134.83a 28.27a 58.99a 133.20a 313.81a 
Adjusted R2 26.59% 51.67% 81.56% 47.41% 65.72% 81.38% 95.39% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 16.44a 13.75a 0.02 32.64a 2.81c 17.96a 15.72a 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. I consider small banks corresponding to the bottom 
25 percentile of average Gross Total Assets (GTA), those in the top 25 percentile as large banks, and the rest medium banks. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on their year 
of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009.Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific 
characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as 
base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regression is estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 
cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992), composed of 38 annual 
observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort 
(1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All 
variables are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 1.67 1.09 1.67 4.62b 4.86b 6.80a 2.78c 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 2.46 1.52 7.49 10.46a 1.02 38.83a 18.74a 
Large Banks 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.810a 0.343         0.041a 0.003 
CRELGTA     0.949a 0.060       0.024a 0.003 
TEGTA       -1.739a 0.302     -0.720a 0.091 
OBSGTA         0.723a 0.080   0.017a 0.003 
NIIOI           1.693a 0.076 0.920a 0.073 
Dum 1980s 0.038c 0.021 -0.003 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.081a 0.020 -0.029 0.018 -0.005 0.009 0.006 0.007 
Dum1990s 0.115a 0.023 0.025 0.021 0.046a 0.014 0.159a 0.022 -0.041 0.025 0.070a 0.010 0.042a 0.011 
Dum2000s 0.127a 0.026 -0.024 0.028 0.050 0.017 0.193a 0.026 0.047b 0.022 0.147a 0.011 0.096a 0.012 
Constant 0.278a 0.015 0.239a 0.013 0.104a 0.014 0.438a 0.030 0.166a 0.017 0.072a 0.011 0.266a 0.015 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 12.09a 30.92a 89.36a 19.78a 35.12a 167.17a 304.72a 
Adjusted R2 21.57% 49.72% 74.50% 38.30% 53.01% 84.60% 95.26% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 3.17c 0.04 1.29 15.81a 2.64 0.37 0.71 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 10.72a 2.16 5.58b 13.98a 0.32 54.04a 22.01a 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.19 4.41b 6.23b 1.84 14.24a 35.82a 41.14a 
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3.5.2 Time Trend 
The averages of cohorts are calculated over different periods. For example, the cohort average 
for the 2000s banks is calculated using only 18 observations from 2000 to 2017, while the 
cohort average for the pre-1980 banks is calculated using 38 observations from 1980 to 2017. 
Since the cohorts might not have comparable averages, one may argue that this could represent 
overall time trends. To test this possibility, I follow (Brown and Kapadia, 2007) and Srivastava 
(2014) and include a variable, which controls for the secular time trend, in my regression 
analysis. Table 12 presents the results. While credit risk has similar results to those presented 
in Panel B of Table 5, liquidity risk has marginally different results. The difference is that the 
2000s cohort slightly decreased but it is still larger than the 1980s cohort and the F-test is 
insignificant. Other results are broadly consistent with my main conclusion previously obtained 
in Table 8. 
 
3.5.3 Excluding M&As and Failures 
Banks typically exit the market if failing, are acquired by another institution, or merged with 
another bank. This can lead to a re-evaluation of financial statements which may affect my 
analysis. To investigate whether the main results are influenced by these exit states, I exclude 
from the sample the non-surviving banks that failed, were acquired, or merged. I find that the 
results presented in Table 13 are robust to the impact of mergers, acquisitions, or failures; and 
they leave my main conclusion unchanged.  
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 Table 12: Financial risks after controlling for time trend, cohorts and bank-specific characteristics 
 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.152a 0.250         0.035a 0.004 
CRELGTA     0.756a 0.038       0.012a 0.002 
TEGTA       -0.563a 0.186     -0.412a 0.1113 
OBSGTA         1.059a 0.160   0.032a 0.005 
NIIOI           -0.855a 0.223 -0.189a 0.112 
Time trend 0.001a 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Dum1980s 0.037a 0.009 0.018a 0.007 -0.032a 0.005 0.035a 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.065a 0.012 -0.026a 0.006 
Dum1990s 0.068a 0.009 0.025a 0.008 -0.010c 0.006 0.072a 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.073a 0.009 -0.020a 0.005 
Dum2000s 0.078a 0.010 0.018c 0.010 -0.030a 0.007 0.095a 0.011 0.027b 0.012 0.052a 0.012 -0.025a 0.007 
Constant 0.591a 0.011 0.616a 0.009 0.545a 0.005 0.655a 0.023 0.493a 0.017 0.653a 0.019 0.678a 0.014 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 27.14a 53.87a 194.09a 25.50a 40.65a 27.88a 173.08a 
Adjusted R2 52.40% 73.56% 91.04% 56.32% 67.61% 58.59% 94.22% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 14.67a 6.23b 34.92a 14.83a 0.10 31.34a 14.93a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 10.48a 0.87 27.74a 14.72a 1.46 0.57 1.86 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.86 0.77 16.72a 4.36b 2.58 2.68 0.56 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on 
their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-
specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I consider the dummy variable for pre-
1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit 
risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992), composed 
of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 
1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–





Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   0.619 0.444         0.029a 0.003 
CRELGTA     0.687a 0.085       0.021a 0.002 
TEGTA       -1.279a 0.134     -1.174a 0.119 
OBSGTA         1.123a 0.131   0.012a 0.001 
NIIOI           1.293a 0.143 0.305a 0.114 
Time trend 0.002a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 0.001a 0.001 
Dum1980s 0.067a 0.011 0.063a 0.011 0.019c 0.010 0.082a 0.008 0.034a 0.009 0.033a 0.009 0.033a 0.006 
Dum1990s 0.077a 0.012 0.067a 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.102a 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.067a 0.009 0.035a 0.006 
Dum2000s 0.070a 0.014 0.053a 0.018 -0.019 0.016 0.120a 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.114a 0.012 0.070a 0.009 
Constant 0.098a 0.010 0.102a 0.010 0.069a 0.009 0.234a 0.025 0.049a 0.009 0.041a 0.010 0.264a 0.014 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 103.13a 83.56a 141.05a 163.89a 148.30a 155.43a 296.90a 
Adjusted R2 77.15% 77.33% 85.27% 87.07% 85.89% 86.45% 95.86% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 37.34a 30.20a 3.33c 94.51a 13.50a 12.52a 24.03a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 0.69 0.11 0.16 4.82b 4.91b 12.01a 0.18 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.27 0.80 8.07a 2.48 0.20 13.38a 21.92a 
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Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.171a 0.193         0.064a 0.003 
CRELGTA     0.566a 0.036       0.032a 0.002 
TEGTA       -0.878a 0.171     -0.622a 0.107 
OBSGTA         1.099a 0.201   0.024a 0.003 
NIIOI           0.429a 0.171 -0.414a 0.086 
Dum1980s 0.030a 0.010 0.011 0.007 -0.011c 0.006 0.031a 0.009 -0.008 0.011 0.010 0.013 -0.012b 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.068a 0.010 0.020b 0.008 0.011c 0.007 0.078a 0.009 -0.001 0.016 0.061a 0.010 -0.024a 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.090a 0.012 0.014 0.010 -0.004 0.008 0.118a 0.011 0.028c 0.015 0.097a 0.011 -0.023a 0.009 
Constant 0.629a 0.007 0.606a 0.005 0.547a 0.007 0.724a 0.019 0.528a 0.019 0.581a 0.020 0.790a 0.016 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 23.87a 73.53a 124.52a 29.41a 30.91a 20.50a 136.53a 
Adjusted R2 41.93% 75.33% 83.87% 54.47% 55.74% 45.08% 91.94% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 7.77a 2.51 3.48c 10.93a 0.49 0.60 5.19b 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 12.45a 1.33 16.49a 22.46a 0.36 18.98a 3.62c 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 3.31c 0.55 5.88b 13.06a 8.17a 7.59a 0.01 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017 excluding mergers and acquisitions and failures 
banks. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results 
for credit risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific 
characteristics. I consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations 
(except risk-weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank 
Regulatory database by WRDS from 1992), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual 
observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), 
and 18 annual observations for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   4.743a 0.440         0.070a 0.004 
CRELGTA     1.134a 0.047       0.031a 0.003 
TEGTA       -1.845a 0.284     -0.455a 0.113 
OBSGTA         2.232a 0.153   0.015a 0.003 
NIIOI           1.908a 0.101 0.767a 0.102 
Dum1980s 0.056a 0.021 0.028c 0.015 -0.002 0.009 0.083a 0.018 -0.016 0.013 -0.016 0.011 -0.013b 0.006 
Dum1990s 0.118a 0.023 0.019 0.018 -0.006 0.010 0.159a 0.020 -0.064a 0.018 0.051a 0.012 -0.008 0.009 
Dum2000s 0.164a 0.026 -0.009 0.024 -0.053a 0.014 0.232a 0.024 -0.007 0.019 0.152a 0.013 0.022c 0.012 
Constant 0.195a 0.014 0.154a 0.011 0.057a 0.008 0.385a 0.031 0.037a 0.014 0.020c 0.011 0.233a 0.019 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 16.54a 54.48a 215.09a 27.30a 87.35a 138.56a 295.77a 
Adjusted R2 27.81% 63.43% 87.62% 46.51% 74.06% 81.97% 95.12% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 7.28a 3.44c 0.09 20.15a 1.56 2.11 4.43b 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 7.12a 0.25 0.19 14.42b 9.03a 34.29a 0.34 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 2.70c 1.84 14.54a 8.92a 11.28a 49.45a 9.45a 
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3.5.4 Banking Crises 
During my sample period, the banking industry encountered two banking crises: first, the credit 
crunch that occurred in the U.S. between 1990 and 1992, due to poorly capitalised institutions 
from the loan loss incidents of the late 1980s (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1995), the increase in 
risk-based capital and supervisory requirements (e.g., Thakor, 1996), and the reduction in loan 
demand associated with macroeconomic and regional recessions (Berger and Bouwman, 
2013); second, the subprime mortgage crisis that started in the U.S. between early 2008 and 
the end of 2009 and that spread to the rest of the world. It was mainly triggered by the meltdown 
of real estate prices, leading to a high number of foreclosures and the collapse of large and 
complex banks. 
 These crises have had a significant impact on the health of the U.S. banking system and 
on the soundness of individual banks. To control for possible effects on the reliability of my 
findings, I re-ran my main analyses while excluding the years of the banking crises (1990, 
1991, 1992, 2008, and 2009). Table 14 contains the results for liquidity risk and credit risk. As 
can be seen, the results are similar to the main results presented in Tables 5 and 8. 
3.5.5 ‘‘True” Commercial Banks 
Following Distinguin et al. (2013), I limit my sample to “true” commercial banks defined by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) as banks that have commercial real estate or commercial and 
industrial loans outstanding, have deposits, have positive equity capital, have average GTA 
above $25 million, have unused commitments below four times GTA, have residential real 
estate loans below 50% of GTA, and are not classified as credit card banks.34 Table 15 shows 
that the results are in line with those earlier presented in Tables 5 and 8 on my full sample of 
banks.
                                                          
34 A credit card bank as defined by the Federal Reserve Board is a bank that has 50% or more of its total assets in 
the form of loans to individuals, 90% or more of its loans to individuals in the form of credit card payments 
outstanding, and $200 million or more in loans to individuals. 
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Table 14: Financial risks after controlling for banking crises, cohorts and bank-specific characteristics  
 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.165a 0.251         0.056a 0.002 
CRELGTA     0.609a 0.037       0.033a 0.001 
TEGTA       -0.692a 0.186     -0.455a 0.096 
OBSGTA         1.293a 0.168   0.017a 0.002 
NIIOI           0.229 0.170 -0.190a 0.059 
Dum1980s 0.036a 0.010 0.019b 0.008 -0.019a 0.006 0.034a 0.009 -0.006 0.010 0.028b 0.012 -0.029a 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.069a 0.010 0.028a 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.073a 0.009 -0.001 0.012 0.067a 0.010 -0.017a 0.005 
Dum2000s 0.084a 0.011 0.019c 0.011 -0.013 0.008 0.105a 0.012 0.019 0.012 0.088a 0.011 -0.017a 0.007 
Constant 0.634a 0.007 0.610a 0.006 0.540a 0.006 0.706a 0.020 0.506a 0.017 0.607a 0.021 0.750a 0.012 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
F-value 22.54a 50.69a 140.77a 23.04a 43.85a 17.53a 197.93a 
Adjusted R2 43.48% 70.29% 86.94% 51.21% 67.11% 44.04% 94.94% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 11.87a 5.74b 10.41a 12.57a 0.46 5.56b 35.32a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 9.46a 1.29 24.11a 14.90a .54 11.37a 7.58b 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 1.87 0.96 9.51a 7.50a 4.96b 3.10c 0.01 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on 
their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after controlling for banking crises, cohorts 
and bank-specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for banking crises, cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I consider the 
dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except risk-weighted assets, 
as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 
1992), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for 
credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s 
cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3. 
 
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   4.144a 0.406         0.043a 0.002 
CRELGTA     1.132a 0.061       0.016a 0.001 
TEGTA       -1.718a 0.302     -0.748a 0.159 
OBSGTA         1.919a 0.149   0.008a 0.002 
NIIOI           1.825a 0.088 0.852a 0.078 
Dum1980s 0.062a 0.021 0.042a 0.011 -0.011 0.010 0.086a 0.019 0.007 0.013 0.016c 0.009 0.008 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.130a 0.023 0.026c 0.014 -0.012 0.013 0.151a 0.020 -0.014 0.018 0.076a 0.010 0.016b 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.146a 0.026 -0.005 0.018 -0.060a 0.016 0.207a 0.025 0.007 0.019 0.139a 0.011 0.048a 0.011 
Constant 0.213a 0.014 0.194a 0.008 0.063a 0.010 0.383a 0.032 0.065a 0.014 0.039a 0.010 0.219a 0.018 
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
F-value 15.47a 56.54a 136.13a 23.26a  71.52a 166.38a 211.42a 
Adjusted R2 29.46% 69.39% 83.86% 46.13% 73.06% 86.41% 94.50% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 8.66a 12.72a 1.15 20.64a 0.30 2.96c 1.80 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 7.12a 1.38 0.00 10.11a 1.80 34.05a 1.38 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.32 4.25b 12.06a 4.76b 1.57 24.90a 10.22a 
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Table 15: Financial risks after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics (Commercial banks only) 
 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.167a 0.198         0.060a 0.002 
CRELGTA     0.643a 0.031       0.035a 0.002 
TEGTA       -0.865a 0.240     -0.495a 0.113 
OBSGTA         1.316a 0.179   0.015a 0.002 
NIIOI           0.317c 0.189 -0.209a 0.066 
Dum1980s 0.031a 0.011 0.016b 0.007 -0.035a 0.005 0.026b 0.010 -0.001 0.010 0.023c 0.012 -0.032a 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.064a 0.011 0.025a 0.008 -0.013b 0.006 0.066a 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.066a 0.011 -0.025a 0.005 
Dum2000s 0.089a 0.012 0.020b 0.010 -0.025a 0.007 0.109a 0.013 0.031b 0.012 0.098a 0.013 -0.027a 0.008 
Constant 0.640a 0.008 0.615a 0.006 0.539a 0.006 0.730a 0.025 0.511a 0.018 0.603a 0.023 0.760a 0.012 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
F-value 20.09a 64.18a 188.74a 20.26a 37.20a 16.07a 203.24a 
Adjusted R2 37.61% 72.68% 88.77% 44.78% 60.39% 38.81% 94.45% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 7.50a 4.64b 36.31a 6.16b 0.03 3.73c 35.87a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 8.30a 1.23 19.04a 13.01a 2.51 11.26a 2.80c 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 4.02b 0.25 4.48b 11.54a 3.12c 5.93b 0.16 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. commercial banks only over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four 
cohorts based on their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after controlling for 
cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I consider the dummy 
variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except risk-weighted assets, as a 
proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database by WRDS from 
1992), composed of 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (26 annual observations for 
credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (26 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations for the 2000s 
cohort (2000–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   3.290a 0.380         0.048a 0.003 
CRELGTA     1.078a 0.057       0.025a 0.003 
TEGTA       -2.075a 0.309     -0.957a 0.149 
OBSGTA         2.166a 0.150   0.013a 0.002 
NIIOI           2.048a 0.100 1.009a 0.091 
Dum1980s 0.068a 0.021 0.054a 0.013 -0.019c 0.011 0.086a 0.017 0.018 0.013 0.029a 0.010 0.010 0.007 
Dum1990s 0.107a 0.023 0.028c 0.015 -0.039a 0.013 0.133a 0.020 -0.014 0.016 0.085a 0.010 0.019b 0.008 
Dum2000s 0.148a 0.026 0.018 0.020 -0.072a 0.017 0.210a 0.024 0.006 0.018 0.162a 0.012 0.061a 0.012 
Constant 0.218a 0.014 0.205a 0.010 0.077a 0.010 0.419a 0.032 0.050a 0.014 0.021c 0.011 0.274a 0.017 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 13.57a 38.37a 130.36a 25.21a  79.83a 148.41a 221.70a 
Adjusted R2 23.77% 56.52% 81.05% 44.46% 72.27% 82.97% 93.88% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 10.84a 15.84a 2.87c 23.08a 1.99 7.46a 1.97 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 2.91c 3.01c 2.91c 6.04b 5.09b 29.05a 2.01 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 2.29 0.29 5.63b 10.33a 1.66 35.15a 24.25a 
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3.5.6 Alternative Risk Proxies 
To verify my main results, I use two alternative risk measures: one measure of liquidity risk, 
and one of credit risk. The description and calculation for each measure is provided in Table 2. 
The first is liquidity risk developed by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) which measures the 
relationship of short-term obligations to short-term assets, including off-balance sheet items 
and shows to what degree a bank exposes itself to the interbank lending and derivative markets. 
The second is credit risk measured by Z-score, which represents the number of standard 
deviations below the mean by which profits would have to fall so as to deplete the bank’s equity 
capital (Houston et al., 2010). The Z-score is considered a measure of a bank’s distance to 
insolvency and has been widely used in the empirical banking literature for measuring bank 
risk (e.g., Bertay et al., 2013; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Delis et al., 2014). Estimation results, 
reported in Panel A of Table 16, show that each new cohort is less stable than its predecessor. 
In Panel B, the liquidity risk increases in successive cohorts but with smaller values than for 
my main results presented in Table 5. Other findings are comparable to those presented in 
Tables 5 and 8. 
3.5.7 Alternative Cohort Period 
To examine the sensitivity of my results to different cohort measurement periods, I split the 
new banks into six 5-year groups: a cohort of 1,375 banks that started between 1980 and 1984, 
a cohort of 1,161 banks that started between 1985 and 1989, a cohort of 447 banks that started 
between 1990 and 1994, a cohort of 895 banks that started between 1995 and 1999, a cohort of 
655 banks that started between 2000 and 2004, and a cohort of 668 banks that started between 
2005 and 2009. The results are presented in Table 17 and show that the trends I find for 10-
year periods are generally present in the shorter time periods as well. This indicates that my 
main findings reported in Tables 5 and 8 are relatively not sensitive to alternative cohort peri-
ods.
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Table 16: Financial risks after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics (Using alternative measures) 
 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   15.370a 2.981         0.275a 0.069 
CRELGTA     4.534a 0.534       0.155a 0.052 
TEGTA       -2.349 2.350     2.321 0.250 
OBSGTA         8.533a 1.101   0.064 0.096 
NIIOI           6.010a 1.028 0.311 1.343 
Dum1980s -0.610a 0.108 -0.726a 0.100 -0.948a 0.093 -0.590a 0.110 -0.860a 0.093 -0.780a 0.100 -1.037a 0.104 
Dum1990s -0.783a 0.118 -1.128a 0.126 -1.350a 0.113 -0.751a 0.122 -1.378a 0.122 -0.932a 0.107 -1.427a 0.126 
Dum2000s -1.157a 0.137 -1.748a 0.168 -2.069a 0.149 -1.092a 0.010 -1.739a 0.134 -1.163a 0.120 -2.109a 0.187 
Constant 3.773a 0.076 3.643a 0.073 3.176a 0.091 4.004a 0.022 3.099a 0.107 3.190a 0.120 3.518a 0.278 
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
F-value 29.05a 33.32a 54.69a 22.04a 48.05a 36.65a 30.05a 
Adjusted R2 41.83% 52.49% 64.73% 41.83% 61.67% 54.93% 66.52% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 31.51a 51.49a 103.56a 28.59a 83.78a 60.85a 98.19a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 2.14 12.04a 17.51a 1.83 23.91a 2.13 10.26a 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 6.68a 19.84a 36.22a 5.26b 9.44b 3.18c 21.10a 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on 
their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-
specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I consider the dummy variable for pre-
1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 122 cohort–year observations (except Z-score, as a proxy for credit risk, is 118 
cohort–year observations because the first annual observation of each cohort is exempt of calculations), composed of 38 annual observations (37 annual observations for credit risk) for 
the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (37 annual observations for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 28 annual observations (27 annual 
observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort (1990–2017), and 18 annual observations (17 annual observations for credit risk) for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017). All variables are 
defined in Table 2 and 3. 
 
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   2.487a 0.655         2.228a 0.598 
CRELGTA     0.926a 0.106       -1.039a 0.174 
TEGTA       -1.458a 0.353     -1.213a 0.159 
OBSGTA         2.629a 0.139   2.775a 0.191 
NIIOI           2.132a 0.134 1.066a 0.123 
Dum1980s 0.002 0.023 -0.016 0.023 -0.064a 0.020 0.019 0.022 -0.073a -0.056a 0.029a 0.013 -0.033a 0.009 
Dum1990s 0.075a 0.025 0.022 0.028 -0.036 0.023 0.101a 0.024 -0.106a 0.016 0.022 0.014 -0.045a 0.011 
Dum2000s 0.086a 0.029 -0.005 0.036 -0.092a 0.031 0.136a 0.030 -0.098a 0.017 0.083a 0.016 0.050a 0.017 
Constant 0.197a 0.016 0.177a 0.016 0.077a 0.019 0.340a 0.038 -0.004 0.013 -0.003 0.015 0.119a 0.022 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
F-value 5.58a 8.26a 25.66a 9.02a 106.17a 75.83a 148.57a 
Adjusted R2 10.19% 19.36% 44.91% 20.95% 77.66% 71.21% 90.70% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 0.01 0.50 10.34a 0.73 34.37a 16.49a 12.13a 
1990s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 8.20a 2.15 1.89 11.36a 5.74b 29.18a 1.10 
2000s > 1990s (γ3> γ2) 0.11 0.78 4.89b 1.39 0.27 11.49a 53.13a 
136 | P a g e  
 
     Table 17: Financial risks after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics (Alternative cohort period of 5 years) 
 



















Control for all 
& 
Cohorts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   1.99a 0.157         0.050a 0.002 
CRELGTA     0.625a 0.025       0.028a 0.001 
TEGTA       -0.813a 0.120     -0.639a 0.056 
OBSGTA         1.109a 0.144   0.013a 0.001 
NIIOI           0.164 0.139 -0.274a 0.044 
Dum1980s 0.018 0.012 0.009 0.008 -0.028a 0.006 0.017c 0.010 -0.003 0.010 0.013 0.013 -0.016a 0.004 
Dum1985s 0.042a 0.012 0.024a 0.008 -0.009c 0.006 0.039a 0.010 -0.002 0.011 0.036a 0.013 -0.015a 0.004 
Dum1990s 0.060a 0.012 0.036a 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.061a 0.010 -0.011 0.014 0.056a 0.012 -0.022a 0.005 
Dum1995s 0.066a 0.012 0.019b 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.077a 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.066a 0.012 -0.007 0.004 
Dum2000s 0.086a 0.013 0.019c 0.010 -0.005 0.007 0.100a 0.011 0.033a 0.013 0.088a 0.013 -0.008c 0.005 
Dum2005s 0.080a 0.015 0.009 0.012 -0.030a 0.008 0.114a 0.014 0.031b 0.014 0.085a 0.016 -0.012c 0.007 
Constant 0.642a 0.008 0.614a 0.006 0.535a 0.006 0.727a 0.014 0.530a 0.016 0.623a 0.018 0.716 0.008 
Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
F-value 12.50a 44.70a 135.60a 20.38a 23.19a 10.94a 221.41a 
Adjusted R2 30.54% 66.08% 85.72% 46.35% 49.73% 30.71% 93.92% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 2.47 1.16 25.33a 2.86c 0.10 1.03 15.39a 
1985s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 4.13b 3.36c 12.28a 4.46b 0.03 4.05b 0.22 
1990s > 1985s (γ3> γ2) 2.36 1.98 4.08b 4.58b 0.85 2.82c 3.86c 
1995s > 1990s (γ4> γ3) 0.24 3.46c 0.21 1.97 6.11a 0.59 14.52a 
2000s > 1995s (γ5> γ4) 2.18 0.00 2.13 3.92b 2.54 2.56 0.13 
2005s > 2000s (γ6> γ5) 0.15 0.74 11.54a 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.57      
Panel B: Liquidity Risk 
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Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level. The sample is based on annual data of U.S. banks over the period 1980-2017. The banks are sorted into four cohorts based on 
their year of opening: prior to 1980, between 1980-1985, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009. Panel A shows the OLS regression results for credit risk after 
controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. Panel B shows the OLS regression results for liquidity risk after controlling for cohorts and bank-specific characteristics. I 
consider the dummy variable for pre-1980s as base case; therefore, I exclude it from the regression. The regressions are estimated by using 191 cohort–year observations (except risk-
weighted assets, as a proxy for credit risk, is 96 cohort–year observations because U.S. banks started to report it in Call Reports from 1990, but it is available in Bank Regulatory database 
by WRDS from 1992, composed of 38 annual observations (annual observations for credit risk) for the pre-1980-bank category (1980–2017), 38 annual observations (annual observations 
for credit risk) for the 1980s cohort (1980–2017), 33 annual observations for the 1985s cohort, 28 annual observations (annual observations for credit risk) for the 1990s cohort, 23 annual 
observations (annual observations for credit risk) for the 1995s cohort (1990–2017), 18 annual observations (27 annual observations for credit risk) for the 2000s cohort (2000–2017), 
and 13 annual observations (17 annual observations for credit risk) for the 2005s cohort (2005–2017). All variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.
 β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE 
BDGTA   3.026a 2.981         0.045a 0.002 
CRELGTA     0.998a 0.043       0.025a 0.002 
TEGTA       -1.586a 0.178     -0.676a 0.072 
OBSGTA         1.916a 0.128   0.007a 0.001 
NIIOI           1.834a 0.090 0.785a 0.060 
Dum1980s 0.052a 0.019 0.042 0.013 -0.006 0.010 0.067a 0.016 0.016 0.013 -0.001 0.011 -0.009c 0.005 
Dum1985s 0.089a 0.020 0.047a 0.014 0.006 0.011 0.102a 0.017 0.004 0.014 0.016 0.012 -0.004 0.005 
Dum1990s 0.125a 0.021 0.067a 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.145a 0.017 -0.030c 0.017 0.053a 0.012 0.005 0.007 
Dum1995s 0.116a 0.022 0.019 0.017 -0.012 0.012 0.146a 0.019 -0.012 0.017 0.077a 0.012 0.014b 0.007 
Dum2000s 0.144a 0.024 0.017 0.019 -0.030b 0.014 0.181a 0.020 0.013 0.018 0.125a 0.013 0.032a 0.008 
Dum2005s 0.133a 0.028 0.000 0.022 -0.072a 0.017 0.210a 0.025 0.009 0.021 0.154a 0.016 0.041a 0.010 
Constant 0.221a 0.013 0.204a 0.010 0.080a 0.009 0.377a 0.021 0.068a 0.014 0.047a 0.011 0.221a 0.011 
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
F-value 11.44a 31.08a 112.27a 25.27a 53.70a 90.54a 261.02a 
Adjusted R2 24.80% 53.36% 80.39% 47.20% 66.01% 76.74% 93.96% 
F-test 
1980s > Pre-1980s (γ1>0) 7.53a 9.84a 0.37 17.42a 1.45 0.01 2.85c 
1985s > 1980s (γ2> γ1) 3.54c 0.15 1.43 4.61b 0.75 2.38 1.06 
1990s > 1985s (γ3> γ2) 2.76c 1.71 0.47 5.67b 4.83b 9.40a 2.29 
1995s > 1990s (γ4> γ3) 0.15 8.44a 4.57b 0.00 1.2 3.35c 2.32 
2000s > 1995s (γ5> γ4) 1.16 0.02 1.69 2.55 2.08 10.74a 6.51a 
2005s > 2000s (γ6> γ5) 0.13 0.62 6.56a 1.13 0.04 2.76c 1.29 
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3.6 Conclusion 
According to Allen and Santomero (1997), the role of banks has changed from reducing transaction 
costs and asymmetric information to risk management over the last few decades. This 
transformation can be attributed to major regulatory changes (e.g., deregulation), financial 
innovations, and technology. Although, this role is pivotal for many banks, it has a significant 
impact on banks’ riskiness. Thus, this study sheds light on the systematic trend in bank risk 
measured by liquidity risk and credit risk, and examines potential explanations for this trend.  
 My main results are as follow. First, there is strong evidence of a positive trend in bank 
risk over my sample period, 1980-2017. Second, the increase in bank risk is the result of successive 
cohorts of young and riskier banks. Third, the risk differences across successive cohorts persist. 
Fourth, the cohort risk phenomenon is significantly attenuated once I account for new cohorts’ 
bank-specific characteristics including brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, 
off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income. In other words, the adoption of business strategy 
that is based on higher brokered deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet items, 
and non-interest income and lower capital by each new cohort is responsible for the cohort risk 
phenomenon. I perform a set of robustness checks and the main results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 My results offer deeper insights into the understanding of bank risk and support recent 
regulatory requirements to enhance the stability of the banking industry to avoid the adverse effects 
on whole economy. In addition, my results should interest bank managers, supervisors, policy 
makers, and researchers who attempt to prevent upcoming banking crises.  
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4. THE LONGER THE TAIL, THE SHORTER THE SAIL 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the information content of market-based 
indicators has drawn increased attention in the domain concerned with systemic risk and financial 
stability (Milne, 2014). This crisis, considered to be one of the most acute financial crises in terms 
of costs to society (Atkinson et al., 2013), raised scepticism about our understanding of the 
vulnerability of financial institutions to black swan (low probability and high impact) events, in 
particular, the vulnerability of banking institutions. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that this 
crisis was the alarm bell that augmented global awareness about the vulnerability that financial 
institutions face due to unforeseen tail risk events (Cohen et al., 2014). This calls for an improved 
understanding of the factors affecting bank failure, so that pre-emptive measures can be undertaken 
to reduce their failure likelihood and, in turn, reduce costs associated with such failures. Thus, in 
this study, I hypothesise that more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns result in higher 
tail risk, and this subsequently increases banks’ likelihood of experiencing distress risk. 
The empirical literature on the determinants of bank distress has focused heavily on financial 
ratios based on accounting information. Early studies have documented that the United States  
(U.S.) banks’ default risk is mainly driven by low profitability, low capitalisation, weak asset 
quality (nonperforming loans), cost inefficiency and/or poor management, and illiquidity (e.g., 
Cole and Gunther, 1995; Martin, 1977; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). 
Recent studies have mostly applied these proxies to U.S. bank failures during the financial crisis 
of 2007-08 supplemented with some information related to banks’ audit quality (Jin et al., 2011), 
real estate investments (Cole and White, 2012), income from non-traditional banking activities 
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(DeYoung and Torna, 2013), or corporate governance (Berger et al., 2016). Generally, they find 
that the CAMEL indicators are still efficient in explaining the bank failure.35 
However, a separate strand of literature argues for the superior performance of accounting-
based bank failure prediction models when supplemented with market price-based factors (e.g., 
Coffinet et al., 2010; Curry et al., 2007; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Flannery, 1998; Gropp et al., 
2006). While these studies focus on individual bank risk, others explicitly take into account the 
systemic aspect (e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; De Jonghe, 2010; Hartmann et al., 2005; 
Straetmans et al., 2008). The general finding across these studies is that the use of market-based 
variables plays a significant role in explaining bank failure and can enhance the prediction 
performance of bank failure prediction models. 
However, relative to market indicators, existing literature on the determinants of bank 
distress has primarily focused on the information content of financial statements in predicting bank 
failure/distress. But market-based indicators derived from banks’ stock prices may signal useful 
marginal information on the future distress likelihood of banks. Hence, a thorough understanding 
of bank fragility should also focus equally on potential market-based determinants, especially 
banks’ stock prices. In practice, U.S. bank supervisors have recently started to use market data 
combined with traditional early warning models to monitor publicly traded federally insured 
institutions (Coffinet et al., 2013; Curry et al., 2007). 
Notwithstanding that prior studies have clearly established a strong link between the 
information content of market indicators and individual bank risk (e.g., Coffinet et al., 2010; Curry 
et al., 2007; Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Flannery, 1998; Gropp et al., 2006), they do not focus on the 
                                                          
35 Demyanyk and Hasan (2010) provide a comprehensive survey by reviewing the results obtained in several econom-
ics, finance and operations studies that attempt to explain financial crises and bank defaults. 
141 | P a g e  
 
relationship between banks’ extreme negative daily equity returns (tail risk) and their likelihood 
of experiencing a distress event. In this study, I address this important gap in the literature by 
exploring whether increase in tail risk exposure is associated with an increased likelihood of 
financial distress in banks. I hypothesise that more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns 
result in higher tail risk, and this subsequently increases banks’ likelihood of entering financial 
distress. Specifically, I explore the information content of tail risk measures, namely Value-at-risk 
(VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), in explaining banks’ likelihood of financial distress. 
There are several reasons for considering the relationship between downside risk measures, 
which focus only on the risk of underperforming a defined benchmark return, and the financial 
distress of banks. First, a new body of research, focusing mainly on the determinants of individual 
bank tail risk, find that the tail risk is higher for banks with a weak risk management function, 
greater earnings management, small inside debt holdings, non‐traditional activities (securities held 
for‐sale, trading assets and derivatives used for trading purposes), and a large relative size (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hagendorff et al., 2018; Kashyap et al., 2008; 
Knaup and Wagner, 2010; Srivastav et al., 2017; Van Bekkum, 2016). In addition, they suggest 
that excessive exposure to tail risk can enhance banks’ short-term performance, but it can also be 
associated with a small probability of large losses to these banks. Second, the recent literature also 
argues that tail risk could cause a serious threat to banks’ stability (e.g., Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
Kashyap et al., 2008), thus leading me to hypothesise that banks with higher extreme negative 
daily equity returns lead to higher tail risk, thereby increasing their likelihood of financial distress. 
Third, there is an extensive literature on safety-first investors who minimise the probability of 
large negative outcomes. Such investors are intended to select portfolios that have maximum 
expected returns with limited downside risks (see, among others, Roy, 1952; Arzac and Bawa, 
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1977). Fourth, financial firms routinely apply tail risk measures for their risk-management 
objectives, and firms are increasingly adopting these measures to manage their risk as well. Finally, 
empirical evidence generally finds that the stock returns are fat tailed, implying that the rate of 
occurrence of negative extreme events is more frequent than suggested by the normal distribution 
(see, among others, Jansen and De Vries, 1991; Conrad et al., 2013). Thus, traditional market risk 
measures might be insufficient for explaining the probability of maximum loss that a bank may 
face, especially during highly volatile periods. 
Considering the above discussion, I assess the marginal discriminatory power of tail risk 
measures, namely VaR and ES, in predicting the financial distress of publicly-traded BHCs in the 
United States. In particular, I use tail risk estimates reported in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and 
Gupta and Chaudhry (2019) as my primary measures of tail risk, generated using three-month, six-
month, one-year, three-year, and five-year daily returns. Following Liang and Park (2010), I 
include the Cornish and Fisher (1938) expansion in these risk measures. The advantage of adding 
this expansion is to bring skewness and kurtosis into the equation, which is more appropriate for 
non-normal financial returns (Gupta and Chaudhry, 2019). I estimate the tail risk measure of each 
bank at the year-end to predict banks’ financial distress in the following year. To proxy banks’ 
distress risk, I use the celebrated Z-score, which is widely used in banking literature to proxy 
financial distress of banks (e.g., Beck et al., 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Goetz et al., 2016; 
Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014 and many others). 
To test my hypothesis, I empirically analyse an unbalanced panel of publicly-traded BHCs 
in the U.S. during the period 1987 to 2017.36 I start the empirical validation by estimating separate 
                                                          
36 Throughout the paper, I will use BHC and bank interchangeably. 
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one-year distress prediction models using respective tail risk estimates (three-month, six-month, 
one-year, three-year, and five-year at a 99% confidence level) to assess their statistical significance 
in explaining the likelihood of banks’ distress in a univariate framework. The results of univariate 
regression are in line with my hypothesis, and show a significantly positive relationship between 
banks’ extreme negative equity returns and their likelihood of experiencing financial distress. In 
the second part of my analysis, I develop multivariate models to test the marginal discriminatory 
power of tail risk measures. First, I estimate a one-year financial distress prediction model 
(baseline model), using the OLS regression technique, with accounting-based variables, as well as 
bank and year fixed effects. Specifically, I use the standard proxies of the CAMEL components 
along with measures of bank size and real estate loans.37 I then supplement respective tail risk 
measures with my baseline distress model and investigate their significance in the presence of 
competing variables. 
Empirical results verify the finding of  extant bank default literature that traditional proxies 
for the CAMEL are essential determinants of bank distress (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1995; Cole 
and White, 2012). Specifically, the capital ratio and return on equity have significant and negative 
effects, suggesting that more capital and high profitability reduce default probability of banks. On 
the other hand, weak assets quality (high credit risk), high liquidity risk, more reliance on real-
estate loans, and large bank size significantly increase the chances of a bank’s default. More 
importantly, I find that all rolling estimates of VaR and ES measures at a 99% confidence level 
are significantly and positively linked to the probability of bank distress. These results strongly 
support my hypothesis that banks with more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns are 
                                                          
37 The CAMEL ratings system was introduced by the US regulators in 1979 to evaluate the financial health of indi-
vidual banks, where the letters refer to Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management skills, Earnings, Liquidity. 
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more likely to experience financial distress. Moreover, my results are consistent with the findings 
of previous studies that market-based measures can efficiently signal bank fragility (e.g., Curry et 
al., 2007; Gropp et al., 2006). 
To validate the main results, I perform a range of robustness checks. First, I use the Merton 
distance to default (DD) model as an alternative measure for banks’ distress risk. Second, I use a 
confidence level of 95% instead of 99% to estimate tail risk measures. Third, I divide my overall 
sample into small, medium, and large banks. Fourth, I include additional variables to control for 
competition and macroeconomic conditions. Fifth, I add dummy variables to control for financial 
crises. Sixth, I exclude mergers and acquisitions. Seventh, I drop “Too big To Fail” banks. Eighth, 
I lag my explanatory variables by 3 years to further mitigate the impact of potential endogeneity 
issues (i.e., simultaneity). In general, my main results stand up to all these tests and analyses. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses data and financial 
covariates; Section 4.3 presents my empirical methods and main results; Section 4.4 presents 
additional results on robustness checks; and Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
4.2 Data, Sample and Covariates 
In this section, I first discuss the sources of my datasets, followed by construction of the sample 
analysed. Finally, I define key dependent and independent covariates employed in my regression 
estimates. 
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4.2.1 Data Sources 
To perform my empirical analysis, I use accounting, market and macroeconomic data. First, all 
accounting information on the U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) are obtained from the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank (FRB) of Chicago.38 Since June of 1986, the FRB of Chicago has collected data 
from the FR Y-9 reports that are filed by BHCs on a quarterly basis. The FR Y-9C reports contain 
basic financial data on a consolidated basis in the form of a balance sheet, income statement, and 
detailed supporting schedules. Second, market data including daily stock returns, stock prices, and 
number of shares outstanding for publicly traded BHCs are collected from the Centre for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP). Finally, I collect macroeconomic data consisting of daily risk-free rate, 
which is 1-year U.S. Treasury Constant Maturity series offered by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, House Price Indices (HPIs) acquired from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and state 
personal income data sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.39 
4.2.2 Sample Construction 
Considering the nature of my study, I limit my sample to publicly traded BHCs in the United 
States. I match accounting information on BHCs with their market counterparts by using CRSP-
FRB Link, that has been successfully used by several studies in the literature (e.g., Carmichael and 
Coën, 2018; Gandhi et al., 2019; Goetz et al., 2016) (provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to link entity numbers (rssd9001) in the FR Y-9C to PERMCO numbers in CRSP).40 
To efficiently predict the likelihood of financial distress in a bank, it is important that the prediction 
model identifies any distress sufficiently ahead of time. Hence, I use annual bank data reported as 
                                                          
38 Available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website (www.chicagofed.org). 
39 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate [DGS1] is 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS1). 
40 Available at the New York Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) website, specifically on the following link 
(https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html). 
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of December 31 of each calendar year over a relatively long analysis period from 1987 to 2017, to 
develop one-year distress prediction models. Since the starting date of both CRSP-FRB Link and 
FRB Chicago data is June 1986, and my sample employs annual information, I start my sample 
from 1987 to align with both. The final sample contains 11,980 bank-year observations of 1,095 
unique BHCs. 
4.2.3 Dependent Variables 
4.2.3.1 Measuring Distress Risk 
To measure the overall distress risk of banks, I mainly employ Z-score, which is an accounting-
based distress risk indicator originally proposed by Roy (1952). Since then, the Z-score has re-
mained a popular choice in the empirical banking literature for measuring banks’ distress risk (e.g., 
Beck et al., 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Goetz et al., 2016; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014 
and many others). It is calculated as the sum of the return on assets plus the ratio of total equity to 
gross total assets (GTA) divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. It can be interpreted 
as the number of standard deviations below the mean by which profits would have to fall so as to 
deplete the bank’s equity capital (Houston et al., 2010). It indicates the bank’s distance from de-
fault (Goetz, 2018). According to Laeven and Levine (2009), default is defined as a state in which 
losses overcome equity (𝐸 < −𝜋) (where 𝐸 is equity and 𝜋 is profit). Thus, the probability of 
default can be expressed as prob (−𝑅𝑂𝐴 < 𝐶𝐴𝑅), where 𝑅𝑂𝐴 (= 𝜋/𝐺𝑇𝐴) is the return on gross 
total assets, and 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (= 𝐸/𝐺𝑇𝐴) is the capital assets ratio. I calculate each bank’s Z-score (fol-




                                                         (1) 
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where 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the standard deviation of 𝑅𝑂𝐴. I calculate the 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴⁡using a 3-year rolling window 
to allow for time variation in the Z-score’s denominator, and to avoid the possibility that Z-score 
values are entirely driven by variation in the levels of capital and profitability (Danisewicz et al., 
2017). I use the Z-score’s natural logarithm, which is suggested to smooth out its high skewness 
(Beck et al., 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
I also proxy banks’ distress risk using the Merton distance to default (DD) model (Merton, 
1974) as a robustness check, and report the results in Section 4.1. The Merton DD model has also 
been widely used in empirical literature as a market-based indicator of the soundness of publicly 
listed financial institutions (e.g., Bennett et al., 2015; Fu et al., 2014; Pereira and Rua, 2018). This 
model assumes that the capital structure primarily consists of equity and debt. The equity is viewed 
as a call option on the value of assets. The strike price of the call option is the face value of debt 
maturing at time 𝑇. When the value of assets at the maturity date falls below the strike price, the 
value of equity equals zero and the default occurs. 
To estimate the bank default risk measure using the Merton DD model, I follow the iterative 
process that is very similar to the one used by Moody’s KMV and outlined in Bharath and 
Shumway (2008). First, I use daily stock returns over the past year to calculate the volatility of 
equity returns, and use this as a proxy for asset volatility 𝜎𝑉 in the first iteration. Second, I infer 
the value of bank assets (𝑉) for each trading day over the past 12 years using the following standard 
Black–Scholes formula:  
E = V𝒩(d1) − e
−rTF𝒩(d2)                                                    (2) 
where 𝐸 is the market value of the bank’s equity, 𝐹 is the debt’s face value, 𝑇 is the time until the 
debt matures (one-year horizon), 𝑟 is the risk-free interest rate, 𝒩 is the cumulative standard nor-
mal distribution function, and,  𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are estimated as follows: 









,⁡⁡d2⁡=⁡d1 − σV√T⁡⁡                                    (3) 
This generates a daily time series 𝑉, which is used to obtain the next estimate of 𝜎𝑉. Third, I repeat 
the iterative procedure until the values of 𝜎𝑉⁡converge within a small tolerance level. After con-








                                                        (4) 
where 𝜇 is the mean of the instantaneous rate of return on the assets. Finally, I assume that the 
expected frequency of default follows the theoretical distribution implied by Merton’s model, 
which is the normal distribution. Thus, the probability of default (PD) is given by:  
PD = 𝒩(−DD)                                                          (5) 
I repeat this procedure at the end of each year for each respective bank, resulting in a yearly time 
series of PDs for each bank. The main advantage of this PD is that it responds quickly to new 
information, and is not subject to misrepresentation by ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Milne, 2014). To 
facilitate a more consistent interpretation with the probability of default (the Merton distance to 
default model), I follow Khan et al. (2017) and multiply the natural logarithm of Z-score values 
by −1. This implies that the higher the Z-score, the higher is the distress risk of the bank. 
2.4 Independent Variables 
2.4.1 Downside Risk Measures 
Following Van Bekkum (2016), I use tail risk measures, namely value at risk (VaR) and expected 
shortfall (ES) to proxy a bank’s tail risk exposure. Employing a similar approach to Liang and 
Park (2010), I generate these measures by using daily stock returns for three-month, six-month, 
one-year, three-year, and five-year periods separately for each bank as of the month-end (of the 
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latest available daily return data) in a given year to predict bank’ financial distress in the next year. 
For example, if the date on which a bank’s financial statements were filed is June 2015, I compute 
its risk measures as of May 2015 to predict the probability of the bank’s financial distress in the 
next year.  
Value-at-risk: VaR has become a standard measure for determining market risk of financial and 
non-financial firms (Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002). To estimate VaR, I need to define two quan-
titative parameters, the confidence level (1 − 𝛼) and the time horizon (τ), along with the estimation 
model. Then, I use these parameters to estimate the maximum loss that may occur over a target 
horizon and at a specified confidence level. I follow Hagendorff et al. (2018) and use the number 
of trading days in the year (set at 252 trading days), rather than the number of calendar days, to 
compute VaR and ES. In terms of time horizon, there are no defined rules or detailed guidelines. 
Therefore, I follow Gupta and Chaudhry (2019) and consider the liquidity of the risk and the du-
ration of exposure to that risk. The lower the assets’ liquidity, the higher the time required to totally 
hedge the exposure. Considering a longer time horizon when measuring VaR in market with a 
greater range of movements is recommended (Gupta and Chaudhry, 2019). In the light of the above 
arguments, I estimate VaR using five different time horizons to capture any intertemporal differ-
ences. I estimate the risk of each bank as of the month-end (of the latest available daily return data) 
in a given year using the past three-month, six-month, twelve-month, three-year, and five-year 
daily returns to predict banks’ financial distress in the next year.  Likewise, the selection of confi-
dence level relies on the attitude of users towards risk and the nature of application. For instance, 
commercial banks are required by the Basel II Accord to apply a high confidence level of 99% for 
calculating their minimum capital requirements, while rating authorities require an even higher 
confidence level (99.97%) to achieve a high credit rating (AA or above) (Gupta and Chaudhry, 
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2019; Jorion, 2000). Additionally, using a lower confidence level (95%) with a shorter risk horizon 
(1 day) might be acceptable for a risk manager while setting VaR bases trading limits. Accordingly, 
I follow the recommended practice by authorities (e.g., the Basel Accord), and estimate the down-
side risk measures at 99% confidence levels. I also apply a confidence level of 95% as a robustness 
check and report the results in Section 4.2.  
To compute the VaR, let τ denote the time horizon, 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 denote a firm’s return between the time 
period t and t + τ, and let 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 represent the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 condi-
tional upon the set of information available at time t. Then, 𝐹𝑅,𝑡
−1 represents the inverse function of 
𝐹𝑅,𝑡. Given this, the VaR of a bank’s return as of time t with a time horizon τ and at (1 − 𝛼) 
confidence level can be estimated as follows: 
VaRt(α, τ) = −FR,t
−1(α)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6) 
The semi-parametric Cornish-Fisher VaR (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹) is different to normal VaR. It allows higher 
moments (skewness and kurtosis) to be considered, thus, accounting for non-normality in the re-
turn distribution (Cornish and Fisher,1938). This was first introduced by Zangari (1996) to esti-
mate the VaR of option portfolios, because distributions can be approximated with these known 
moments (Johnson et al., 1994; Jaschke, 2002). Therefore, I use 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹
41 to adapt non-symmetrical 
and fat-tailed returns distribution. The fourth order Cornish and Fisher (1938) expansion for 𝛼 
percentile of (𝑅 − 𝜇)/𝜎 is shown in Equation 7, while Equation 8 defines the Cornish-Fisher VaR 
(𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹).  
                                                          
41 I use VaR and VaRCF interchangeably in this study. 
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Ω(𝛼) = 𝑍(𝛼) +
1
6
(𝑍(𝛼)2 − 1)𝑆 +
1
24
(𝑍(𝛼)3 − 3𝑍(𝛼))𝐾 −
1
36
(2𝑍(𝛼)3 − 5𝑍(𝛼))𝑆2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(7) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹 =⁡−(𝜇 + Ω(𝛼) × 𝜎)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(8) 
where 𝜎 is the standard deviation, μ is the average return, S is the measure of skewness, K is the 
excess kurtosis of past n-month daily returns,⁡(1 − 𝛼) is the confidence level, and 𝑍(𝛼) is the 
critical value obtained from the standardised normal distribution.42  
Expected Shortfall: Unlike VaR, Expected Shortfall (ES) provides information about the size 
of the loss in the event when that level is breached. Theoretically, Artzner et al. (1999) argue that 
ES is superior to VaR in possessing mathematical properties such as continuity and sub-additivity, 
which are needed for a coherent measure of risk. ES is the conditional expected loss that is greater 
than or equal to the VaR. It is expressed in terms of return rather than dollar amount and formulated 
as follows: 













Here, 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 represents a firm’s return in the time period 𝑡, and 𝑡 + 𝜏 and 𝑓𝑅,𝑡 denotes the conditional 
probability density function (PDF) of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏. 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 is the conditional CDF of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 conditional upon 
the information set available at time⁡𝑡, 𝐹𝑅,𝑡
−1 represents the inverse function of 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 , and (1 − 𝛼) is 
                                                          
42 The original VaR and ES are usually negative. To avoid confusion, I follow Gupta and Chaudhry (2019) and mul-
tiply the original VaR and ES numbers by −1 in Equations 7 and 8. Hence, the VaR and ES numbers presented in this 
paper are usually positive. 
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the confidence level. I use Cornish-Fisher VaR (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹) calculated using Equations 7 and 8 to 
estimate Expected Shortfall, denoted as 𝐸𝑆𝐶𝐹.
43 
4.2.4.2 Baseline Factors  
As discussed in the introduction, banks’ failure risk has traditionally been explained using indica-
tors other than downside risk measures discussed in Section 2.4.1. Specifically, accounting-based 
determinants that are related to capitalisation, asset quality, managerial skills, earnings, and liquid-
ity (CAMEL) of banks and several others have been successfully employed in explaining banks’ 
failure risk. Following the banking literature and supervisor practice, I use standard proxies for the 
CAMEL as baseline explanatory variables of bank distress. Furthermore, I include a measure of 
real estate loans, as well as the log of GTA for controlling bank size. I also include other factors 
to control for competition and macroeconomic conditions as a robustness check and report the 
results in Section 4.4.44  
Capital (C): Capital is the first in the CAMEL list and foremost factor in virtually all early warning 
models adopted by regulatory and supervisory agencies (e.g., Basel) to evaluate the soundness of 
banks, and to ensure that the financial system is secure and healthy. Moreover, it has been em-
ployed as a main variable in the majority of academic studies (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
Betz et al., 2014; Cole and White, 2012). The level of capital is considered as the mirror image of 
the capacity of banks to meet their financial obligations. Thus, a deterioration of capital could be 
a critical indicator of potential financial distress and vice-versa. To measure capital adequacy, I 
use the ratio of total equity to gross total assets (TEGTA), which is largely used in the literature 
                                                          
43 I use ES and ESCF interchangeably in this paper. 
44 I include Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), house price index, and state personal income for controlling compe-
tition, inflation, and GDP, respectively. 
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and is a highly valuable proxy of capital (e.g., Berger et al., 2016; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; 
DeYoung and Torna, 2013). Normalisation of the equity by GTA is essential to make the depend-
ent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid assigning excessive weight to 
the largest institutions (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Following Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), I 
do not use the regulatory capital ratio, namely the Tier 1 and Total risk-based capital ratios, for 
three reasons: first, to avoid any risk assessment; second, the calculation of these ratios is based 
on relatively arbitrary weights; third, these ratios became fully effective a few years into my sam-
ple period. Although some theories argue that higher capital may hurt bank safety (e.g., Calem and 
Rob, 1999; Koehn and Santomero, 1980), I believe that a solid TEGTA ratio reduces the proba-
bility of default because equity counts as a buffer between the value of the bank’s assets and the 
value of its liabilities (Cole and White, 2012); additionally, most theories, particularly the recent 
ones (e.g., Acharya et al., 2016; Mehran and Thakor, 2011), predict that capital is positively related 
to bank survival (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
Asset quality (A): Asset quality is represented by net loan losses (loan charge-offs minus loan 
recoveries) in the current year against the allowances for these loan losses (including the excess 
allowance on loans and leases) recorded in the previous year. This measure was developed by 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) and is similar to the measures used by Angbazo (1997) and Dick 
(2006) to assess credit risk. According to Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), this indicator not only 
measures the current riskiness of a banks’ loan portfolio, because it can be affected by bank man-
agement in a short-term period, but also captures the unexpected loan losses. Therefore, a higher 
ratio indicates weak asset quality or higher credit risk, and values above 1 imply unexpected losses. 
I follow Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) and employ this proxy variable to evaluate the accuracy 
of banks’ risk management to predict short-term loan losses and to observe the unexpected loan 
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losses that may face banks and affect their soundness. Overall, poor quality of assets is expected 
to have a positive relationship with the probability of bank default. 
Management (M): Management proficiency is essential to enhance the performance and success 
of a bank. However, it has rarely been used in the literature because it is hard to observe and 
measure with financial data (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Some researchers have employed other 
CAMELS categories such as earnings and asset quality to capture the quality of management 
(Mayes and Stremmel, 2014). Thus, I consider earnings proxied by return on equity (ROE) ratio, 
net income divided by stockholders’ equity, to approximate to management skills. I believe that 
insufficient management capability leads to wrong decisions and high losses, thereby increasing 
the probability of default. 
Earnings (E): Earnings reflects the performance, in general, and the profitability of a bank, in 
particular. Numerous indicators have been applied in the empirical literature to measure this cate-
gory but the most frequently employed are return on assets (ROA), net income divided by GTA, 
and return on equity (ROE). I follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) and use ROE, which is a com-
prehensive profitability measure, because both net income and equity reflect the bank’s on- and 
off-balance-sheet activities. I use ROA, as a robustness check, and obtain similar results. Similar 
to management competence, I expect that higher earnings enhance banks’ performance. Accord-
ingly, the relationship between profitability and the likelihood of distress is expected to be nega-
tive. 
Liquidity (L): Liquidity determines whether the bank is able to meet its current obligations and 
unexpected withdrawals of depositors and creditors. Following Betz et al. (2014), I assess a bank’s 
liquidity by the ratio of interest expenses to total liabilities. A higher share of interest expenses to 
total liabilities is expected to be positively associated with bank distress. 
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Real Estate Loans: Real-estate loans play a significant role in determining bank distress. This is 
supported by a new body of literature which focuses on the recent financial crisis (e.g., Berger et 
al., 2016; Cole and White, 2012; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). Hence, I include the ratio of real-
estate loans to GTA for this purpose. 
Bank Size: The literature documents that bank size has a vital impact on banks’ distress (Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013; Bertay et al., 2013). Bank size matters and is expected to have a negative 
effect on the probability of default, because it is well-known that small banks are likely to fail more 
easily than large banks (Cole and White, 2012). Due to the importance of bank size and the ad-
vantages generated by size heterogeneity, I include a proxy to control for bank size represented by 
the logarithm of GTA.45 
Following conventions in the literature, I winsorize all independent variables at the 1% level to 
limit the influence of extreme values on my statistical estimates. I also lag all independent variables 
(including VaR and ES) by 1 year to alleviate the impact of potential concerns endogeneity (i.e., 
simultaneity) (Hagendorff et al., 2018; Srivastav et al., 2017). All covariates are defined in detail 






                                                          
45 As a robustness check, I rerun my main regression separately for small, medium, and large banks. A detailed dis-
cussion and the results are provided in Section 4.3 of the paper. 
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Table 1: Description of the variables 
Variable Description Data source 
Dependent Variables 
Z-score The sum of the return on assets and the ratio of total equity to total assets divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets. I use its log due to its high skewness. 
Federal Reserve Bank 
PD The bank-level probability of default. Federal Reserve Bank & 
CRSP 
Independent Variables 
LGTA Natural Logarithm of Gross Total Assets (GTA). Federal Reserve Bank 
TEGTA Total Equity divided by GTA. Federal Reserve Bank 
CR The net loan charge-offs divided by the loan loss allowance in the previous year. Federal Reserve Bank 
ROA Return on Assets; Net Income divided by GTA. Federal Reserve Bank 
ROE Return on Equity; Net Income divided by Total Equity. Federal Reserve Bank 
RELGTA Real-estate loans divided by GTA. Federal Reserve Bank 
IETL Total Interest Expenses divided by Total Liabilities. Federal Reserve Bank 
VAR3M1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 1% significance level. CRSP 
VAR6M1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 1% significance level. CRSP 
VAR1Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 1% significance level. CRSP 
VAR3Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 1% significance level. CRSP 
VAR5Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level. CRSP 
VAR3M5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 5% significance level CRSP 
VAR6M5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 5% significance level. CRSP 
VAR1Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 5% significance level. CRSP 
VAR3Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 5% significance level. CRSP 
VAR5Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level. CRSP 
ES3M1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 1% significance 
level. 
CRSP 
ES6M1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 1% significance 
level. 
CRSP 
ES1Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 1% significance level. CRSP 
ES3Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 1% significance level. CRSP 
ES5Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level. CRSP 
ES3M5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 5% significance 
level. 
CRSP 
ES6M5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 5% significance 
level. 
CRSP 
ES1Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 5% significance level. CRSP 
ES3Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 5% significance level. CRSP 
ES5Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level. CRSP 
Control Variables 
GHPI Growth of State-level House Price Indices (HPIs). Federal Housing Finance 
Agency 
GCPI Growth of State-level personal income. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis 
HHI Market concentration based on the bank’s weighted deposits in the state. constructed 
SL Dummy variable indicating whether the year is on saving and loans crisis (credit crunch) 
that occurred between 1990 and 1992. 
constructed 
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GFC Dummy variable indicating whether the year is on subprime lending crisis (Global Financial 
Crisis) that occurred between 2007 and 2009. 
constructed 
Dot Dummy variable indicating whether the year is on the dot.com bubble and the September 
11 terrorist attack that occurred between 2000 and 2002. 
constructed 
Notes: This table reports the set of accounting- and market-based covariates, as well as control variables that I use in my empirical analysis. The 
first column lists names of covariates, while the second column provides their respective definitions. The third column provides the data sources. 
 
4.3 Empirical Methods 
In this section, I provide summary statistics of my covariates along with relevant discussion 
pertaining to correlation among the covariates. Next, I perform univariate regression analysis of 
each tail risk covariate in turn using Z-score to understand any unexpected behaviour in their 
discriminatory performance, and discuss the results. Finally, I develop multivariate regression 
models using the fixed effects to examine the marginal explanatory power of downside risk 
measures, and discuss the main results.  
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
To gain a preliminary understanding of the variability of my covariates, I split the sample in a 
given year into two groups: financially distressed and non-distressed/healthy banks. Following 
Curry et al. (2007), I consider BHC is distressed if the final year of exit was during my sample 
period and the reason for termination was voluntary liquidation, inactivity, or failure. Table 2 
provides summary statistics of the variables discussed earlier. It shows clear disparities between 
distressed and non-distressed banks. Not surprisingly, distressed banks are, on average, smaller 
than non-distressed banks, have lower capital ratios, lower earnings, weak performance, poor 
assets quality (higher credit risk), and greater real-estate loans. Interestingly, distressed banks 
have, on average, marginally lower total interest expenses to total liabilities (IETL) than non-
distressed banks, implying that liquidity risk is lower in distressed banks. 
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On the tail risk side (i.e. VaR and ES), distressed banks exhibit higher mean values compared 
to non-distressed banks. This is expected because distressed banks tend to have extreme 
movements. The VaR indicates the loss that will not surpass a certain amount over a target time 
span with a fixed confidence level (Hull, 2015). The greater magnitude of VaR indicates a greater 
likelihood of loss. As shown in Table 2, the mean value of VAR1Y1 for financially distressed 
banks is 22.7%. It implies that I am 99% confident that the mean loss for financially distressed 
banks over a one-year period will not exceed 22.7%. On the other hand, ES is the expected loss 
conditional on the loss being larger than a specific threshold over a target time  (Hull, 2015). For 
example, in Table 2, the mean value of ES1Y1 for financially distressed banks is 30.07%. It 
suggests that the average loss for financially distressed banks will be 30.07% over a one-year 
period with the assumption that the loss is greater than 99% of the loss distribution. Table 2 also 
shows intertemporal differences among extreme measures. Specifically, the mean values at longer 
rolling windows are higher than those at shorter ones. 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable   
   Healthy Banks                Distressed Banks  
N Mean      Sd       Min     Max                            N Mean      Sd        Min       Max 
Z-score 11119 4.076 1.275 -4.968 7.006 43 2.863 1.752 -2.354 7.006 
PD 11868 0.300 0.192 0.000 0.701 59 0.153 0.189 0.000 0.701 
TEGTA 11921 0.090 0.026 0.028 0.188 59 0.070 0.040 0.028 0.188 
CR 10768 0.295 0.328 -0.073 1.783 57 0.321 0.381 -0.073 1.783 
ROE 11921 0.080 0.127 -0.747 0.252 59 -0.052 0.324 -0.747 0.252 
ROA 11921 0.008 0.009 -0.038 0.023 59 -0.005 0.017 -0.038 0.023 
IETL 11921 0.027 0.016 0.001 0.068 59 0.024 0.015 0.002 0.064 
RELGTA 11921 0.433 0.163 0.011 0.785 59 0.477 0.156 0.011 0.785 
LGTA 11921 14.51 1.663 11.198 21.674 59 13.777 1.045 11.515 17.013 
VAR3M1 11759 0.059 0.048 0.320 0.010 59 0.127 0.125 0.320 0.010 
VAR6M1 11737 0.066 0.054 0.362 0.015 54 0.156 0.141 0.362 0.015 
VAR1Y1 11698 0.075 0.080 1.000 0.006 48 0.227 0.263 1.000 0.006 
VAR3Y1 11864 0.097 0.106 1.000 0.010 57 0.232 0.244 1.000 0.023 
VAR5Y1 11890 0.112 0.122 1.000 0.023 58 0.238 0.232 1.000 0.034 
ES3M1 11878 0.079 0.087 0.641 0.014 59 0.188 0.205 0.641 0.014 
ES6M1 11835 0.088 0.088 0.630 0.017 55 0.209 0.206 0.630 0.017 
ES1Y1 11771 0.104 0.119 1.000 0.007 50 0.307 0.308 1.000 0.011 
ES3Y1 11885 0.123 0.129 1.000 0.004 58 0.357 0.304 1.000 0.052 
ES5Y1 11904 0.128 0.126 1.000 0.022 59 0.277 0.246 1.000 0.051 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for all variables across healthy and distressed bank holding companies (BHCs) over the period 1987–
2017. The classification variable is binary. If a BHC voluntary liquidates, be inactive, or fails in final year t during my sample period, the BHC’s 
binary indicator is ‘1’ in that year t and ‘0’ otherwise. Further information on definition of respective variables is provided in Table 1.  
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Table 3 reports the results for the pair-wise correlation analysis. Panel A shows that all 
correlations among accounting variables have low to moderate values, except ROE which shows 
strong positive correlation with ROA (0.892). This is expected, as both are competing indicators 
of banks’ profitability. However, I deal with this issue by including these measures separately. 
Specifically, I use ROE in regressions with Z-score; for the robustness check, I use ROA in 
regression with the alternative risk measure (distance to default). Panel B shows that all estimates 
of tail risk measures (VaR and ES) exhibit low to moderate correlations with accounting variables.  
Table 3: Pairwise Correlations  
Variables           (1) (2)      (3)   (4) (5)    (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Correlation among Accounting Variables 
(1) Z-score 1.000 
(2) PD 0.150 1.000 
(3) TEGTA -0.215 0.072 1.000 
(4) CR 0.395 0.133 -0.181 1.000 
(5) ROE -0.565 -0.215 0.149 -0.471 1.000 
(6) ROA -0.577 -0.180 0.319 -0.514 0.892 1.000 
(7) IETL 0.032 -0.067 -0.330 0.226 0.016 -0.030 1.000 
(8) RELGTA 0.037 0.059 0.106 -0.095 -0.152 -0.152 -0.216 1.000 
(9) LGTA 0.017 0.026 -0.001 0.099 0.065 0.063 -0.158 -0.326 1.000 
Panel B: Correlation among Accounting and Tail Risk Variables 
(10) VAR3M1 0.339 0.189 0.206 -0.389 0.467 0.504 -0.171 -0.064 0.146 
(11) VAR6M1 0.355 0.196 0.231 -0.400 0.486 0.524 -0.191 -0.044 0.127 
(12) VAR1Y1 0.315 0.197 0.212 -0.332 0.431 0.469 -0.131 -0.040 0.084 
(13) VAR3Y1 0.304 0.189 0.179 -0.306 0.384 0.418 -0.126 -0.050 0.056 
(14) VAR5Y1 0.289 0.166 0.151 -0.251 0.335 0.365 -0.104 -0.063 0.044 
(15) ES3M1 0.266 0.162 0.170 -0.289 0.375 0.406 -0.124 -0.042 0.104 
(16) ES6M1 0.287 0.176 0.196 -0.310 0.417 0.446 -0.135 -0.052 0.127 
(17) ES1Y1 0.284 0.184 0.195 -0.271 0.388 0.422 -0.089 -0.069 0.108 
(18) ES3Y1 0.298 0.208 0.182 -0.250 0.370 0.406 -0.082 -0.083 0.084 
(19) ES5Y1 0.304 0.172 0.164 -0.248 0.338 0.368 -0.106 -0.069 0.073 
Notes: This table reports correlation among the set of covariates. Panel A displays correlations among accounting variables. Panel B provides 
correlations among accounting variables and the respective tail risk measures (VaR and ES). 
 
4.3.2 Univariate Regression Analysis 
To get an initial insight into the statistical significance of respective tail risk measure, I perform 
univariate regression analysis with Z-score as the dependent variable. The results in Table 4 show 
that all rolling estimates (generated using daily three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, and 
five-year returns) of tail risk measures (VaR and ES) are highly significant at the 1% significance 
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level. This implies that the extreme risk measures can predict financial distress, even with a longer 
horizon.  
The results also show intertemporal differences and that short-duration rolling coefficients of VaR 
have higher values than long-duration rolling coefficients. For example, three-month VaR 
(VAR3M1), estimated at the 1% level of significance, has the highest coefficient value of 8.81%, 
while five-year VaR (VAR5Y1) has the lowest coefficient value of 3.53%. This suggests that 
shorter duration rolling estimates of VaR perform better in predicting the financial distress of 
banks. On the other hand, coefficients of some of the long-duration rolling ES are slightly higher 
than some of the short-duration rolling coefficients. For instance, the coefficient value for three-
year ES (ES3Y1), estimated at the 1% level of significance, equals 4.19% which is marginally 
higher than the coefficient value for three-month ES (ES3M1) that equals 3.63%. This generally 
indicates that longer term rolling estimates of ES perform better in predicting the financial distress 
of banks. Overall, these results clearly reveal the strong relationship between banks’ distress risk 
and downside risk measures. These results also support my hypothesis that banks with higher fre-
quent extreme negative daily equity returns are more likely to experience financial distress. 
Table 4: Univariate Regression  
Variable                         N                          Coef.                   SE  t-value 
VAR3M1 10,574 8.810*** 0.421 20.94 
VAR6M1 10,590 7.624*** 0.395 19.30 
VAR1Y1 10,622 4.857*** 0.507 9.57 
VAR3Y1 10,684 4.464*** 0.402 11.11 
VAR5Y1 10,689 3.525*** 0.310 11.38 
ES3M1 10,676 3.637*** 0.238 15.28 
ES6M1 10,660 4.141*** 0.248 16.68 
ES1Y1 10,654 3.231*** 0.230 14.05 
ES3Y1 10,693 4.194*** 0.334 12.56 
ES5Y1 10,698 3.537*** 0.313 11.30 
Notes: This table reports the univariate regression results of respective tail risk measures using Z-score as the dependent variable over the period 
1987–2017. The regressions are estimated using fixed effects models. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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4.3.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this section, I examine whether downside risk measures found significant in the previous section 
have any marginal explanatory power above the baseline covariates discussed in Section 2.4.2. I 
begin my multivariate empirical analysis by estimating a baseline multivariate model for the full 
sample of BHCs with accounting-based covariates using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regres-
sion technique. The model is specified as follows:  
Riskb,t = βXb,t−1 + δb + δt + εb,t ,                                            (10) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘b,t is bank distress risk represented by the natural logarithm of Z-Score of BHC 𝑏 dur-
ing year 𝑡, 𝑋𝑏,𝑡−1 is a vector of bank-specific characteristics lagged by 1 year, 𝛿𝑏 are BHC fixed 
effects, 𝛿𝑡 are year fixed effects and b,t⁡is an error term that is adjusted for heteroskedasticity. My 
motivation for using the fixed effects model is to account for time-invariant unobserved heteroge-
neity at the bank level.46 All reported standard errors are robust and adjusted for clustering at the 
bank level to control for heteroskedasticity.  
 The results of the baseline model, shown in column (1) of Table 5, indicate that all financial 
ratios are strongly significant with expected signs. An exception is that bank size has a positive 
relationship with bank risk which is opposite to my expectation based on the suggestions of some 
recent studies (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole and White, 2012)  In more detail, the capital 
ratio (TEGTA) and return on equity (ROE) have significant and negative effects, implying that 
more capital and high profitability reduce banks’ default probability. Conversely, other main var-
iables exhibit significantly positive coefficients, suggesting that weak assets quality (high credit 
                                                          
46 I also perform the Hausman test to choose between the fixed effects model and random effects model in panel data. 
The result suggests using the fixed effects model. 
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risk (CR)), high liquidity risk (IETL), more reliance on real-estate loans (RELGTA), and large 
bank size (LGTA) increase their likelihood of default risk. Overall, all these covariates are jointly 
significant in explaining the financial distress of BHCs and are consistent with a broad body of 
research (e.g., Betz et al., 2014; Cole and White, 2012; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014).  
 Subsequently, I supplement this baseline multivariate model with respective tail risk 
measures (VaR and ES) to gauge their marginal discriminatory power in predicting banks’ failure. 
I run separate multivariate models for daily three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, and five-
year tail risk estimates to account for any intertemporal differences that may exist. Columns (2) to 
(6) of Table 5 report my multivariate regression results with VaR measures estimated at a 1% 
significance level. I find that all rolling estimates of VaR measures are significant, and positively 
linked to default probability across all model specifications. Second, I observe that the magnitudes 
of short-duration rolling coefficients are mostly stronger than those of long-duration rolling coef-
ficients, implying that short-duration rolling estimates have superior performance in predicting the 
financial distress of banks. 
Now I turn to multivariate regression with ES measures estimated at a 1% significance level, 
reported in columns (7) to (11) of Table 5. Similar to multivariate regression results with VaR, I 
find that all rolling estimates of ES measures have significantly positive influence on the proba-
bility of default in all model specifications. However, the magnitudes of short-duration rolling 
coefficients are generally weaker than those of long-duration rolling coefficients, implying that 
long-duration rolling estimates perform better in predicting the financial distress of banks. 
In general, the results of all rolling estimates of VaR and ES measures support my hypothesis 
that banks with more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns experience higher probability 
of financial distress. These results broadly reinforce the findings of Gropp et al. (2006) who show 
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that market-based measures (distance to default and subordinated bond spreads) have some fore-
casting power at a horizon of 6-18 months. Furthermore, my results with respect to the long-term 
horizons (3 and 5 years) are consistent with the findings of Curry et al. (2007), that stock market 
data has significant predictive ability for up to 4 years in terms of predicting bank failure. Overall, 
the addition of tail risk measures (VaR and ES), as market-based indicators, to multivariate anal-
ysis with accounting-based proxies represented by CAMEL improves the power of traditional 
models for bank stability. This strongly supports the limited empirical literature on the use of mar-
ket-based indicators in assessing banks distress (e.g., Coffinet et al., 2010; Curry et al., 2007; 
Evanoff and Wall, 2002; Flannery, 1998; Gropp et al., 2006; Milne, 2014)
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Table 5: Multivariate Regression Models 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  4.460***          
   (0.352)          
VAR6M1   4.135***         
    (0.338)         
VAR1Y1    2.486***        
     (0.288)        
VAR3Y1     2.966***       
      (0.304)       
VAR5Y1      2.289***      
       (0.208)      
ES3M1       1.829***     
        (0.171)     
ES6M1        2.169***    
         (0.181)    
ES1Y1         1.718***   
          (0.146)   
ES3Y1          2.804***  
           (0.241)  
ES5Y1           2.322*** 
            (0.209) 
TEGTA -2.256** -1.932* -1.760* -1.754* -1.936* -2.196** -2.117** -1.901* -1.773* -1.674* -2.145** 
  (1.081) (1.074) (1.078) (1.086) (1.047) (1.035) (1.068) (1.080) (1.078) (1.041) (1.021) 
CR 0.750*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.695*** 0.654*** 0.697*** 0.709*** 0.700*** 0.706*** 0.666*** 0.695*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
ROE -3.135*** -2.608*** -2.570*** -2.677*** -2.676*** -2.848*** -2.800*** -2.721*** -2.770*** -2.572*** -2.814*** 
  (0.145) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.150) (0.144) (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.143) 
IETL 12.679*** 9.817*** 10.011*** 10.960*** 8.560*** 9.057*** 11.271*** 10.920*** 11.296*** 9.052*** 9.396*** 
  (1.475) (1.507) (1.501) (1.479) (1.473) (1.450) (1.477) (1.482) (1.471) (1.443) (1.431) 
RELGTA 1.221*** 1.096*** 1.114*** 1.146*** 1.031*** 0.980*** 1.152*** 1.175*** 1.160*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 
  (0.231) (0.230) (0.231) (0.232) (0.226) (0.222) (0.229) (0.230) (0.229) (0.226) (0.221) 
LGTA 0.231*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.219*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
_cons -8.023*** -7.940*** -7.972*** -8.015*** -7.431*** -7.300*** -7.995*** -8.002*** -7.976*** -7.663*** -7.569*** 
  (0.542) (0.543) (0.540) (0.538) (0.519) (0.508) (0.540) (0.536) (0.536) (0.520) (0.508) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9618 9500 9511 9537 9597 9605 9593 9571 9564 9604 9611 
R-squared  0.230 0.251 0.251 0.245 0.272 0.264 0.244 0.247 0.248 0.277 0.265 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-
score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective multivariate regression 
estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression estimates 
supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-
squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression models include year and BHC 
fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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4.4 Robustness Checks 
This section presents numerous robustness checks in support of my hypothesis. First, I use an 
alternative bank failure risk measure. Second, I use an alternative confidence level to estimate tail 
risk measures. Third, I split my sample into small, medium, and large banks. Fourth, I control for 
competition and macroeconomic conditions. Fifth, I control for financial crises. Sixth, I exclude 
mergers and acquisitions. Seventh, I exclude “Too big To Fail” banks. Eighth, I use long lags (3 
years) for my explanatory variables to reduce the impact of endogeneity. Generally, my main re-
sults are robust to all these tests, and remain qualitatively and quantitatively unaffected. 
4.4.1 Alternative Bank Risk Measure  
To assess the reliability of the main results in Section 3.3, I use a different dependent variable as 
an alternative risk measure, the Merton distance to default (DD) model, already introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.1 of this paper. I rerun the same OLS regression models (replacing ROE with ROA47) 
discussed in Section 3.3 and report the results in Table 6. The results are basically comparable to 
the main results reported in Table 5. Interestingly, the magnitudes of tail risk coefficients are gen-
erally stronger than my findings using Z-score as a dependent variable in predicting bank distress 
(see Table 5). This suggests that applying market-based indicator (DD) as a dependent variable is 
superior compared to the accounting-based measure (Z-score) when I use tail risk estimates as the 
main independent variables to investigate bank stability. However, I do not regress the DD, as a 
main measure of bank risk in my study, on downside risk measures (VaR and ES) to further avoid 
potential simultaneity, as all these measures are based on market information. Thus, I prefer to use 
                                                          
47 I exclude the ROA in the model specifications using the Z-score because the Z-score is mainly calculated using the 
return on assets and its standard deviation. However, I include the ROA as a substitute for ROE in the model specifi-
cation using the DD to test the robustness of the profitability proxy in explaining the bank risk. 
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the DD as a robustness test. The baseline specification results in column (1) are different to my 
main results, in terms of significances and relationships with bank risk. Specifically, the effects of 
capital (TEGTA), liquidity risk (IETL), and credit risk (CR) are not significant anymore, and CR 
even turns negative. These results are persistent across all model specifications.  
4.4.2 Alternative Confidence Level 
The choice of confidence level in tail risk estimations is fundamental for the assessment of a capital 
cushion only. This implies that a greater amount of capital should cover potential losses, thereby 
leading to a higher confidence level. It will be less important if the tail risk estimations are just 
used as a benchmark to compare risks across different markets. As Dennis Weatherstone, former 
CEO, JP Morgan, said: “VaR gets me to 95% confidence. I pay my Risk Managers good salaries, 
to look after the remaining 5%.” 1 use a less strict confidence level at 95% to estimate VaR and 
ES. Table 7 shows that the results are strongly consistent with my main findings, and show even 
stronger magnitudes of respective coefficients in all model specifications. This indicates that the 
multivariate models estimated using tail risk measures at the 95% confidence interval are more 
resilient than those estimated using tail risk measures at the 99% confidence interval. However, 1 
do not use the 95% confidence interval, as a main confidence level in my study, to be consistent 
with the suggested practice by the authorities (e.g., the Basel Accord) as highlighted in Section 
2.4.1.
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Table 6: Multivariate Regression Models with Merton distance to default (DD) 
Variable      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11) 
VAR3M1  4.396***          
   (0.548)          
VAR6M1   4.323***         
    (0.535)         
VAR1Y1    2.817***        
     (0.596)        
VAR3Y1     3.124***       
      (0.469)       
VAR5Y1      2.459***      
       (0.307)      
ES3M1       1.910***     
        (0.253)     
ES6M1        2.531***    
         (0.289)    
ES1Y1         2.194***   
          (0.319)   
ES3Y1          3.133***  
           (0.447)  
ES5Y1           2.501*** 
            (0.322) 
TEGTA -0.075 -0.082 -0.062 -0.040 -0.069 -0.076 -0.076 -0.050 -0.028 -0.048 -0.081 
  (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) 
CR -0.008 -0.019** -0.018** -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ROA -1.834*** -1.019** -1.007** -1.072** -1.113*** -1.374*** -1.301*** -1.182*** -1.099** -1.057** -1.333*** 
  (0.408) (0.445) (0.443) (0.438) (0.417) (0.414) (0.428) (0.431) (0.428) (0.416) (0.414) 
IETL 0.312 0.066 0.106 0.206 0.006 0.057 0.189 0.192 0.215 0.052 0.070 
  (0.242) (0.246) (0.246) (0.242) (0.243) (0.246) (0.242) (0.243) (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) 
RELGTA 0.186*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
LGTA 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
_cons -0.707*** -0.702*** -0.698*** -0.705*** -0.655*** -0.650*** -0.702*** -0.705*** -0.702*** -0.673*** -0.669*** 
  (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 9676 9557 9567 9595 9654 9662 9651 9629 9622 9662 9669 
R-squared  0.020 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.028 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the probability of default 
estimated using Merton distance to default (DD). Column (1) reports regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report 
respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of 
bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression 
models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression Models with 95% confidence level of tail risk measures 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M5  8.158***          
   (0.617)          
VAR6M5   9.109***         
    (0.673)         
VAR1Y5    5.613***        
     (1.258)        
VAR3Y5     5.584**       
      (2.637)       
VAR5Y5      4.836*      
       (2.547)      
ES3M5       5.159***     
        (0.386)     
ES6M5        4.626***    
         (0.359)    
ES1Y5         2.472***   
          (0.329)   
ES3Y5          2.667***  
           (0.383)  
ES5Y5           2.068*** 
            (0.377) 
TEGTA -2.256** -2.029* -1.879* -1.904* -2.424** -2.637** -2.006* -1.753* -1.970* -2.358** -2.513** 
  (1.081) (1.067) (1.071) (1.099) (1.085) (1.078) (1.066) (1.075) (1.093) (1.089) (1.084) 
CR 0.750*** 0.637*** 0.620*** 0.682*** 0.699*** 0.718*** 0.654*** 0.663*** 0.705*** 0.715*** 0.725*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.061) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
ROE -3.135*** -2.544*** -2.480*** -2.661*** -2.750*** -2.885*** -2.566*** -2.586*** -2.779*** -2.856*** -2.990*** 
  (0.145) (0.157) (0.160) (0.171) (0.202) (0.173) (0.153) (0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.149) 
IETL 12.679*** 9.267*** 9.310*** 10.709*** 10.001*** 10.722*** 9.785*** 10.331*** 11.514*** 10.673*** 11.310*** 
  (1.475) (1.512) (1.523) (1.555) (1.776) (1.703) (1.500) (1.500) (1.499) (1.475) (1.476) 
RELGTA 1.221*** 1.074*** 1.063*** 1.126*** 1.116*** 1.174*** 1.096*** 1.114*** 1.169*** 1.181*** 1.213*** 
  (0.231) (0.229) (0.230) (0.235) (0.236) (0.234) (0.229) (0.229) (0.233) (0.232) (0.232) 
LGTA 0.231*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.209*** 0.217*** 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
_cons -8.023*** -7.932*** -7.994*** -8.104*** -8.025*** -8.106*** -7.955*** -7.980*** -8.021*** -7.792*** -7.874*** 
  (0.542) (0.542) (0.545) (0.550) (0.547) (0.544) (0.539) (0.541) (0.542) (0.538) (0.534) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9618 9521 9487 9440 9368 9348 9597 9578 9548 9451 9435 
R-squared  0.230 0.254 0.257 0.246 0.250 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.241 0.246 0.240 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-
score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective multivariate regression 
estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 95% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression estimates 
supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 95% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-
squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression models include year and BHC 
fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Bank Size  
The variances in banks’ incentives, engendered by size heterogeneity, may cloud the interpretation 
of my main results. This issue is addressed partly in my empirical analysis because bank size is 
controlled by including the log of gross total assets (GTA). Yet, this might not be enough due to 
intertemporal differences in some of these banks. To address this, I follow Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) and split my sample into small banks (gross total assets, or GTA, up to $1 billion), medium 
banks (GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $3 billion), and large banks (GTA exceeding $3 bil-
lion). Next, I rerun my regressions separately for these three groups. Tables 8, 9, and 10 show the 
results for small, medium and large banks, respectively. As can be seen, these results are broadly 
similar to the results of all banks because the log of GTA might capture the size effects (see Table 
5). 
In more detail, all variables across small, medium, and large banks are significant, except 
the capital (TEGTA), with signs similar to those I report in Table 5. An exception also is that the 
real estate loans (RELGTA) variable among small banks is insignificant, and the sign turns nega-
tive across most of the model specifications. This suggests that small banks do not heavily rely on 
such loans in their business strategies. Finally, among the tail risk variables, the highest magnitude 
of coefficients is generally across medium banks, followed slightly by large banks, and the lowest 
is across small banks. This implies that tail risk measures broadly perform better when bank size 
is increased.
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Table 8: Multivariate Regression Models for Small BHCs 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  3.469***          
   (0.596)          
VAR6M1   3.421***         
    (0.573)         
VAR1Y1    1.788***        
     (0.312)        
VAR3Y1     2.019***       
      (0.455)       
VAR5Y1      1.534***      
       (0.319)      
ES3M1       1.226***     
        (0.241)     
ES6M1        1.563***    
         (0.283)    
ES1Y1         1.241***   
          (0.210)   
ES3Y1          1.970***  
           (0.402)  
ES5Y1           1.513*** 
            (0.296) 
TEGTA -1.385 -0.753 -0.504 -0.607 -1.120 -1.300 -1.223 -1.001 -0.931 -0.930 -1.311 
  (1.956) (1.893) (1.877) (1.944) (1.838) (1.841) (1.942) (1.923) (1.903) (1.819) (1.838) 
CR 0.473*** 0.418*** 0.400*** 0.438*** 0.421*** 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.452*** 0.457*** 0.424*** 0.461*** 
  (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.100) (0.100) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
ROE -2.994*** -2.517*** -2.502*** -2.610*** -2.704*** -2.791*** -2.735*** -2.677*** -2.690*** -2.657*** -2.806*** 
  (0.290) (0.319) (0.322) (0.301) (0.302) (0.292) (0.299) (0.303) (0.301) (0.302) (0.291) 
IETL 11.652*** 9.277*** 9.453*** 10.796*** 8.759*** 9.233*** 10.576*** 10.205*** 10.761*** 9.249*** 9.476*** 
  (2.844) (2.812) (2.843) (2.828) (2.819) (2.761) (2.836) (2.861) (2.827) (2.818) (2.771) 
RELGTA 0.002 -0.045 -0.123 -0.196 -0.186 -0.140 -0.045 -0.016 -0.131 -0.236 -0.172 
  (0.453) (0.433) (0.433) (0.444) (0.436) (0.437) (0.446) (0.449) (0.443) (0.436) (0.436) 
LGTA 0.447*** 0.456*** 0.473*** 0.452*** 0.409*** 0.383*** 0.452*** 0.442*** 0.424*** 0.416*** 0.392*** 
  (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.115) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115) 
_cons -9.876*** -10.217*** -10.442*** -10.069*** -9.456*** -9.125*** -10.033*** -9.972*** -9.698*** -9.601*** -9.256*** 
  (1.585) (1.545) (1.534) (1.561) (1.529) (1.529) (1.579) (1.569) (1.575) (1.537) (1.531) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2551 2503 2511 2516 2539 2542 2542 2534 2530 2543 2547 
R-squared  0.193 0.215 0.219 0.206 0.223 0.214 0.203 0.210 0.208 0.225 0.216 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using subsample (small BHCs with less than $1B of GTA) of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) 
report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of 
bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression 
models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 9: Multivariate Regression Models for Medium BHCs 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  5.775***          
   (0.710)          
VAR6M1   4.890***         
    (0.669)         
VAR1Y1    3.350***        
     (0.770)        
VAR3Y1     3.941***       
      (0.582)       
VAR5Y1      2.939***      
       (0.422)      
ES3M1       2.361***     
        (0.406)     
ES6M1        2.484***    
         (0.355)    
ES1Y1         1.626***   
          (0.273)   
ES3Y1          3.021***  
           (0.351)  
ES5Y1           3.178*** 
            (0.441) 
TEGTA -0.754 0.655 0.587 0.161 0.288 -0.230 -0.397 0.304 0.058 0.530 -0.046 
  (2.141) (2.172) (2.174) (2.136) (2.053) (2.047) (2.101) (2.148) (2.134) (2.031) (1.957) 
CR 0.782*** 0.634*** 0.677*** 0.715*** 0.681*** 0.731*** 0.717*** 0.727*** 0.762*** 0.722*** 0.723*** 
  (0.101) (0.094) (0.096) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.097) (0.098) (0.101) (0.099) (0.099) 
ROE -3.200*** -2.579*** -2.524*** -2.627*** -2.602*** -2.881*** -2.736*** -2.737*** -2.804*** -2.494*** -2.763*** 
  (0.250) (0.268) (0.265) (0.276) (0.257) (0.248) (0.263) (0.255) (0.273) (0.269) (0.255) 
IETL 15.926*** 13.131*** 13.317*** 13.727*** 10.707*** 11.884*** 14.477*** 14.161*** 14.659*** 13.188*** 12.869*** 
  (3.040) (3.164) (3.160) (3.095) (3.137) (3.074) (3.040) (3.042) (3.024) (2.950) (2.956) 
RELGTA 1.294*** 0.931** 1.140*** 1.190*** 1.073*** 1.077*** 1.184*** 1.261*** 1.247*** 1.136*** 1.068*** 
  (0.386) (0.400) (0.411) (0.403) (0.404) (0.391) (0.402) (0.405) (0.384) (0.388) (0.386) 
LGTA 0.551*** 0.529*** 0.515*** 0.520*** 0.453*** 0.449*** 0.515*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.457*** 0.464*** 
  (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.102) (0.101) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.102) (0.100) 
_cons -12.653*** -12.576*** -12.477*** -12.460*** -11.512*** -11.391*** -12.292*** -12.296*** -12.230*** -11.696*** -11.726*** 
  (1.467) (1.448) (1.461) (1.472) (1.416) (1.403) (1.453) (1.459) (1.474) (1.415) (1.388) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2999 2959 2958 2971 2991 2995 2986 2980 2979 2993 2996 
R-squared  0.262 0.293 0.288 0.281 0.309 0.295 0.281 0.285 0.277 0.314 0.301 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using subsample (medium BHCs with GTA between $1B and $3B) of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns 
(2) to (6) report respective regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of 
bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression 
models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 10: Multivariate Regression Models for Large BHCs 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  4.396***          
   (0.548)          
VAR6M1   4.323***         
    (0.535)         
VAR1Y1    2.817***        
     (0.596)        
VAR3Y1     3.124***       
      (0.469)       
VAR5Y1      2.459***      
       (0.307)      
ES3M1       1.910***     
        (0.253)     
ES6M1        2.531***    
         (0.289)    
ES1Y1         2.194***   
          (0.319)   
ES3Y1          3.133***  
           (0.447)  
ES5Y1           2.501*** 
            (0.322) 
TEGTA 0.249 0.138 0.269 0.402 0.079 -0.438 0.255 0.140 0.185 0.152 -0.258 
  (1.936) (1.921) (1.936) (1.925) (1.899) (1.873) (1.906) (1.937) (1.908) (1.913) (1.877) 
CR 0.861*** 0.754*** 0.740*** 0.785*** 0.714*** 0.764*** 0.793*** 0.774*** 0.765*** 0.724*** 0.768*** 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) 
ROE -2.782*** -2.358*** -2.291*** -2.287*** -2.336*** -2.511*** -2.516*** -2.360*** -2.419*** -2.258*** -2.486*** 
  (0.220) (0.228) (0.233) (0.232) (0.213) (0.209) (0.221) (0.227) (0.213) (0.214) (0.206) 
IETL 14.430*** 10.829*** 11.054*** 11.866*** 9.729*** 9.876*** 12.607*** 12.144*** 12.085*** 9.149*** 10.017*** 
  (2.314) (2.327) (2.281) (2.268) (2.227) (2.215) (2.291) (2.281) (2.244) (2.217) (2.205) 
RELGTA 1.717*** 1.471*** 1.474*** 1.630*** 1.375*** 1.225*** 1.571*** 1.560*** 1.612*** 1.227*** 1.202*** 
  (0.410) (0.409) (0.409) (0.411) (0.405) (0.400) (0.403) (0.405) (0.410) (0.415) (0.405) 
LGTA 0.143** 0.104* 0.104* 0.119** 0.088 0.089 0.124** 0.123** 0.120** 0.093* 0.100* 
  (0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) 
_cons -7.411*** -6.829*** -6.870*** -7.151*** -6.518*** -6.412*** -7.139*** -7.160*** -7.132*** -6.594*** -6.637*** 
  (0.943) (0.905) (0.892) (0.895) (0.860) (0.848) (0.918) (0.910) (0.898) (0.861) (0.847) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4068 4038 4042 4050 4067 4068 4065 4057 4055 4068 4068 
R-squared  0.212 0.232 0.233 0.233 0.263 0.254 0.227 0.230 0.237 0.267 0.255 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using subsample (small BHCs with more than $3B of GTA) of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) 
report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of 
bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression 
models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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4.4.4 Additional Control Variables  
I augment the multivariate models by introducing additional control variables to ensure robustness 
of my main results, and test whether these variables significantly affect the probability of bank 
distress. Following Berger et al. (2016), I include the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
market concentration based on each bank’s weighted deposits at state level to proxy for the 
competition.48 I also include economic variables at the state level—GDP growth proxied by annual 
personal income and inflation rate measured using house price index growth—the latter of which 
could affect bank stability because real estates are used by banks as collaterals, thereby changes in 
real estate prices allow banks to partially recover the collaterals in case of defaulted mortgage 
loans (Berger et al., 2016). These variables are broadly used in the empirical literature on bank 
risk (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Buch et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2017). Table 11 reports the 
results. As shown, they are very similar to the results without these factors (see Table 5). These 
results also indicate that the market power of banks has an insignificant positive influence on bank 
stability. This can be supported by the “competition-stability” view, more market power in the 
loan market may result in higher bank risk and a higher probability of failure (e.g., Boyd and De 
Nicoló, 2005; Schaeck et al., 2009).  However, house price inflation and GDP growth show 
significantly negative values, suggesting that declining real estate prices and negative GDP growth 
increase the likelihood of banks’ default.  This is consistent with the findings by Berger et al. 
(2016).
                                                          
48 HHI is calculated by summing the squared percentage of deposits share of each bank in the market (State). 
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Table 11: Multivariate Regression Models with Control Variables 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  3.807***          
   (0.358)          
VAR6M1   3.610***         
    (0.346)         
VAR1Y1    2.167***        
     (0.262)        
VAR3Y1     2.671***       
      (0.297)       
VAR5Y1      2.007***      
       (0.208)      
ES3M1       1.573***     
        (0.168)     
ES6M1        1.875***    
         (0.182)    
ES1Y1         1.571***   
          (0.139)   
ES3Y1          2.554***  
           (0.236)  
ES5Y1           2.046*** 
            (0.208) 
TEGTA -3.582*** -3.125*** -2.995*** -3.076*** -3.090*** -3.334*** -3.356*** -3.175*** -3.058*** -2.832*** -3.294*** 
  (1.065) (1.069) (1.072) (1.077) (1.036) (1.023) (1.060) (1.070) (1.066) (1.031) (1.009) 
CR 0.646*** 0.585*** 0.582*** 0.609*** 0.583*** 0.618*** 0.622*** 0.616*** 0.615*** 0.593*** 0.616*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
ROE -2.834*** -2.428*** -2.388*** -2.460*** -2.485*** -2.641*** -2.568*** -2.509*** -2.524*** -2.389*** -2.610*** 
  (0.141) (0.154) (0.153) (0.151) (0.147) (0.141) (0.145) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) (0.141) 
IETL 7.911*** 5.963*** 6.045*** 6.734*** 5.133*** 5.787*** 6.961*** 6.689*** 6.853*** 5.560*** 6.093*** 
  (1.504) (1.538) (1.534) (1.510) (1.501) (1.481) (1.506) (1.513) (1.498) (1.473) (1.463) 
RELGTA 0.626*** 0.598** 0.611*** 0.609** 0.576** 0.544** 0.612*** 0.641*** 0.610*** 0.511** 0.518** 
  (0.236) (0.234) (0.235) (0.236) (0.231) (0.228) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.230) (0.227) 
LGTA 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.139*** 0.130*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.150*** 0.144*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
GHPI -2.821*** -2.679*** -2.712*** -2.722*** -2.212*** -2.090*** -2.740*** -2.712*** -2.759*** -2.183*** -2.082*** 
  (0.279) (0.275) (0.272) (0.274) (0.272) (0.279) (0.274) (0.273) (0.273) (0.267) (0.276) 
GCPI -3.323*** -1.805*** -1.797*** -2.515*** -2.777*** -3.355*** -2.557*** -2.388*** -2.649*** -2.756*** -3.362*** 
  (0.468) (0.476) (0.477) (0.469) (0.463) (0.462) (0.472) (0.472) (0.459) (0.464) (0.462) 
HHI 0.040 0.046 0.036 0.048 -0.005 0.030 0.046 0.023 0.027 -0.005 0.035 
  (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.141) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.142) (0.140) 
_cons -6.320*** -6.604*** -6.633*** -6.524*** -6.156*** -5.970*** -6.478*** -6.537*** -6.451*** -6.376*** -6.207*** 
  (0.536) (0.546) (0.543) (0.539) (0.521) (0.511) (0.541) (0.538) (0.535) (0.524) (0.511) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9618 9500 9511 9537 9597 9605 9593 9571 9564 9604 9611 
R-squared  0.230 0.251 0.251 0.245 0.272 0.264 0.244 0.247 0.248 0.277 0.265 
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Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-
score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective multivariate regression 
estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression estimates 
supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-
squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients (except competition, and macroeconomic variables) are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 
year. All regression models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
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4.4.5 Financial Crises 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) recognise that the influence of financial crises most likely varies and 
depends on the source of crisis. For instance, a crisis that started in the banking sector is different 
in impact from one that started in the capital markets. Thus, it is interesting to investigate the extent 
to which my results hold during crises. I follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) in defining periods 
for banking crises (the credit crunch 1990–1992 and subprime lending crisis 2007– 2009) and 
market crises (the 1987 stock market crash, the dot.com bubble and the September 11 terrorist 
attack 2000–2002).49 
These crises have had a significant impact on the health of the U.S. banking system and on 
the soundness of individual banks. To control for possible effects on the reliability of my findings, 
Ire-estimate my main analyses controlling for the years of crises.50 Table 12 reports the results. As 
can be seen, these results verify my main findings, suggesting that my main results are not affected 
by the financial crises. In addition, I find that both banking crises have positive relationships with 
bank risk, and only the recent crisis is significant, whereas the market crises have negative 
relationships with bank risk, and are only significant in some model specifications. These findings 
are generally intuitive as defaulted banks (banking crises) have direct and adverse effects on other 
banks in the sector but vary in terms of significance levels. Nonetheless, market crashes most likely 
have an indirect and less stringent impact on banks’ failure risk. This is in line with Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), who show that higher capital helps banks improve the probability of surviving 
during banking crises.
                                                          
49 Note that stock market crash omitted due to collinearity. 
50 I use dummy variables indicating whether the years are on crises. See Table 1 for further information on definition 
of all variables. 
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Table 12: Multivariate Regression Models with Financial Crises 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  3.519***          
   (0.357)          
VAR6M1   3.363***         
    (0.335)         
VAR1Y1    2.116***        
     (0.252)        
VAR3Y1     2.628***       
      (0.290)       
VAR5Y1      1.911***      
       (0.191)      
ES3M1       1.504***     
        (0.162)     
ES6M1        1.825***    
         (0.173)    
ES1Y1         1.543***   
          (0.135)   
ES3Y1          2.506***  
           (0.231)  
ES5Y1           1.963*** 
            (0.195) 
TEGTA -2.516** -2.248** -2.123** -2.093** -2.196** -2.386** -2.402** -2.248** -2.112** -1.968* -2.361** 
  (1.038) (1.046) (1.048) (1.050) (1.019) (1.011) (1.033) (1.044) (1.039) (1.016) (1.000) 
CR 0.783*** 0.698*** 0.695*** 0.731*** 0.683*** 0.725*** 0.745*** 0.734*** 0.737*** 0.694*** 0.724*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
ROE -3.110*** -2.679*** -2.637*** -2.708*** -2.697*** -2.872*** -2.828*** -2.752*** -2.774*** -2.601*** -2.841*** 
  (0.143) (0.157) (0.156) (0.154) (0.150) (0.143) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.150) (0.143) 
IETL 4.953** 5.494** 5.262** 4.868** 2.836 3.470 5.147** 5.121** 4.938** 3.684* 3.709* 
  (2.201) (2.211) (2.211) (2.213) (2.203) (2.189) (2.207) (2.214) (2.195) (2.163) (2.169) 
RELGTA 0.663*** 0.693*** 0.688*** 0.667*** 0.637*** 0.618*** 0.667*** 0.702*** 0.664*** 0.575** 0.588*** 
  (0.232) (0.231) (0.231) (0.232) (0.228) (0.225) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.227) (0.224) 
LGTA 0.115*** 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
SL 0.055 0.025 0.032 0.045 0.088 0.084 0.039 0.042 0.049 0.071 0.079 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
GFC 0.633*** 0.471*** 0.494*** 0.554*** 0.481*** 0.467*** 0.558*** 0.539*** 0.568*** 0.465*** 0.469*** 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Dot -0.037 -0.093** -0.094** -0.067 -0.046 -0.025 -0.064 -0.078* -0.074* -0.053 -0.022 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
_cons -5.925*** -6.490*** -6.441*** -6.237*** -5.923*** -5.856*** -6.204*** -6.285*** -6.169*** -6.192*** -6.066*** 
  (0.555) (0.572) (0.566) (0.561) (0.547) (0.540) (0.563) (0.561) (0.556) (0.546) (0.539) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9618 9500 9511 9537 9597 9605 9593 9571 9564 9604 9611 
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R-squared  0.254 0.265 0.267 0.265 0.285 0.276 0.263 0.266 0.268 0.290 0.277 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-
score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective multivariate regression 
estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression estimates 
supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-
squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients (except financial crises dummy variables) are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All 
regression models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
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4.4.6 Excluding Mergers and Acquisitions 
Numerous banks typically exit my sample because they were acquired by another institution or 
merged with another bank. This can lead to a re-evaluation of financial statements which may 
affect the analysis (Goetz, 2018). To investigate the impact of mergers and/or acquisitions on the 
main results, I exclude the non-surviving banks that were acquired or merged. The results from 
this sample are presented in Table 13. I find that the main results presented in Table 5 are robust 
to the impact of mergers and/or acquisitions and remain unchanged. 
4.4.7 Excluding TBTF Banks 
To avoid potential safety net issues associated with “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) policies involving 
large organisations (Curry et al., 2007), I re-estimate my main analyses while excluding these 
banks. In the absence of a formal definition of TBTF, I follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) and 
consider all banks with gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $50 billion to be TBTF, which is con-
sistent with the definition of systemically-important banks in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The results summarised in Table 14 indicate that the main 
results in Table 5 are still strongly significant. An exception is the capital ratio (TEGTA); it is 
insignificant in most model specifications.
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Table 13: Multivariate Regression Models without Mergers and Acquisitions  
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  4.363***          
   (0.434)          
VAR6M1   3.955***         
    (0.431)         
VAR1Y1    2.148***        
     (0.351)        
VAR3Y1     2.709***       
      (0.379)       
VAR5Y1      2.113***      
       (0.242)      
ES3M1       1.854***     
        (0.234)     
ES6M1        2.249***    
         (0.261)    
ES1Y1         1.574***   
          (0.208)   
ES3Y1          2.749***  
           (0.352)  
ES5Y1           2.190*** 
            (0.251) 
TEGTA -2.454* -2.122 -1.963 -2.034 -2.056 -2.245* -2.321* -2.140 -1.971 -1.700 -2.172* 
  (1.363) (1.347) (1.348) (1.356) (1.325) (1.313) (1.348) (1.354) (1.355) (1.326) (1.294) 
CR 0.844*** 0.729*** 0.733*** 0.785*** 0.728*** 0.775*** 0.786*** 0.775*** 0.793*** 0.731*** 0.774*** 
  (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) 
ROE -3.398*** -2.863*** -2.814*** -2.992*** -2.964*** -3.122*** -3.043*** -2.957*** -3.041*** -2.817*** -3.074*** 
  (0.181) (0.198) (0.202) (0.195) (0.192) (0.182) (0.191) (0.193) (0.192) (0.202) (0.184) 
IETL 14.634*** 11.650*** 11.926*** 12.969*** 10.421*** 10.643*** 12.967*** 12.559*** 13.095*** 10.477*** 10.851*** 
  (2.068) (2.080) (2.079) (2.059) (2.067) (2.040) (2.068) (2.077) (2.063) (2.031) (2.018) 
RELGTA 1.250*** 1.112*** 1.166*** 1.186*** 1.050*** 0.991*** 1.183*** 1.214*** 1.205*** 0.975*** 0.967*** 
  (0.272) (0.272) (0.273) (0.272) (0.269) (0.264) (0.271) (0.271) (0.270) (0.270) (0.263) 
LGTA 0.206*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.199*** 0.195*** 0.200*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
_cons -7.780*** -7.687*** -7.767*** -7.854*** -7.257*** -7.090*** -7.770*** -7.783*** -7.850*** -7.489*** -7.331*** 
  (0.712) (0.712) (0.711) (0.712) (0.691) (0.677) (0.707) (0.707) (0.710) (0.689) (0.677) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5792 5752 5759 5777 5788 5788 5787 5780 5783 5789 5791 
R-squared  0.245 0.265 0.264 0.258 0.283 0.277 0.258 0.262 0.258 0.287 0.279 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample (exclude Mergers and Acquisitions) of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) 
report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of 
bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression 
models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 14: Multivariate Regression Models without Too-Big-To-Fail 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  4.709***          
   (0.375)          
VAR6M1   4.303***         
    (0.363)         
VAR1Y1    2.693***        
     (0.325)        
VAR3Y1     3.122***       
      (0.356)       
VAR5Y1      2.406***      
       (0.252)      
ES3M1       1.925***     
        (0.186)     
ES6M1        2.209***    
         (0.194)    
ES1Y1         1.744***   
          (0.153)   
ES3Y1          2.835***  
           (0.269)  
ES5Y1           2.431*** 
            (0.252) 
TEGTA -2.034* -1.598 -1.485 -1.459 -1.531 -1.766 -1.897* -1.662 -1.512 -1.295 -1.715 
  (1.125) (1.119) (1.119) (1.131) (1.095) (1.076) (1.112) (1.123) (1.123) (1.090) (1.061) 
CR 0.762*** 0.667*** 0.668*** 0.704*** 0.669*** 0.709*** 0.723*** 0.715*** 0.719*** 0.684*** 0.707*** 
  (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
ROE -3.136*** -2.580*** -2.545*** -2.651*** -2.672*** -2.862*** -2.787*** -2.711*** -2.770*** -2.581*** -2.828*** 
  (0.151) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165) (0.159) (0.150) (0.156) (0.157) (0.155) (0.158) (0.150) 
IETL 11.772*** 8.805*** 9.028*** 10.095*** 7.730*** 8.319*** 10.346*** 9.997*** 10.524*** 8.413*** 8.768*** 
  (1.555) (1.589) (1.577) (1.557) (1.559) (1.531) (1.559) (1.564) (1.550) (1.525) (1.509) 
RELGTA 1.117*** 0.980*** 1.018*** 1.053*** 0.955*** 0.922*** 1.057*** 1.083*** 1.061*** 0.887*** 0.894*** 
  (0.241) (0.240) (0.241) (0.242) (0.237) (0.232) (0.240) (0.240) (0.239) (0.237) (0.231) 
LGTA 0.241*** 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.232*** 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.203*** 0.205*** 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
_cons -8.077*** -8.092*** -8.094*** -8.092*** -7.514*** -7.408*** -8.059*** -8.072*** -8.043*** -7.756*** -7.711*** 
  (0.576) (0.589) (0.583) (0.585) (0.568) (0.557) (0.583) (0.578) (0.578) (0.568) (0.556) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8913 8800 8811 8836 8892 8900 8888 8868 8862 8899 8906 
R-squared  0.232 0.255 0.254 0.248 0.272 0.264 0.247 0.250 0.250 0.276 0.265 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample (exclude Too-Big-To-Fail with $50B of GTA or more) of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 4.2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective 
multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression 
estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-squared. 
See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level and are lagged by 1 year. All regression models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. 
Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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4.4.8 Endogeneity Issues  
It is well-known that endogeneity problems often cloud empirical results. However, it may be 
difficult to know whether I have detected these problems. Following  Hagendorff et al. (2018) and 
others, I address simultaneity, as a notorious type of endogeneity issues, by regressing the bank 
failure risk on longer lagged values of tail risk based on the argument that such historical values 
are largely predetermined (Faleye, 2007). I lag the values of tail risk and all other bank character-
istics by 3 years. This further reduces the potential impact of endogeneity on the bank distress risk-
tail risk relationship. As Table 15 shows, I obtain similar results to the findings reported in Table 
5. This suggests that it is highly unlikely that my main results are clouded by endogeneity issues 
(i.e., simultaneity). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper explores the extent to which the information content of market variables may be useful 
as signals of financial fragility in banks. Using a sample of the U.S. listed bank holding companies 
(BHCs) between 1987 and 2017, I empirically investigate the impact of tail risk measures namely, 
value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), on bank distress. I hypothesise that BHCs with 
higher extreme negative daily equity returns experience higher tail risk, thereby a higher likelihood 
of financial distress. 
In support of my hypothesis, the univariate regression results show a significant and positive 
relationship between banks’ distress likelihood and respective tail risk measures (estimated using 
daily returns for three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, and five-year rolling windows). 
Subsequently, I develop multivariate regression models using the fixed effects to examine the role 
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of tail risk measures alongside accounting-related indicators, typically based on traditional 
CAMEL categories, in predicting banks’ financial distress. 
Empirical results show that proxies for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earn-
ings and liquidity, as well as real estate loans, are still central determinants of bank distress risk as 
documented in the literature (e.g., Cole and White, 2012). However, the tail risk measures play a 
substantial role in explaining the likelihood of banks’ distress risk. More precisely, I find that all 
rolling estimates of VaR and ES measures are significant and positively linked to the probability 
of banks’ distress risk. These results also support my hypothesis that banks with more frequent 
extreme negative daily equity returns are more likely to experience financial distress. 
The main results are robust to endogeneity issues (i.e., simultaneity) and numerous other 
robustness analyses, including the heterogeneity of bank size, the use of an alternative dependent 
variable, the employment of an alternative confidence level to estimate tail risk measures, and 
other control variables (e.g., financial crises and macroeconomic factors). 
My study suggests that it is crucial to assign strong emphasis to market-based variables, 
especially tail risk measures, alongside accounting-based variables in determining bank stability. 
This provides clear implications, which might assist regulators, supervisors, managers, and other 
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Table 15: Multivariate Regression Models With 3-Year Lag 
Variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VAR3M1  1.613***          
   (0.364)          
VAR6M1   1.197***         
    (0.337)         
VAR1Y1    0.679***        
     (0.242)        
VAR3Y1     1.732***       
      (0.279)       
VAR5Y1      2.351***      
       (0.343)      
ES3M1       0.709***     
        (0.193)     
ES6M1        0.555**    
         (0.218)    
ES1Y1         0.479***   
          (0.183)   
ES3Y1          1.693***  
           (0.265)  
ES5Y1           2.327*** 
            (0.339) 
TEGTA -1.003 -0.869 -0.886 -0.884 -0.950 -1.255 -0.892 -0.971 -0.870 -0.768 -1.117 
  (1.570) (1.567) (1.569) (1.574) (1.551) (1.530) (1.564) (1.566) (1.567) (1.538) (1.513) 
CR 0.084 0.040 0.049 0.065 0.026 0.036 0.061 0.063 0.067 0.024 0.032 
  (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) 
ROE -0.732*** -0.566*** -0.598*** -0.636*** -0.512** -0.464** -0.619*** -0.658*** -0.649*** -0.459** -0.446** 
  (0.199) (0.206) (0.204) (0.202) (0.201) (0.197) (0.204) (0.202) (0.200) (0.198) (0.196) 
IETL 28.193*** 27.274*** 27.386*** 27.653*** 25.931*** 24.934*** 27.615*** 27.715*** 27.728*** 25.984*** 25.341*** 
  (1.992) (1.972) (1.978) (1.988) (1.990) (2.003) (1.965) (1.979) (1.987) (1.977) (1.977) 
RELGTA 2.522*** 2.516*** 2.528*** 2.490*** 2.417*** 2.293*** 2.504*** 2.538*** 2.503*** 2.376*** 2.277*** 
  (0.342) (0.344) (0.345) (0.344) (0.338) (0.331) (0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.337) (0.331) 
LGTA 0.476*** 0.472*** 0.468*** 0.472*** 0.452*** 0.429*** 0.473*** 0.471*** 0.473*** 0.459*** 0.447*** 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
_cons -12.745*** -12.763*** -12.708*** -12.725*** -12.452*** -12.103*** -12.743*** -12.721*** -12.747*** -12.593*** -12.412*** 
  (0.774) (0.775) (0.775) (0.772) (0.758) (0.755) (0.770) (0.771) (0.772) (0.759) (0.752) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7699 7650 7666 7687 7695 7697 7691 7686 7694 7696 7698 
R-squared  0.116 0.120 0.119 0.117 0.128 0.145 0.118 0.118 0.117 0.128 0.144 
Notes: This table reports results of multivariate OLS regressions estimated using my sample of bank-year observations over the period 1987–2017. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. Column (1) reports 
multivariate regression estimates (baseline model) that employ only accounting variables discussed in Section 2.4.2. Columns (2) to (6) report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the tail risk measure 
(3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year) at 99% confidence level. Columns (7) to (11) report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the tail risk measure (3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-
year) at 99% confidence level. The last 2 rows of this table provide total number of bank-year observations and R-squared. See Table 1 for further information on definition of respective variables. All coefficients are winsorized 
at the 1% level and are lagged by 3 years. All regression models include year and BHC fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the BHC-year level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5. THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary 
Inspired by the aftermath of financial crises, the serious threat of risks to bank stability, the 
large number of bank failures, the authorities requirements (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act of  2010 
and the Basel III framework), and the demand to focus on some aspects that have not been fully 
investigated in the empirical literature of bank risk, this thesis analyses distinctive lines of 
research on risks in banks. The primary objectives of this thesis are to address the important 
gaps in the literature and enhance the understanding about the bank risk. To that end, three 
empirical essays are pursued. 
In first essay (chapter 2), I provide a comprehensive analysis of bank failures by 
developing separate early-warning models for small, medium, and large banks, and report any 
differences in comparison to all bank failure prediction models, irrespective of bank size. I 
apply univariate regression analysis as a variable selection technique to examine the relative 
importance of accounting-based variables that have been used in bank failure literature and 
compare the consistency (statistical significance and average marginal effects (AMEs)) of these 
covariates across size categories. I also propose an econometric method on multivariate model 
building strategy based on variables’ AMEs and their inter-temporal discrimination ability. 
Empirical results show that factors affecting bank failure and the magnitudes of 
mutually significant factors (AMEs) vary across small, medium, and large banks. Further 
interesting results of this essay are as follows. First, credit risk has a significant impact on bank 
failure probability across size classes and for the three-time lagged periods, implying that weak 
assets quality, represented by net charge off, past due 90+ days, loan loss reserves, and other 
real estate owned, increases the risk of failure. Second, small banks are most likely to fail if 
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they have high deposit ratios, are more cost inefficient, and have a high liquidity risk, while 
medium and large banks with poor capital and low net interest margins are more likely to fail.  
Finally, I perform several robustness tests and the main results remain valid. Moreover, 
the AUROC of all multivariate models developed across bank size classes for out-of-sample 
have an excellent performance for different forecast horizons.  
 My second essay (chapter 3) explores the systematic trend in bank risk measured by 
liquidity risk and credit risk, and examines potential explanations for this trend. I find a strong 
evidence of a positive trend in bank risk over the sample period, 1980-2017. I explain the 
increase in bank risk is the result of successive cohorts of young and riskier banks, and the risk 
differences across these cohorts persist. Moreover, the cohort risk phenomenon is significantly 
attenuated once I account for new cohorts’ bank-specific characteristics including brokered 
deposits, commercial real estate loans, capital, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest 
income. In other words, the adoption of business strategy that is based on higher brokered 
deposits, commercial real estate loans, off-balance sheet items, and non-interest income and 
lower capital by each new cohort is responsible for the cohort risk phenomenon. I perform a 
set of robustness checks and the main results are qualitatively unchanged. 
The third essay (chapter 4) empirically investigates the impact of tail risk measures 
namely, value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), on bank distress. I hypothesise that 
BHCs with higher extreme negative daily equity returns experience higher tail risk, thereby a 
higher likelihood of financial distress. 
In support of my hypothesis, the univariate regression results show a significant and pos-
itive relationship between banks’ distress likelihood and respective tail risk measures (esti-
mated using daily returns for three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, and five-year roll-
ing windows). Subsequently, I develop multivariate regression models using the fixed effects 
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to examine the role of tail risk measures alongside accounting-related indicators, typically 
based on traditional CAMEL categories, in predicting banks’ financial distress. 
Empirical results show that proxies for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, 
earnings and liquidity, as well as real estate loans, are still central determinants of bank distress 
risk as documented in the literature (e.g., Cole and White, 2012). However, the tail risk 
measures play a substantial role in explaining the likelihood of banks’ distress risk. More pre-
cisely, I find that all rolling estimates of VaR and ES measures are significant and positively 
linked to the probability of banks’ distress risk. These results also support my hypothesis that 
banks with more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns are more likely to experience 
financial distress. The main results are robust to numerous sensitivity analyses. Finally, this 
essay suggests that it is crucial to assign strong emphasis to market-based variables, especially 
tail risk measures, alongside accounting-based variables in determining bank stability.  
Overall, my thesis makes a crucial contribution to the literature by providing new and 
deeper insights into the understanding of bank risk. It also strongly supports recent regulatory 
reforms to enhance the stability of the banking sector to avoid the adverse effects on whole 
economy. In addition, my thesis should interest all parties including bank managers, 
supervisors, policy makers, and researchers who attempt to prevent future banking crises.  
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this thesis presents strong results and offers several policy implications, it has 
its limits as other empirical studies. 
The key limit to the first essay (chapter 2) is the information content of market-based 
indicators. Due to the great majority of commercial banks in the United States are not publicly 
traded, I focus on financial ratios based on accounting data. This limitation presents an 
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opportunity for future work by using sample of publicly listed banks in developed and/or 
developing countries, and replicating my analysis supplemented with market-based measures. 
The potential limit to the second essay (chapter 3) is the suggested reasons for cohort risk 
phenomenon. While this essay provides several valuable explanations for this phenomenon, I 
believe there are more factors may explain the phenomenon. Thus, number of avenues for 
further research on this topic can be considered. An interesting area for future research would 
be to explain the observed cohort risk phenomenon according to competition and/or 
macroeconomic (e.g., interest rate) factors. 
The main limit to the third essay (chapter 4) is the scarcity of actual failures among 
publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States. This restricts the 
methodology choices to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression when analysing the 
impact of tail risk exposure on the probability of bank distress. Therefore, I suggest a possible 
direction for future research by using logit regression, which is a common model for predicting 
individual bank distress, based on distress events introduced by Betz et al. (2014), including 
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